On 23 September, three Pakayaw Karen families were left destitute after their farmland in Mae Ngao National Park in the northern province of Mae Hong Son, which they claimed to use for subsistence farming, was reclaimed by officials from the Royal Forest Department (RFD). Prior to their eviction, these Karen families had been ordered by the RFD to move down from their traditional homes up on the mountains to the river basin only to be evicted again several years later.

Soybean and papaya plantations of Pakakayaw Karen tribe in Mae Ngao National Park of the northern province of Mae Hong Sorn       

“We have been living in these hills for hundreds of years; our ancestors moved down from the highlands to cultivate these lands sustainably for generations, so as to obey the Thai authorities’ order, but now some of us have again been left with no land to cultivate for food,” said Tawee Paitaimongkonboon, a Pakayaw Karen village head.

These Karen families have been growing soybeans, rice, papaya, and bananas, and collecting forest products for a living. One family of 3-5 usually shares a plot of 2-3 acres to cultivate throughout their lives.

The Forestry Department reclaims Karen farmland in Mae Ngao National Park and puts up a sign reads ‘This land is reclaimed on 24 July 2014, acre: 6-3-19, case: 106/2014. The authority reclaims this plot of land and no one can possess or reserve it’  

Down in the south, the RFD in early September used tractors to destroy the settlements of poor farmers of Plai Phaya District of Krabi Province in order to reclaim a land plot adjacent to a protected area even though the area had years ago already been turned into a palm oil plantation by capitalists. The landless villagers helplessly watched their homes being crushed.

Up in the north east, villagers who had been living in Khao Bat community Dong Yai Wildlife Sanctuary in Buriram Province since the 1960s were forced to sign an agreement drafted by the military, which stated that the signatories will leave their homes to pave the way for forest reclamation. The military told them that they would be relocated to new facilities provided in exchange for relocation, but according to Human Rights Watch, the facilities were far from adequate.  

These are examples of the junta’s attempts to protect Thailand’s green spaces after they assumed power in May. The junta announced Order No. 64/2014 on 14 June to buttress this policy and promised that encroached forests would be reclaimed. The coup makers also announced Order No. 66/2014 on 17 June, which states that poor people should not be affected by their policies. However, many human rights activists and people who are living in community forests still fear that this policy might result in large scale population displacements, especially under the current suppressive political environment under the junta.

Order No. 66/2014 stipulates that poor people and those who are living in protected areas prior to the announcement of the Order No. 64/2014 will not be affected by the policy, and that the authorities will only apply strict measures to prevent further encroachment into protected areas. However, the reality starkly differs from this rhetoric.

MIlitary officers inspect former Khao Bat community inhabitants left homeless by the eviction in June  and now resides at the temple adjacent to the sanctuary       

There are two main responses to the junta’s forest conservation policy issued after the coup. The first response is that the policy is justified because National Parks should be protected from every kind of human interference. The second response, however, opposes the junta’s hard-handed approach to forest protection and holds that people inhabiting the forests should be given an important role in protecting and managing the forests.    

Damrong Pidech, a former chief of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) and current leader of the Thai Forest Land Reclamation Party (TFLRP), has advocated the first such view for many years. He said the junta policy to tighten up land use regulations and nature conservation measures offers an opportunity for Thailand to increase its national park areas after years of encroachment and exploitation.

“In my days it was not as easy as this; sometimes RFD personnel had to act without orders from the administration, but now all public agencies have to cooperate in this and martial law is still in place, so no search warrants are needed,” said the conservationist, known for his aggressive measures against forest encroachers. “Therefore, strict measures can be applied to people who have encroached on forest land,” said Damrong.

He urged that the deep forest should remain undisturbed by human activity and that villagers should comply with the current policies on forest protection.

“Since the 2007 Community Forest Act was passed by the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), a parliament appointed by the 2006 coup group, approximately 7000 communities throughout the country have already benefited. They should be satisfied with this and refrain from settling in the deep forest,” said Damrong.

Military and the Royal Forest Department officers confiscate planks of wood the villagers in Don Yai sanctuary claimed to be using for building their houses, Buriram, northeastern Thailand. The authority, however, believes that the villagers cut the wood to sell     

The 2007 Community Forest Act was the first in Thailand to allow people living in communities whose lands overlap with areas designated as national parks to continue to stay, provided that the areas are managed sustainably by the villagers under RFD monitoring. The movement to pass the Community Forest Bill started in the 1980s. However, when the law was passed, it was not accepted by many land rights activists and villagers from forest communities because it still placed decisions on forest management solely with the RFD.      

When asked to give comments on the livelihoods of the Karen and other minorities which rely on the forest, Damrong said “The Karen who are living in the forest cannot continue with their traditional ways of life forever. Since most of them have opted for Thai citizenship, they should think of the advantages that the forests provide to the majority.”

Many believe that the Karen communities practise nomadic agriculture, a method of cultivation that extends cultivated areas without restraint, which contributes to a massive loss of forest. However, Karen communities argue that they only practice shifting cultivation, where only limited areas of the forest are sustainably cultivated in cycles of 5-7 years.

Tall trees and other vegetation retakes a plot of Karen farmland left to restore itself after a year of cultivation

In contrast, the second perspective on what the forests should be and how the resources from the forests should be managed has long been promoted by Rodjaraeg Wattanapanit.

Rodjaraeg is a well-known land rights activist from the Community Forest Support Group (CFSG) based in northern Chiang Mai province.

She believes that the communities settled in the forests before and after the forest areas were gazetted as national parks should be given the rights to live in the areas and participate in sustainable forest management.

“When the authorities look at the green areas on the satellite images, they don’t see that there are people living in the forests and afterwards tend to declare these areas as protected. This is problematic for people who have been settled in the forests because after these areas become protected national parks, the communities in the areas will be evicted,” said Rodjaraeg.

She added that the land rights problem and land encroachment cannot be separated from each other because in Thailand the distribution of land ownership throughout the nation is concentrated in the hands of the privileged few, while marginalised people are left little land to cultivate for a living.

“Although the 2007 NLA passed the Community Forest Act to allow people to establish and manage community forest areas, the conditions of this act, such as those that say that settlements need to be older than ten years to stay and that every decision on how to manage the forests has to be approved by state officials, make it nearly impossible for villagers in these communities to participate in the management of these community forests,” added the activist.

Local activists led by the Assembly of the Poor and Four Region Slum Network comes to Bangkok on June 15 to request the NCPO that the eviction must stop  

Moreover, Rodjaraeg points out that the attempts to evict people from National Parks do not apply to everyone equally. “There have always been double standards from the Royal Forest Department to evict people from their homes. Capitalists might be allowed to stay while poor villagers are often evicted,” stated the land rights activist.

This inequality in the application of the laws regarding forest protection has regularly been cited by many forest communities.

“The Royal Forest Department and the military cooperated with capitalists to try to evict our communities,” said a local activist from the Southern Peasant’s Federation of Thailand (SPFT) in Khlong Sai Pattana community in the southern province of Surat Thani, which the authorities were trying to evict in early October, in an interview with Prachatai on 30 September.

Thawee, the Pakayaw Karen village head in Mae Hong Son added that the junta does not have credibility because they have not followed their promise to leave some land for the poor.

“According to Order 66/2557, the junta’s National Council for Peace and Order promised not to evict poor people from the forest, but I have observed from many cases that they seem to only be following Order 64/2557 to reclaim the land” said the village chief.

No matter which perspective on forest conservation the junta relied on for Order 64/2557, which has now resulted in the eviction of hundreds of households of marginalised people, it is unlikely that this policy will change any time soon under the suppressive political environment of martial law.

Villagers of Khlong Sri Community in Surat Thani province rallies against junta’s policy to evict their community on 2 October. One of the banner reads: ‘We will stand for justice to protect our last land. Stop evicting the poor we will fight’

On 13 October, the military stopped a caravan of Lahu villagers who had been affected by Order 64/2557, from travelling to Bangkok to complain to the junta’s National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), according to Thai Rath.

Earlier on 16 August, fifty military officers and two members of the local mafia intimidated villagers of the embattled Khlong Sai Pattana community of Surat Thani, searched the houses of eight SPFT activists and gave orders to the villagers to leave the area in seven days.

Perhaps the major obstacle to solving the problem today is summarized by Rodjaraeg’s words: “At least under a civilian government, people affected by this sort of policy could stage protests against the government and the Royal Forest Department. But now this can’t be done under military rule because no one wants to stage a rally in front of the guns,” said the active promoter of land rights.

Although the junta promised to eradicate the alleged corruption of the former civilian government which served the capitalists, the new Mining Bill is designed to give mining businesses easy access to more land without the need for mitigation of environmental and social impacts in most areas.  Meanwhile marginalised people affected by mines will find it difficult under martial law to oppose the bill.

The new Mining Bill, which has been strongly opposed by civil groups, has been picked up by the junta’s National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and will soon be deliberated by the rubber-stamp National Legislative Assembly (NLA) to replace current 1967 Mining Act.

During the previous civilian administration, due to pressure from several environmental groups and community rights activists who strongly opposed the proposals to amend certain essential Articles of the Act, a draft amendment bill was dismissed by parliament.

In 2014, however, it was brought back by the Department of Primary Industry and Mines (DPIM), while martial law can still be used to silence opposition to the Bill. The new Mining Bill is now being reviewed by the Council of State, before being submitted to the National Legislative Assembly.

134,664.5 acre of the protected potential mining areas of Loei province, which the Ministry of Industry has an authority to give out concessions to mining operators   

Several articles in the new Mining Bill are changed.  Here is a summary of the new version.

Article 80: For the benefit of managing economic minerals in the country and the acquisition of valuable mineral resources, the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), with the advice of the Committee and permission of the Cabinet, has the authority to gazette any area as a mining area as a priority over conservation or other beneficial uses provided that this area:

1.      has abundant and economically valuable minerals

2.      is not protected by any law that specifically bans use for private benefit and that concerns safety or national security.

Article 81: A mining operator who receives a state mining concession has exclusive rights to mine certain types of ore deposits in specific areas under conditions established by the MNRE and relevant Committee. The MNRE will receive royalties which will be shared with local administrative organizations in mining areas and areas affected by mining activities.        

Article 82: The Minister with the advice of the Committee has the authority to announce the conditions and regulations covering certain mining operations without the need for a licence under this Act. In order to expedite the process of obtaining permission from other government agencies, operators can submit a request to the DPIM, the Director-General of which can form a committee of the relevant agencies to process permission quickly.

In other words, Article 80 states that the government has exclusive rights to utilise and decide where to give mining concessions while Article 81 adds that licenced mining companies have exclusive rights to mine certain areas and types of ore deposits under conditions stipulated by the government. In addition, Article 82 speeds up the process of approving mining concessions.

River creek that allegedly turns brown because of mining activities in Wang Saphung District of the northeastern province of Loei

According to Lerdsak Kamkongsak, an environmental activist and researcher based in the northeast, several articles of the new mining bill obviously show that the junta’s Cabinet is giving a green light to mining corporates to raise the profit margins for shareholders as quickly and as much as possible regardless of environmental and social costs.  

In the new mining bill, the period of time for the state to approve mining concessions is shortened from approximately 310 days under the procedures of the 1967 Mining Act to only about 100-150 days. Moreover, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Environmental Health Impact Assessment (EHIA) do not need to be conducted before the concession is granted to the mining operators. This contradicts Article 67 of the 2007 Constitution which states that the EIA and EHIA need to be approved before mining concessions are granted, according to Lerdsak.

In addition, the new Bill also removes the phrase “important forest watersheds” from Article 80 of the 1967 Mining Bill. This means that the new Mining Bill will not prevent mining businesses from using important forest lands for mining activities, added the environmental activist.

Wang Saphung villagers stage rally against the mine, the banner (center) reads “Loving the mine is a dog, loving the forest is a human”

For the villagers of Wang Saphung in the northeastern province of Loei, who have been battling with the Thung Kham Co. Ltd., a gold mining operator who is alleged to have caused environmental and social damage to the community, if the new bill is passed, there will be nothing to stop the mining company from opening up more land.

“Although I don’t know much about law and the new Mining Bill, even with the current Mining Act [1967] which states that the EIA has to be conducted before mining activities can start, the environmental and social costs are still grave; I think that it will be much worse if the new Mining Bill is really implemented,” said Pornthip Hongchai, one of the key leaders of the Khon Rak Baan Koed Group (People who love their homes) (KRBK), an organization established by six villages in Wang Saphung affected by gold mining activities.

For Lerdsak, the underlying reason why the new Mining Bill has been brought back despite its obvious flaws is that under the dictatorial rule of the junta there is no space for public participation and the military are free to issue laws to please big business.

“Under a civilian government, people are allowed to take part in the process of reviewing the bill before it is passed. However, under a military dictatorship in which the junta relies only on government officials, the bargaining power of the public is very limited and can be ignored very easily,” added the environmentalist.

Seven months ago twenty-six people were arrested in Khon Kaen and now face charges of terrorism and treason—offences that could exact the death penalty. The case, known as the "Khon Kaen Model," is the most high-profile case to be tried in a military court since the junta took power in May. Kate Cowie-Haskell and Plia Xiong have been following the case in Khon Kaen to learn more about the process of military court and its consequences for families of the defendants. [Those interviewed for this story preferred that neither real names nor photographs be used, worried that it may affect the case of their family members.]

It is past noon, but “Nok” is still in her pajamas. She stands in front of her open refrigerator, staring at its meager contents. The shelves have become bare as the months drag on and she is unable to search for a job. Finally, she removes two eggs and turns toward the cluttered kitchen. “I can’t go anywhere, so I can’t make any money,” she says as she cracks the eggs into a pan. “The soldiers watch me whenever I leave.”

It has been a month since Nok, still in her forties, was released on bail for medical reasons from the Khon Kaen Central Prison. There she was held for five months with the twenty-five other people accused of plotting the “Khon Kaen Model” of resistance, an alleged Red Shirt plan to overthrow the military government that came into power on the 22nd of May. The suspects were arrested in the days following the coup, and imprisoned on June 4th.

Nok was released from prison, but she has been unable to fall back into her role as the provider for the seven people in her family. Instead, she spent most of the last month under what is essentially house arrest. She doesn’t want to give the soldiers a reason to suspect she is organizing or attending meetings, so she limits contact with friends and never strays more than a few hundred meters from her house. Nok is even too afraid to find work, fearing that contact with anyone outside her family may incriminate her again. Her family’s financial situation has become dire since her arrest, and continues to deteriorate despite her release from prison.

“It has been a very hard time for our family,” admits Nok’s father, who has become increasingly immobile as muscular atrophy claims his body. He sits in the small makeshift bedroom that has become his world in the past few years. “I am becoming weaker, and I can’t support the family. We have many financial problems now. With three kids, school and meals cost a lot.”

Nok doesn’t know when she will be able to find a job. For now, she is paralyzed by the knowledge that the military can interpret anything she does as a reason to put her back in prison.

“We have no income, and I have to think about everything I do before I do it. Every decision I make can affect my family now, and I don’t want to make our situation worse.”

* * *

The Khon Kaen Model suspects and their families have been under the watchful eye of the military government since the arrests were made in May. All twenty-six suspects were accused of nine charges, including amassing arms and conspiracy to commit terrorism.

Order No. 37 of the junta, stipulating that offenses against the “internal security of the Kingdom” come under the jurisdiction of a military court, was issued days after defendants in the Khon Kaen Model case had already been apprehended. A lawyer familiar with the case called this arrangement “strange” and “against legal principles.”  Regardless, the Khon Kaen Model case is being tried in military court.

A number of international human rights organizations have denounced civilians being tried by military court as a violation of human rights. In military court there are no appeals, and bail has so far been denied to the Khon Kaen Model suspects without preexisting medical conditions. All twenty-six suspects could face the death penalty.

November 26th—Shackled, the defendants enter the court at the Sri Patcharin military base for the case's third hearing as their families look on.

The defense lawyers have repeatedly called for the case to be moved to a civilian criminal court on the grounds that a trial by military tribunal violates Article 4 of the junta’s 2014 interim constitution, which vaguely states that the new government will protect human rights.

According to Mr. Wilder Tayler, the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, “Under international standards, civilians should not be subject to the jurisdiction of military tribunals, particularly where, like in military-ruled Thailand, military tribunals lack the institutional independence from the executive required by international law regarding fair trials.”

The court proceedings of the Khon Kaen Model case have appalled the defendants and their lawyers. Since May the judges assigned to the case have already changed once, and two of the three current judges are military personnel with no professional background in law. The court has also been unclear about the dates of court appearances for the defendants, rescheduling hearings multiple times.

A legal expert familiar with the details of the case who asked to remain unnamed is frustrated with the lack of transparency in the court process. “I don’t know what principle the court is working from. Are they waiting for the political situation to get better? Or are they waiting for orders from higher powers? The more detailed of this case are revealed, this expert says, “the clearer it is that these families can’t get justice.”

The high-profile nature of the case, particularly the terrorism charges, has garnered a lot of attention for the accused and their families. The media has painted the families as treasonous and violent. As a result, they have been ostracized in their communities.  

* * *

“Dao” has been socially isolated since her husband’s arrest. She sits at a table in her sparsely furnished home, which for her has become unbearably empty.

“Nobody comes to visit my family. They see us as criminals and they think we are trying to ruin the country,” Dao says through tears. “I am a Red Shirt but I have no war weapons— I don’t even know what they look like.”

Before the arrest, Dao and her husband sold sausages, making around 1,000 baht per day. But suddenly, after the arrests she could only make 200 baht per day. Now her most eager customers are the dogs she gives her leftovers to at the end of the night.

“My neighbors used to come buy sausages from me, but now they don’t even come near me. I ask them why, and they just say they don’t want to eat sausages anymore.”

Dao mentions that some of her old friends received phone calls from a person who warned them to avoid interacting with her. She does not know who these calls were from.

Unable to handle the way people stare at her (or worse, ignore her) in the street, Dao locks herself in her home. Now, her only comfort lies in the fifteen-minute visits she has with her husband at prison. She goes whenever she can afford the bus fare. Desperate for fast cash she skips meals and sells her motorcycles, sewing machines, rice steamers—anything she can find—at the scrap dealer for a fifth of their price. She often stays at the jail long after morning visitation hours are over, sitting alone in the darkening waiting room until she is asked to return to her empty home.

In the few months after the arrest Dao’s 18-year-old daughter, “Noi,” was her mother’s sole companion and only source of income. An accomplished boxer, Noi made around 5,000 baht for each of her fights in a boxing ring in Khon Kaen. Without her father to drive her, Noi took public transport to the ring every week with her mother. When the fights ended too late for the women to catch a bus home the two slept on the bare mats at the ring, using their bags as pillows. But soon after the arrests the ring manager heard about Noi’s situation and started putting her in lower fight levels, where she could only make 300 baht per fight.

Disgusted with this treatment and fed up with the teasing she endured at school, Noi dropped out of eleventh grade. She left her mother and moved to a province in another region, where she is able to conceal her connection to the Khon Kaen Model. Now she boxes during the week and takes adult education classes on the weekend, sending money to her mother when she can.

* * *

“Aom,” 17, is also sacrificing her education because of the Khon Kaen Model case. Her father was one of the twenty-six people arrested in May, and as each day passes without his income her family faces greater losses.

In the dark kitchen of her family’s cement home Aom chops up vegetables for the evening meal. Out of the corner of her eye she sees her backpack slouching against the dirty wall, with unfinished readings and assignments threatening to spill out of it. She hasn’t picked it up since the last time she went to school four days ago. Tonight though, she knows she will have to tackle some of the assignments that have been building up on her since the semester began in November.

Aom’s school fees have become an unbearable strain. The weekly 100 baht that Aom needs for transportation to school is now required for basic necessities for herself, her four-year old brother, and her mother. Recently Aom’s mother, Mai, has become so desperate for money that she asked her daughter to drop out of school and find work.

It has been a tense topic for the mother and daughter recently, as Aom insists that she should stay in school for one more year so she can graduate. For now, the family has reached a fragile compromise: Aom will go to school only two or three days a week.

“No mother wants her child to leave school,” Mai says as she watches her daughter sweep the oil-stained floor of their kitchen. “I want her to have the highest education possible so she can get a good job and have a future.  But I don’t know where to get money—if my husband was here we could work this out together.”

Over the last semester and a half, school has become a battleground. Aom is failing most of her classes. Already her poor attendance has barred her from taking the final exams for half of her classes this semester. She will have to make up the assignments next semester, on top of her new schoolwork.

“I don’t know if I will be able to do it,” Aom confides. “But I want to graduate high school so I can get a good job.”

She has dreams of studying hotel management at Khon Kaen University, the leading university in the Northeast. Her sociable personality would serve her well, and she is intrigued by the glamour of it all. “I want to look fancy,” she laughs.

However, her dreams are quickly moving beyond her reach. She has a commitment to support her family, and her mother’s emotional instability since the arrests has only made it more necessary to shoulder some of the caretaking burden left behind by her father.

Mai tries to put on a brave face and smile for her two children, but the sorrow that lies just beneath the surface is sometimes unmanageable. “After the arrest I cried for weeks,” she admits quietly. “I was devastated, I didn’t know what to do with my life. My daughter saw this and stopped going to school for two weeks to keep me company.”

With her future on the line, Aom must now try to balance the financial distress caused by the case and her family’s emotional upheaval, even while coping with her own sense of loss.

“I miss my father,” she says. “When I think about him I want to cry.”

Seven months after the arrests it is clear that the acute emotional loss the Khon Kaen Model families feel has cut far deeper than their financial losses. Without the presence of their loved ones, they are suspended in a kind of mourning— indefinitely. The convoluted processes of the military court give families little hope that their suffering will end in the near future.  

Since the arrests few questions have been answered for the affected families. They have asked to see the evidence against their loved ones, they have asked for bail, for release dates, for the dates of court hearings. And they have asked, again and again: What have we done to justify such grave punishment?

A lawyer in the case fears for the future of his defendants’ families. “Not knowing the next date and knowing that the court refuses to give bail has impacted families a lot. They are in limbo—they don’t know when they will be together again.”

* * *

Like Aom’s mother, the members of the “Damrong” family have been paralyzed by grief since the arrest of “Somsak”: their husband, father, and grandfather.

“Joy” has been married to Somsak for 36 years, and his arrest has taken a steep emotional toll on her. As she walks across the rutted yard in front of the family home, she pauses. “Everything reminds me of him,” she says solemnly. She looks to the front of the small house, where a vegetable garden stubbornly persists amidst riotous vines. “He loves planting,” she says, her voice choked. “He made that vegetable garden, and he built this house and dug out the fish pond. Anywhere you look you have to think about him.”

His absence is a void that his loved ones cannot ignore. Friends come to join family dinners, but everyone has become so accustomed to the rhythm of life with Somsak that they are at a loss when there are pauses in the conversation that his jokes normally fill.

“It is like there is no happiness in the family,” says Joy. “I have no energy, and all I can think about is how to help him.”

Since May the family has thrown itself into efforts to bail him out. They raised money and scoured documents, but the military has denied bail. Seven months later, Somsak is still in jail, and his wife still doesn’t know why.

“If we knew he was guilty it would be different because there would be a reason for him to be there. But I can’t think of anything he did wrong.”

Her claims match those of the defendants, all of whom have claimed innocence to the accusations.  But despite what a lawyer described as “weak” evidence against them, the trial persists.

The only thing Joy is absolutely sure of is that her husband should have been released long ago. “All we want is for him to be back with us. If there was justice he would be home by now.”

Justice, it seems, is not something the Khon Kaen Model families will see soon. At the third case hearing on November 26th the court was as vague as ever, once again cancelling the next court appearance and failing to provide a new date. The lawyers’ request to move the case to a civilian criminal court remains under deliberation.  

A relative of one of the defendants reacts after seeing her husband walk into the courtroom in chains.

Meanwhile, these families must continue their battle with the uncertainty that is consuming their lives. The unanswered questions loom over them, and the unbelievable power the military holds over their situation permeates their daily life.

* * *

Dusk is just settling over Nok’s small home when she climbs on her motorcycle to buy vegetables down the road. As the motorcycle pulls away Nok’s brother rises and makes his way to the end of the dusty driveway, where he stares after the vanishing taillights. He stands there in the dark, headlights occasionally illuminating his concerned face, until his sister returns fifteen minutes later.

“He thinks that if I leave I might not come home again,” explains Nok. “Every time he returns home, he checks up on me and he is happy to see that I am still here.”

She drops the bag of vegetables on the table and sags against the wall of her home, the home that has become her prison.

About the authors: Kate Cowie-Haskell studies Anthropology at the University of Rochester and Plia Xiong is majoring in Human Development and Family Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. They are student journalists on the CIEE Khon Kaen study abroad program.

Six months after Thailand’s martial law is imposed discontent stirs across diverse factions.

BURIRAM -- Sitting cross-legged in a bamboo hut, concealed by tall corn stalks, the 62-year-old man seems at ease, enjoying passion fruit and a cigarette. Yet, the laughter leaves his eyes as he casts furtive glances towards the sound of every vehicle that rumbles past.  

“I am afraid that once you leave,” Lun Soisot nervously admits, “the military will come and ask what we were doing.”

Lun was a rice farmer before the military arrived in his village and evicted everyone from their homes and farmland.

Lun knows too well what happens when the military takes special interest in a person. The military arrested  Lun and other community leaders in Kao Bat Village, who protested the junta’s decision to evict villagers from Dong Yai Wildlife Sanctuary in July. Paitoon, his son and a local activist, has also faced arrest and is now on the run.  

Lun and his son are just two of the estimated hundreds of grassroots leaders that have been arrested, threatened, and harassed by the junta that seized power in the May 22 coup.  

The reach of martial law

Martial law, instituted two days before the coup, has maintained a tight grip over Thailand - outlawing political meetings of five or more people, prohibiting criticism of the junta, and charging civilians in military courts.  

The crackdown on opposition, through a series of arrests and detentions, has discouraged any attempts to speak out against the military regime. These tactics have kept Thailand remarkably quiet for the last six months.

The post-coup calm has been particularly unusual in the Northeast, which is a stronghold for the Red Shirts, a pro-democracy movement allied to deposed former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The Red Shirt’s lack of organized resistance suggests that martial law has been effective in silencing dissent.

As of November 30, the organization iLaw documented 626 cases of persons apprehended under martial law, 340 of which led to arrest.  

The vast majority of those apprehended were pro-democracy politicians, academics, activists, and journalists in Bangkok publicly summoned by the military soon after the coup.  

The military has focused much energy on suppressing opposition here in the Northeast as it is the heartland of the Red Shirts. While there’s ample anecdotal evidence, exact statistics on those affected by martial law in the Northeast are hard to come by. As many as 130 people in the region have been affected by martial law, according to iLaw, and upwards of 50 who have been formally arrested. But there are dozens if not hundreds of students, community activists, and university professors who have been unofficially “invited” in by the military for a chat, harassed at work, monitored, and threatened.

‘We fear for our lives’

Martial law and the fear of the junta’s formal and informal intimidation tactics may explain why a unified resistance movement has not formed.

Alongkorn Akkasaeng, Assistant Dean at Mahasarakham University’s College of Politics and Governance, felt his work impacted by martial law when he was called in to speak at a military base. “The experience has caused me to be more careful in what I say and write,” he explains. Many of his colleagues have been called in and continue to be called in, and so “everyone is quite aware that they are being monitored by the military.”

Last month, five students from the activist group “Dao Din,” borrowing from the movie “The Hunger Games,” raised three fingers directly in front of Prime Minister and junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha when he was visiting the Northeast for the first time.

The students were immediately arrested. As their protest and detention attracted national and international attention, the military decided to release them without charge. But even after their release, the students have been persistently harassed and monitored by the military, driving some students to move out of their homes. “We fear for our lives,” stated one of the students in an interview with the Bangkok Post.

But more than anti-coup groups have been affected by martial law. The junta’s decrees, such as Order No. 64 that authorizes the military to evict communities from their land for the sake of national forests, has embroiled rural communities. Faced with the loss of homes and livelihoods, grassroots-level activists are the latest victims of martial in Thailand’s Northeast. The widespread repression of rights to freedom of assembly and expression has severely limited their ability to advocate for community rights.

It was reported in Prachatai on December 16 that almost 1,800 warrants have been issued against farmers on charges of trespassing into forest areas. Activists claim that if the junta continues its eviction polices, as many as 30,000 Isaan people may be affected.

‘Leave my family alone’

Kridsakorn Silark, an activist working with dam-affected communities in Ubon Ratchathani province, has similarly been summoned and harassed for speaking out against the military’s human rights violations.

On November 18, the military asked Kridsakorn to deactivate his professional Facebook page, on which he had publicly asked the junta to cooperate with dam-affected villagers, as well as his personal account that he used to express his pro-democracy opinions.

Kridsakorn proudly shows off his controversial Facebook page, on which he posted a picture of Aung San Suu Kyi: “You should never let your fears prevent you from doing what you know is right.”

Claiming that he had forgotten the account password, Kridsakorn kept the page up and dodged the military’s calls.

After three days of evasion, however, Kridsakorn received a call from his mother; military officers had begun to harass her, calling every ten minutes and eventually showing up at her house. Kridsakorn realized he had no choice but to meet with the military.

“I was very angry. They can do anything they want to me, but leave my family alone,” he snapped.

At the meeting, officers forbade Kridsakorn from writing anti-coup declarations and from posting anything on his Facebook critical of the junta.

These intimidation tactics employed by the military are used particularly harshly against those affiliated with the Red Shirt movement.

On the day of the coup, “Daeng” (a false name used for fear of reprisals), a Red Shirt media activist in the Northeast, threw a hard drive of his life’s work into water, knowing what it held could incriminate him under the newly imposed martial law.

The fear that drove him to such extremes remains at the forefront of his thoughts. While being interviewed, Daeng insisted on moving locations several times, convinced that a government spy was eavesdropping nearby.

Daeng spent a month covertly collecting stories on the impact of martial law in the region, especially stories that the junta has attempted to cover up. Daeng has unique insight into the mood of the Northeast.

“People only talk with people they trust.  Everyone wants to talk, though,” says Daeng. “They’re stressed, they’re not satisfied, and they’re angry.”

He tells the story of an unnamed red-shirt DJ in the Northeast. On the day of the coup, 50 soldiers swarmed her workplace, only to find that she was not there.  When they were also unable to locate her at her home, the military held her 10-year-old son hostage. Panicked at the thought of being separated from her son and subjecting him to trauma, she had no choice but to turn herself in.

In addition to threatening family members, the junta has employed other methods to intimidate and blackmail dissidents, such as freezing financial accounts, planting evidence, and extortion through the use of explicit photos.

Of the dozens of people Daeng spoke to, the majority signed an “agreement” with the military, pledging to refrain, under threat of arrest for violating martial law, from attending meetings, expressing political opinions, speaking to the media, or leaving the country.

‘We push forward because we know it is the right thing to do’

Most have adhered strictly to the “agreement” out of fear. However, some who have signed, such as Kridsakorn, insist that signing does not indicate surrender.

“I think I have to be more cautious because I was summoned. But on the other hand, if I do and say nothing, they will feel as if they can do anything. I have to move forward to ensure they do not feel this way,” says Kridsakorn.

Kridsakorn’s cautious defiance is not an isolated instance. Academics, villagers, activists, and Red Shirts across the Northeast have also voiced their resolve to keep fighting, despite the threat of repercussions for speaking out under martial law.

The five Dao Din students continue to be monitored closely by the military. One female student was requested, on December 9th, to come speak to military officers about her group’s activities, over a month after their protest.

She refused to go, reflecting the defiance of the group. They have also displayed their unwavering opposition to the military regime in interviews. Capitalizing on newfound notoriety, the Dao Din students called Thai citizens to action: “We want you to fight,” they said last month in a Prachatai interview. People across Thailand have publicly raised three fingers in support of the students.  

Even Lun, a villager whose name remains unknown to the nation, refuses to give in: “The military tries to stop our movement, but we push forward because we know it is the right thing to do.”

Common ground

Although community activists, like  Lun and Kridsakorn, on the one hand, and Red Shirts on the other, have typically operated separately, the collective oppression under martial law has created an unexpected common cause between the two groups.

Dr. Alongkorn suggests that although community activists and Red Shirts have different ideologies – the former focused on rights connected to their livelihoods and the latter on issues of democracy – they both share a commitment to rights and the value of equality. “In this ongoing struggle,” he says, “[color-coded politics] are secondary.”

“I believe the junta would have something to worry about if these two movements were to find common ground and enjoin their struggles, but I don’t think the junta has quite seen the bigger picture,” he adds.

An academic and former red shirt leader in Khon Kaen also acknowledges the difference in objectives between the two groups. But, Phanwadee Tantisirin adds, “It is democracy and rights that will allow both groups to be able to fight for their cause. We will have to wait to see if these two groups can come together to fight the military government.”

Looking ahead

On December 10, at the Isaan Human Rights Festival in Khon Kaen, villagers, NGOs, students and academics came together to openly express their frustration with how martial law has suppressed their ability to advocate for community rights. The event was one of the first where these different groups were brought together to articulate their common struggle.

Although the military had disallowed organizers of the Human Rights Festival from mentioning politics or martial law, participants were not fazed. One villager asked the crowd, “if we can’t talk about martial law, the NCPO, or politics, what can we talk about?

Whether or not these factions will unify in opposition remains unclear. Yet, the sentiment of individuals from each group does indicate a resolve to continue fighting for human rights and democracy. As the stories of military harassment circulate throughout the Northeast, dissent appears to becoming more and more common.

“The things that have happened within our village and other villages have been spread to everyone, and it has caused fear,” explains  Lun. “The military is making a lot of enemies without even knowing it.”

As  Lun sits on the bamboo floor of the small hut, he asserts his defiance to the coup and commitment to work towards a better Thailand.

“In every movement there has to be someone stubborn enough to get other people to join.  We choose to be fireflies in the forest. We are willing to be small sources of light – even though they’re small, it’s better than total darkness.”

About the authors: Alexandrea Lee studies international studies at Johns Hopkins University and Catherine Darin studies economics at the University of Pennsylvania. They are student journalists who have been studying in Khon Kaen for the past four months.

After tanks and military boots were deployed on the streets of Bangkok on 22 May to stage another coup d’état not even a decade after the 2006 coup, many anti-coup political dissidents flocked to the streets to protest against the new military regime. With the subsequent imposition of martial law however, the voices of these political dissidents eventually died down after months of arbitrary arrests and detention.

Nonetheless, it has become clearer that the new military regime’s reform policies and proposed bills on various issues, such as education, energy, natural resources, land reform, forestry, immigration, education and tax, will benefit some groups of people while negatively affecting others. NGOs and political activists have begun to challenge the junta once again despite the imposition of the martial law, which gives the regime unprecedented power to make arrests over any expression of anti-coup opinion. In November, five student activists from the Dao Din group of Khon Kaen University in the Northeast, gave the three-fingered salute to Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the junta leader. The students were immediately detained and later interrogated by the military. The military also involved their parents and threatened to have them fired from the university if they did not accept the junta’s conditions. Although the junta might expect the harsh treatment and intimidation of the Khon Kaen students to serve as a lesson to keep other young activists at bay, the result was the opposite.

One after another, despite the presumption that the era of Thai student movement ended with the bloody student massacre of October 1976, student activists of various political orientations began once again to voice opposition to the suppression by the junta. Although these new student movements are not mass youth movements affiliated with political ideologies as in the 1970s, neither are they affiliated with the current colour-coded political divide in Thailand. These young activists began to engage in many regional and national problems despite the obstacle of the martial law. To look into the history, dreams, and aspirations of these student activists, who are now at the forefront of Thailand’s political mobilization, Prachatai introduces the series “The Modern Student Movement,” by Emma Arnold and Apisra Srivanich-Raper.

Five members of Khon Kaen University student activist group, Dao Din, flash three-fingered salute in protest against the junta in front of Prayut Chan-o-cha, the junta leader, during his speech.

Part I:

The student uprising of 1973 played a critical role in pushing out a repressive military dictatorship and heralding in a new democratic era in Thailand. Renowned political theorist Benedict Anderson calls the student movement of that time “the driving force” behind a series of political and social reforms. Students became active in labor movements, formed farmer networks, and traveled to rural areas to learn from the marginalized.

The brutal student massacre of 1976 crushed the movement and shook the nation. Forty years later, student activism in Thailand seems to be just a shadow of what it once was. Or is it still alive? An article from The Nation newspaper in Bangkok recently reported that student activism is being revived.

But there is a lot working against student activism. Palagoon Poonklang, an activist student and member of the Phuan Sangkhom at Mahasarakham University, says, “As a student that participates in political movements, I am in the minority of students. The environment of the university doesn't encourage students to be politically engaged,” he asserts. “This environment just forces them to study, only to study.”

But Dr. Buapun Promphakping, a professor from Khon Kaen University’s Faculty of Social Development, believes that the blame should not rest solely on the universities.

“I would have to say that the disengagement is on the students’ side rather than administration or the state’s side,” he explained, “thirty years ago we thought of students as intellectuals. In this era, this is no longer true.”

Students have seemingly been absent from recent political protests, where thousands of people have taken to the streets in support of each the Red and Yellow Shirts. But they have been visible in other ways.

At universities across the country, student activists groups have formed around a variety of interests and goals. Some groups engage in traditional political spheres through activities such as petitions and protests; others approach politics less directly— working on grassroots social development projects, challenging conventions at their universities, and increasing political awareness through education.

The following is a selection of voices of the modern student movement. We spoke to nine student groups at universities in Northeast Thailand about their work, their beliefs, and their hopes. Through these discussions, it is possible to approach the questions of whether students should or should not have a role in politics, what motivates them, and why they have generally avoided defining themselves as red or yellow.

Student forced to lay down facing the ground during the student crackdown in Thammasat University, which later turned into a brutal massacre on 6 October 1976

The Tamed Generation

Soom Giew Dao (ซุ้มเกี่ยวดาว), Khon Kaen University

Affiliation: Independent, Members: 20 members

“You have to understand,” stated Patiwat Saranyaem, “Khon Kaen University limits students. The university doesn’t support them working on any political movements or issues at all.”

Mr. Patiwat is a member of the student group Soom Kiew Dao, or “Harvesting the Stars”.

Members of Soom Kiew Dao are united in the common goal of supporting democracy.

When discussing the group’s work, Mr. Patiwat speaks of collaboration with a variety of Red Shirt organizations in the area but is hesitant to identify his group as such. “Right now it is only the Red Shirts who are building a movement for democracy,” he explained. “Our side, we work to support democracy”.

From a family of political activists in Sakon Nakhon Province, Mr. Patiwat is certainly not shy when it comes to sharing his opinions. He speaks with exuberance, filling the small room with his boisterous voice.

To Mr. Patiwat, fighting for democracy means fighting for the rights of those who are oppressed. He believes that KKU was founded as an undemocratic system of oppression. “KKU was originally established to produce students for labor, not to train students to use their brains,” Mr. Patiwat attests, “KKU was set up to control the Isaan people.”

He goes on to explain that KKU was established in the 1960s under the national government’s first Social and Economic Development Plan. The university’s first two faculties were agriculture and engineering, grooming students to become part of the county’s growing industrial sector. To this day, the university doesn’t have a faculty of political science.

As a result of this, Mr. Patiwat explains, “now KKU students are not interested in social or political issues and they don’t care about history. This is because of the control of the government.”

He laughs, “They don’t have to think about anything. They just eat, shit, sleep, and don’t care about anything.” Students are required to participate in university activities, such as sports events and religious and cultural activities under the school’s Integrated Learning Program. This program was introduced by the university administration in 1989 to better prepare students for their future careers, but Mr. Patiwat describes its requirements as “rituals to control people.”

“Students are tamed by what they study and learn in the educational system. In this way they are tamed and controlled by the conservative elites,” Mr. Patiwat said.

Soom Kiew Dao works to teach what is not taught in school, focusing on political history and working with communities to build local knowledge. Within the group, members regularly exchange books. The fact that some of these books have been censored by the central government makes them all the more important.

When asked about his hopes for the future educational system in Thailand, Mr. Patiwat’s answer is simple and immediate. “I want [the university] to stop controlling students and preventing students from asking questions,” he responds.

He pauses to think for a second before continuing. “I feel it is a shame because I want to be able to say something more, but what I am telling you is ‘please stop preventing students from asking questions’.”

The Thai modern student movement to be continue on Part II

After tanks and military boots were deployed on the streets of Bangkok on 22 May to stage another coup d’état not even a decade after the 2006 coup, many anti-coup political dissidents flocked to the streets to protest against the new military regime. With the subsequent imposition of martial law however, the voices of these political dissidents eventually died down after months of arbitrary arrests and detention.

Nonetheless, it has become clearer that the new military regime’s reform policies and proposed bills on various issues, such as education, energy, natural resources, land reform, forestry, immigration, education and tax, will benefit some groups of people while negatively affecting others. NGOs and political activists have begun to challenge the junta once again despite the imposition of the martial law, which gives the regime unprecedented power to make arrests over any expression of anti-coup opinion. In November, five student activists from the Dao Din group of Khon Kaen University in the Northeast, gave the three-fingered salute to Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the junta leader. The students were immediately detained and later interrogated by the military. The military also involved their parents and threatened to have them fired from the university if they did not accept the junta’s conditions. Although the junta might expect the harsh treatment and intimidation of the Khon Kaen students to serve as a lesson to keep other young activists at bay, the result was the opposite.

One after another, despite the presumption that the era of Thai student movement ended with the bloody student massacre of October 1976, student activists of various political orientations began once again to voice opposition to the suppression by the junta. Although these new student movements are not mass youth movements affiliated with political ideologies as in the 1970s, neither are they affiliated with the current colour-coded political divide in Thailand. These young activists began to engage in many regional and national problems despite the obstacle of the martial law. To look into the history, dreams, and aspirations of these student activists, who are now at the forefront of Thailand’s political mobilization, Prachatai introduces the series “The Modern Student Movement,” by Emma Arnold and Apisra Srivanich-Raper.

Student forced to lay down facing the ground during the student crackdown in Thammasat University, which later turned into a brutal massacre on 6 October 1976

Continue from Part I

The Politician

Artit Chansi, Political Science Student, Ubon Ratchathani University

Though he is still a student, Artit Chansi is already on the campaign trail. The 22-year-old, who studies political science at Ubon Ratchathani University, frequently travels to nearby villages to talk with community members and learn about their political perspectives.

“I go to villages to share ideas with both Red and Yellow Shirt people, to understand why they have chosen each side,” he said. “If I know about opinions from both sides, from Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts, I can understand their backgrounds.”

Understanding these varying perspectives is key to Mr. Artit’s future career. He plans to become a local politician and to be part of the changing political structure in Thailand.

Despite having come straight from class, Mr. Artit looks like a politician; he is clean cut in a button down shirt and dark jeans. He speaks sincerely, leaning forward and resting his elbows on his knees.

Decentralization, he explains, is key to the future of politics. Working with local people in their communities is the best way to create positive change for society.

“I want to help people around here because each person has different problem,” said Mr. Artit. “I also want to work to fix injustice.”

Mr. Artit is not a member of a politically active student group, but is nonetheless part of the modern student movement. He has chosen to challenge conventional politics through becoming a part of the governmental system.

Mr. Artit believes that Thailand is currently in the process of moving from democracy to advanced democracy, which he vaguely defines as moving outside of the confines of the “old traditional box” of governance.

“In democracy everybody should have participation in the system,” he stated. “It is not only about students who study political science, it is not only our responsibility. It is everyone’s responsibility for society. It is their role as a citizen of the country.”

As a budding politician, Mr. Artit looks forward to fulfilling this obligation.

Grassroots Politics

Dao Din, (ดาวดิน) Khon Kaen University

Affiliation: Independent, Members: 20

Defiant and outspoken, members of the group Dao Din are at the forefront of the modern student movement in Thailand. For them, being politically active is not a choice, it is an obligation.

“Since we are born into this world, we have a responsibility do something for society before we leave,” said Nitikon Khamchu, member of Dao Din and recent graduate of Khon Kaen University.

Dao Din focuses on grassroots work with local communities promoting social justice, human rights, and equality. But in the current situation, grassroots effort are rarely enough.

According to Mr. Nitikon, those who have the power to truly improve society are elected politicians who are on a “higher level”.

Dao Din student activists protesting in March against Constitutional Court's ruling to nullify the general election 

The challenge, he explained, is that these “higher level” politicians are not concerned with the needs of the common people. Mr. Nitikon is tall and quiet, but it is clear the younger members of the group respect him greatly. “I believe that the big political parties right now belong only to the investors. Those parties do not belong to the people,” said Mr. Nitikon. He is not the only person to hold these frustrations.

Dissatisfied with the country’s existing parties, a group of activists have established a new political party. Known as the Commoner’s Party of Thailand (CPT), they aim to challenge the conventional top-down approach to politics and to capture the voice of the “common people” of Thailand.

Inspired by his experiences working with Dao Din, Mr. Nitikon became one of the founding members of the Commoner’s Party. He now is a self-described “recruiter” and works with politically active student groups, like Dao Din, to engage the younger generation.

The party’s platform includes challenging lèse-majesté laws, advocating for government decentralization, amending the 2007 constitution, and advancing labor rights. Prominent academics such as Nidhi Eoseewong, a former history professor from Chiang Mai University, have lent their support.

Members of Dao Din support the CPT. Whereas many other student groups shy away from overt political statements, Dao Din members are not afraid of voicing their opinions. They have involved themselves in their country’s messy political situation out a strong desire for change.

“I expect that this party will be the stage for ordinary people to express their opinions,” Mr. Nitigon explained, “because this party does not belong to me or anyone else. This party belongs to the common people.”

Five members of Dao Din group still wearing t-shirts saying in Thai ‘mai ao rat-pra-harn’, meaning ‘No Coup’ while they were on the police pickup-truck after they were arrested for flashing the three-fingered salute, a symbol of political defiance defrived from the 'Hunger Games', in front of Prayut Chan-o-cha, the junta leader, while he was giving a speech at Khon Kaen Provincial Hall on 19 November 2014.

The Commoner’s Party of Thailand represents a new type of political organization—one that works on the policy level to represent the voices of the general population. Taking a grassroots approach to politics is what supporters believe will be the group’s success.

As Thailand is divided between two increasingly polarized groups, there is much talk of civil war as the only solution. Mr. Nitikon sees the Commoner’s Party of Thailand as offering an alternative; “What we have done is create a third area for those who disagree with the civil war; to give them power to do something.” Though his demeanor is calm, his words are full of hope.

The Thai modern student movement to be continue on Part III

After tanks and military boots were deployed on the streets of Bangkok on 22 May to stage another coup d’état not even a decade after the 2006 coup, many anti-coup political dissidents flocked to the streets to protest against the new military regime. With the subsequent imposition of martial law however, the voices of these political dissidents eventually died down after months of arbitrary arrests and detention.

Nonetheless, it has become clearer that the new military regime’s reform policies and proposed bills on various issues, such as education, energy, natural resources, land reform, forestry, immigration, education and tax, will benefit some groups of people while negatively affecting others. NGOs and political activists have begun to challenge the junta once again despite the imposition of the martial law, which gives the regime unprecedented power to make arrests over any expression of anti-coup opinion. In November, five student activists from the Dao Din group of Khon Kaen University in the Northeast, gave the three-fingered salute to Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the junta leader. The students were immediately detained and later interrogated by the military. The military also involved their parents and threatened to have them fired from the university if they did not accept the junta’s conditions. Although the junta might expect the harsh treatment and intimidation of the Khon Kaen students to serve as a lesson to keep other young activists at bay, the result was the opposite.

One after another, despite the presumption that the era of Thai student movement ended with the bloody student massacre of October 1976, student activists of various political orientations began once again to voice opposition to the suppression by the junta. Although these new student movements are not mass youth movements affiliated with political ideologies as in the 1970s, neither are they affiliated with the current colour-coded political divide in Thailand. These young activists began to engage in many regional and national problems despite the obstacle of the martial law. To look into the history, dreams, and aspirations of these student activists, who are now at the forefront of Thailand’s political mobilization, Prachatai introduces the series “The Modern Student Movement,” by Emma Arnold and Apisra Srivanich-Raper.

Student forced to lay down facing the ground during the student crackdown in Thammasat University, which later turned into a brutal massacre on 6 October 1976

Continue from Part I and Part II

Working with the University

The Student Club for Development (ชมรมนักศึกษาเพื่อการพัฒนา), Khon Kaen University

Affiliation: University, Members: 100

Unlike Dao Din and Soom Kiew Dao, the Student Club for Development is a university-affiliated student organization. The university is their primary source of funding and approval. Members believe that being part of the university framework is better than being an independent organization.

“We have more credit when we work with villages because they ask us ‘Where are you from?’ And we say we are from KKU. We have the name of the university affiliated with our group, so we are more credible,” said Nichaphat Weeriyapukkanun, the organization’s newly elected president.

The group was founded in 1984 alongside the University’s Social Development program, with the primary goal of offering students the opportunity to do hands-on work with local communities. Today, this is accomplished through multi-day visits to local villages where members study development problems and later return to help implement solutions.

“I think my group is special because I have the chance to study communities and build a relationship with them,” explained Pornpailin Kaewwungpa, a third-year member. “People who only stay in the classroom cannot do this; they don't know the other world.”

Though they take a very similar grassroots approach to the distinctly political Dao Din, the students in The Student Club for Development are quick to establish that their group is not a political organization. If they were to be more directly involved in politics, it is unlikely that the university would continue to fund their group.

The Student Club for Development staged rally against the privatization of public universities in Khon Kaen University of Thailand’s Northeast on December 2011. The banner at the center reads “the poor....can’t study?” (courtesy from The Student Club for Development Blog)

“We focus only on social development, we let political beliefs be individual interests,” said Budsaban Somboopan, the organization’s former president. “I believe that my group gives each member the freedom of thinking,” said Phongsathon Kapmanee. He does not see this as being the case in the independent political organizations like Dao Din.

“I have found that in the Dao Din group, the members are not independent. When they think about something, every member thinks about it in the same way. There is some power that makes them all believe in the same things,” he explained.

Without shared political interests, members of the Student Club for Development are united in the simple desire to better society. It is apparent that this is what matters most to them.

“I am studying social development because I want to do something for society. I want to help people who have had less opportunity than me,” said Pornpailin Kaewwungpa.

Ms. Pornpailin is earnest in this conviction; when she speaks about changing society, she speaks with compassion. She tells a story from her childhood about how she once saw a poor woman with wounds on her feet get denied access to a local bus. “I was so unhappy for her, I felt so bad,” she said.

It is this empathy that has inspired her to work to alleviate social problems in Thailand.

Ms. Budsaban shares these sentiments. When asked why she loves her group, her eyes light up.

“I love that feeling you get when you help other people,” she says, “You feel like you are useful. Even though what you do to help might not really be a big thing, you still feel good about it.”

Fighting SOTUS

Phuan Sangkhom (เพื่อนสังคม) Mahasarakham University

Affiliation: Independent, Members: 30

Plook Hug (ปลูกฮัก), Mahasarakham University

Name: Plook Hug, Affiliation: Independent, Members: 30

While political turmoil persists outside, within the confines of Mahasarakham University there is another ongoing battle. Student groups Phuan Sangkhom and Plook Hug both aim to promote equality and democracy. For these two groups, this means fighting to bring down SOTUS, the traditional social structure found in universities across Thailand.

SOTUS-- Seniority, Order, Tradition, Unity, and Spirit, is a system of hierarchy and initiation. In this system, younger students are led through a series of activities by the older students within their faculties. Activities include loudly singing school songs in public for extended periods of time, wearing specific nametags, and attending mandatory events.

Although one of the goals of SOTUS is to create unity among students, it has a darker side. The system has come under harsh criticism as organized hazing. In the past activities were less regulated and often far more aggressive. Students have reportedly been forced to crawl through sewage water, publically humiliated, and even being beaten by seniors.

SOTUS operates independently from universities and is carried out by students. Most university administrations try to prevent activities from becoming violent, but they seem do little more than set vague regulations.

Nareumon Konroo (left) and Jakkrapob Lupromma, two members of the student group Plook Hug, work to cultivate political awareness. “Our group focuses on improving ideas and developing perspectives about politics,” said Mr. Jakkrapob. (Photo taken by Arnold and  Srivanich-Raper)

“Now, before students join SOTUS activities they must have the approval by their parents, because in the past some of the students got injured or hurt or they became sick. Some of them even died,” said Krishnachai Kaewskultu, Head of the Student Activity Section of the Department of Student Affairs at Khon Kaen University.

“I would say the system is effective, in some sense. But some seniors don’t care whether it is effective or not, it just has been done in a certain way to them so they do it again to the younger students.”

Together, Phuan Sangkom and Plook Hug are working to destroy SOTUS from within the university. “We do not support the SOTUS system because we believe that it is wrong. It is not democracy,” said Palagoon Poonklang a member of Plook Hug.

The two groups spread awareness of violence and mistreatment through a Facebook page on which they post videos, articles and stories. Group members also speak at welcome ceremonies and organize lunches for freshmen to discuss political events, with the goals of increasing political awareness and encouraging individual empowerment.

The groups offer an alternative to SOTUS: a program in which freshman can live in rural communities for several days and plant rice alongside older students. Group members believe that planting rice achieves many of the goals of the SOTUS system, without promoting oppression and inequality.

“The purpose of the SOTUS system is to build relationships between students, particularly between freshmen and older students. Planting rice also builds these types relationships and teaches responsibility,” said Opas Sintukod, a member of Plook Hug.

Bringing down the SOTUS system, however, is more complicated than it may appear. The battle against SOTUS is also against greater social pressures. SOTUS is a voluntary system, but opting out of it is not an easy choice to make. “Most students take part because they are new and they don’t know anybody,” explained Mr. Kaewskultu, “They have to join the system because if they do not do the activities, they will not be accepted. You become a nobody.”

Being forced to choose between social exile and collective hazing is not a fair choice to have to make. For this reason, both Phuan Sangkhom and Plook Hug consider SOTUS as exemplary of greater social pressures that oppress students. Until these pressures are challenged students will remain unfairly trapped in an undemocratic system. For the two groups, this is worth a fight.

The modern Thai student movement is to be continue on part IV

In the final part of the Modern Thai Student Movement paper, the authors explored the aspirations of two more students activist bodies from Isan who harness their energy in amending Thai educational systems. One group comprises future teachers who try to create the culture of ‘lifelong learning’ and independent thinking, while the other encourage fellow students engage in activities outside the university gates.

After tanks and military boots were deployed on the streets of Bangkok on 22 May to stage another coup d’état not even a decade after the 2006 coup, many anti-coup political dissidents flocked to the streets to protest against the new military regime. With the subsequent imposition of martial law however, the voices of these political dissidents eventually died down after months of arbitrary arrests and detention.

Nonetheless, it has become clearer that the new military regime’s reform policies and proposed bills on various issues, such as education, energy, natural resources, land reform, forestry, immigration, education and tax, will benefit some groups of people while negatively affecting others. NGOs and political activists have begun to challenge the junta once again despite the imposition of the martial law, which gives the regime unprecedented power to make arrests over any expression of anti-coup opinion. In November, five student activists from the Dao Din group of Khon Kaen University in the Northeast, gave the three-fingered salute to Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the junta leader. The students were immediately detained and later interrogated by the military. The military also involved their parents and threatened to have them fired from the university if they did not accept the junta’s conditions. Although the junta might expect the harsh treatment and intimidation of the Khon Kaen students to serve as a lesson to keep other young activists at bay, the result was the opposite.

One after another, despite the presumption that the era of Thai student movement ended with the bloody student massacre of October 1976, student activists of various political orientations began once again to voice opposition to the suppression by the junta. Although these new student movements are not mass youth movements affiliated with political ideologies as in the 1970s, neither are they affiliated with the current colour-coded political divide in Thailand. These young activists began to engage in many regional and national problems despite the obstacle of the martial law. To look into the history, dreams, and aspirations of these student activists, who are now at the forefront of Thailand’s political mobilization, Prachatai introduces the series “The Modern Student Movement,” by Emma Arnold and Apisra Srivanich-Raper.

Student forced to lay down facing the ground during the student crackdown in Thammasat University, which later turned into a brutal massacre on 6 October 1976

Continue from Part I, Part II, and Part III

Teachers for Society

Nok Koon Jae (นกกุญแจ),Roi Et Rajabhat University

Affiliation: Independent, Members: 15

Chanin Yosboon wants to become a “teacher for society.” “My dream is to inform people to know their rights, and to know that their community is really important,” said Mr. Chanin, a 22-year-old Education major studying at Roi Et Rajabhat University.

He continued, “A career as a teacher is one of the careers that can inspire children to be interested in these kinds of issues.” Mr. Chanin is one of the founders of Nok Koon Jae, an independent student organization.

Nok Koon Jae means “key bird,” which is a type of pigeon, in Isaan, the regional dialect of Northeastern Thailand. Mr. Chanin chose this name intentionally: the bird symbolizes freedom, and the key unlocks the “secrets that society is hiding.” The majority of members study education, but these future teachers don’t restrict themselves to the confines of a classroom.

Nok Koon Jae helps different communities “fight for their rights” by bringing them together through joint activities, such as farming. In a recent water management project, fifteen members of Nok Koon Jae supported nearly 300 villagers at the nearby Chi River, an important water source in the Northeast.

“The real learning process happens when students have a chance to go to communities and learn,” said Mr. Chanin. He believes that Thailand’s educational system is not preparing future teachers for their job. Mr. Chanin remained relaxed and easygoing, yet all the while still managed to appear tall and upright from his seated position on the ground, and effectively convey his conviction in what he believed.

“I don’t think a lot of teachers truly understand society’s problems,” explained Mr. Chanin “because the government is typically the only source of information.”

Suprapha Khantiwong, a fellow Nok Koon Jae member and classmate who wants to teach so she can shape children’s decision-making abilities, agreed. “The knowledge we are taught inside the classroom is not enough,” Ms. Suprapha said, “The main problem of the Thai education system is that it teaches the opposite of reality.”

Although Ms. Suprapha seemed reserved because she didn’t speak often, the strength of her words would contrast with the quietness of her voice. It was clear that she was completely engaged in the conversation at hand and felt strongly about these topics.

Suprapha Khantiwong (left) and Chanin Yosboon have studied education together since freshmen year. As members of Nok Koon Jae, they work to build solidarity among Isaan communities.

Ms. Suprapha’s presence as a woman was particularly striking, even though not all of Nok Koon Jae was present, since women seem sparse in politically active student groups. Ms. Suprapha continued to explain how an example of this problem with the Thai education system is that, “The classroom teaches students that dams are good to hold water, and that when there is a drought, the dam will help people. But actually, if a dam is built, people in other areas won’t get water like they are supposed to.”

As Mr. Chanin and Ms. Suprapha see it, centralization is the main problem with the Thai education system. Having a singular standardized national curriculum creates a divide between what students learn in the classroom and the reality of their everyday lives.

Instead, Nok Koon Jae believes that villagers should have a say in creating community-based curriculum, so that traditional skills and local history won’t be lost. Decentralization of education, Ms. Suprapha and Mr. Chanin hope, will also encourage students to give back to their hometowns.

“As a teacher I want the future education system in Thailand to encourage students who graduate from universities to return to their hometowns and develop them,” Mr. Chanin said, “It is not necessary for them to continue being farmers; they just need to come back. They can bring back the knowledge they have learned.”

In their pursuit to promote justice, equality, and community rights, Nok Koon Jae will continue to live up to their group’s symbolic name of freedom. They refuse to be trapped by the confines of conventional education, and will instead choose to educate the future’s children as “teachers for society.” “In our role as teachers, we will be people who can actually help society,” said Mr. Chanin.

Invisible Generation

Naksueksa Kon Nueng (One Scholar) (นักศึกษาคนหนึ่ง), Ubon Ratchathani University

Affiliation: Independent, Members: 3

In a recent demonstration, a group of blindfolded and gagged students stood silently in their university’s food center. The striking signs that they carried read, “Where Are All the Scholars?”

These students are members of “Naksueksa Kon Nueng,” or “One Scholar,” a group that aims to call attention to the lack of students taking an active role in society and in the current political situation.

The group was founded less than a year ago. Chaiwit Kongnil, the independent group’s founder, firmly emphasized that, “Students should show that they have roles in society, and that they have opinions.” He continued, “Right now they are invisible, like they’re being blindfolded, like they’re being gagged. They should be visible.”

Despite the fact that his organization only has three members, he is working to recruit more members, and Mr. Chaiwit’s passion to his cause remains undeterred.

As to what is causing the absence of students’ voices in the current political situation, Mr. Chaiwit thinks aspects of Thai culture are contributing to their disengagement.

“Students are less interested in the political situation right now, because whenever there’s a problem—I think it’s a Thai thing, Thai people will just walk away,” said Mr. Chaiwit. “Thai people avoid problems and they hate confrontation. They hate to face problems. That’s why there’s less interest.”

He believes that the university’s environment also prevents the Thai younger generations from being politically active, since students are afraid to say what they think. “In the education system, we’ve been taught to not be so brave about coming up and standing up for our opinion,” Mr. Chaiwit expressed.

Naksueksa Kon Nueng student activists (One Scholar group) commemorating the student massacre in Thammasat University on 6 October 1976. The group gathered at the Ubon Ratchathani town square on 6 October 2013 with banners read “See things differently...you have to die? The fading memory” and “37 years passed since 6 October, many sacrificed their lives for their principles.” (taken from One Scholar Facebook Page)

Dr. Saowanne Alexander, a Sociolinguistics lecturer at Ubon Ratchathani University who studied in Bangkok and the United States, is among the few academics at her school who encourages her students to voice their opinion.

She echoed Mr. Chaiwit’s opinion that students are not pushed to have a critical perspective: “Thai people have been taught to be good students. What does it mean in the Thai system to be a good student? You listen to your teachers, you do what they say. You don't challenge them, and you don't ask too many questions. So, that mindset limits what you can say or think out loud,” she explained.

Dr. Alexander thinks that students in the Northeast are afraid to express their opinions because of the perceived consequences. She explained, “People can't be open, people can't be straightforward. Being too active can be a source of trouble for students too, because they can be targeted.”

When it came to talking about politics, Dr. Alexander was not afraid to call it as she saw it. Her straightforward manner was strikingly different from the indirect approach of avoiding problems Mr. Chaiwit had mentioned as a Thai cultural norm.

As a professor who tries to encourage her students’ opinions, it remains a tough work in progress. Dr. Alexander said, “It’s very frustrating for me, because I want my students to argue with me, to tell me what they want so that I can accommodate their needs and wants. But they don’t do that.”

Mr. Chaiwit used to be like other university students, trying to keep his head down and afraid to express his opinions. He was empowered to create his own independent student group after he participated in “Freedom Zone,” a non-profit organization that received funding from USAID. One of Freedom Zone’s goals is to get youth involved in talking about political and social issues, so as to best support democracy in Thailand.

“I was a member of the Student Union and worked for the university, but I thought that the activities of the university didn’t answer my goal. At about that time, USAID opened up something called the Freedom Zone,” Mr. Chaiwit explained. “It is an open space for students to learn how to become productive citizens.”

It was this event that inspired Mr. Chaiwit to found his organization. “The Thai older generation thinks the younger generations have no roles and no voice in the society. We formed this group to show them that we actually do have these roles in our society and roles in politics,” Mr. Chaiwit said.

Naksueksa Kon Nueng remains strong in their desire to encourage the invisible generation of students to step up and take part in removing their blindfolds and gags. “Students should be politically active, they should show themselves,” Mr. Chaiwit said with conviction. “They should have their own opinions. The political future should be created by us.”

Towards the end of 2014, the arrests of high ranking police officers and the siblings of Srirasmi, former Royal Consort to the Crown Prince, made the headlines in Thai and International media. The chain of arrests led to the “resignation” of Srirasmi, who later left the palace as a commoner. Apart from normal criminal charges, such as bribery, money laundering, and abduction, the police accused almost all of the suspects in this case of lèse majesté for making false claims about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn for personal gain. However, it is debatable if the lèse majesté law can be applied to people citing the monarchy for personal interests.  

Unlike the political dissidents hunted down by the junta for their political speeches allegedly defaming the monarchy, claims about the monarchy for personal gain may not be deemed as “defaming, insulting, or threatening,” as prescribed in Article 112, or the lèse majesté law.

One must question carefully whether or not claims about a royal personage protected under Article 112 for personal benefit are an offence under the law. This is primarily because Article 112 is a section of Criminal Code and in the judicial procedure in criminal cases, the intention in committing the crime is vital to the ruling. Therefore, the intention of citing the monarchy for personal benefit might not be to defame or insult people protected under the lèse majesté law.    

What are the standards for this? The following article by iLaw, translated by Prachatai, looks back at court rulings in cases of a similar nature to find the standard of application of lèse majesté (if there is one.)

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Article 112 of the Criminal Code or the lèse majesté law is enacted to protect the King, Queen, Heir-Apparent, and Regent from being defamed, insulted and threatened with harm. It is a law that belongs to the first Section dealing with national security laws and carries a penalty of 3-15 years imprisonment. 

Since the coup d’état in May 2014, the number of cases under Article 112 has increased rapidly. Cases have been filed against many people for making false claims about HM the King and others who are protected by this law in order to seek personal benefit.      

Word by word interpretation of Article 112 of the Criminal Code

The 2011 edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Thai Institute gives the following definitions of the words appearing in Article 112.

The word ‘insult’ (in Thai: du min) is a verb which means to act, speak or write in a way which expresses contempt for the inferior status of others or for the fact that they are not really good or really competent. (2014, Page 441)

The word ‘defame’ (min pramat) is a verb which means to act or speak in a way which insults other people. Legally, it is a noun which means the criminal offence of slandering others to a third person in a way that is likely to cause those persons to be defamed, insulted, and hated. (2014, Page 1304)  

The phrase ‘threaten to harm’ (akhat matrai) is a verb which means to be vengeful and to intend to harm others. Together, the two words mean to act vengefully with ill will. (2014, Page 1401-1402)

According to Article 326 of the Criminal Code, whoever defames others to a third person in a way that is likely to make the others to be defamed, insulted or hated has committed the offence of defamation.  

If Article 112 of the Criminal Code is strictly interpreted, those persons who are liable under the scope of this law must have expressed the intention, either by speech, writing or behaviour, in a way that insults, maligns and slanders those who are protected by this law, or expressed behaviour that is vengeful or bears ill will to those who hold positions that are protected by this law.

Whether or not falsely using the name of royalty to seek personal benefit is within the scope of an offence under Article 112 should be considered in careful detail. This is because making a false claim has a different intention from insulting, defaming or threatening harm, and for acts of the nature of making false claims to seek personal benefit, the offence on fraud already specifies a penalty.  

The use of Article 112 of the Criminal Code before May 2014 to prosecute those making false claims

Prior to the coup d’état in May 2014, most lèse majesté charges were filed in cases related to political expression. However, in at least two lèse majesté cases, suspects were charged with citing a royal name to seek personal benefit: the cases of Prachuab I. and Assawin (surname withheld).    

Prachuab case: making false claims about HRH Princess Sirindhorn is not an offence under Article 112.

Prachuab was arrested in early 2004 and faced three lèse majesté cases under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. In one case, he was accused of falsely claiming that he once worked for HRH Princess Sirindhorn while police officers were searching his car. In the second case, he was accused of falsely claiming that he once worked for HM the Queen and HRH Princess Bajrakitiyabha, the eldest daughter of HRH Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. In the last case, when the police invited him to talk at a police station on a case related to fraud, Prachuab was accused of falsely claiming that he once worked closely for Princess Sirindhorn and that arresting him might make trouble for the arresting officers.  

Nakhon Sawan Provincial Court ruled in late 2004 that the false claims by the defendant about HM the Queen, HRH the Crown Prince, and HRH Princess Sirindhorn were not made to honour the monarchy, but were made to seek personal benefit. Making claims about the monarchy without having the duty to do so under royal approval is insulting or defaming the monarchy. The acts of the defendant were separate offences and each was given the penalty of 5 years in jail, totalling 10 years. Prachuab appealed the verdict.      

In early 2005, the Appeal Court ruled that since HRH Princess Sirindhorn was not the Heir-Apparent, the act of the defendant was therefore not an offence. However, the defendant’s claims about HM the Queen and HRH the Crown Prince were an offence, and he was sentenced to five years in jail. Prachuab appealed the verdict to the Supreme Court. In April 2009, the Supreme Court reduced the jail term from five to four years because the defendant had never before committed any criminal offence and still expressed his loyalty. Since on the day that the verdict was read, Prachuab had already been imprisoned for four years and seven months, he was released.     

Assawin case: Whether or not making false claims is an offence must take into consideration if listeners believed the claims or not.  

The case of Assawin, a Chiang Mai businessman, is another case in which the defendant was accused and convicted of citing the name of a royal person protected by the Article to seek personal benefit.   

Assawin was accused of three offences. The first was for expressing to others opinions that insulted HRH the Crown Prince as Heir-Apparent, and the other two counts were for making false claims that he was close to HM the King in order to seek personal benefit. Assawin turned himself in to the police in late 2006. Chiang Mai Provincial Court accepted the case in mid 2010 and he was released on bail during the investigation and trial.  

Chiang Mai Provincial Court dismissed the case against Assawin in December 2013 because there was reason to doubt whether or not the defendant made the alleged remarks. The court however did not rule on the content of the alleged remarks. In July 2014, the Appeal Court partially reversed the ruling of the Court of First Instance.   

The Appeal Court dismissed the offence of insulting HRH the Crown Prince because witness testimony contained sufficient doubt, and the second offence of making false claims that he would develop land to build a residence for HM the King because those with no interest in the case of buying and selling land, when hearing the words, believed that this was drivel.  Making false claims like this did not make listeners have feelings of hatred towards HM the King.

However, on the third charge, in which the defendant cited the name of HM the King to convince the owner of a resort to give him a room, the court ruled that the resort owner was likely to feel that he had an interest, and feel contempt for HM the King. Therefore, the act of the defendant was insulting to HM the King and the Appeal Court sentenced the Assawin to five years in jail. The case is now before the Supreme Court.    

The prosecution of cases of making false claims about the monarchy after the coup d’état in May 2014

The protection of the Thai monarchy is one of the top priorities of the junta’s National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). After the May coup, many people were arrested and charged under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. Most of them are political dissidents.

A new phenomenon in the use of Article 112 which has appeared since the coup is the arrest and prosecution of those who have close connections with the institution of the monarchy on charges of making false claims about the monarchy to seek personal benefit.    

17 November 2014: Lt Col Burin Thongprapai, a staff member of the military Judge Advocate General’s Department and police officers from the Crime Suppression Division arrested Chainarin K., the Secretary General of Office of The Under Royal Graciousness [sic], together with Pitchakan W. Both were accused of using the name of the monarchy to making claims about many projects throughout the country, which is an offence under Article 112, such as asking to use a building of CAT Telecom Public Co Ltd for three years without paying rent. The arrests were made after M.R. Somlabh Kitiyakara, the former Secretary-General of the Office of The Under Royal Graciousness, filed a lèse majesté complaint against Chainarin.     

3 December 2014: Dr Phanarot Tamprateep, the Deputy President of the Board of the National Anti-corruption Network and village representatives from Pha Pang Subdistrict, Mae Phrik District of the northern province of Lampang filed lèse majesté and fraud complaints against Chainarin and 13 others. Phanarot and the villagers accused Chainarin and his associates of making false claims about the monarchy to convince the villagers to cut down three tons of bamboo trees per day on about 1,400 acre of land for a ‘Lampang Model’ sustainable community research project of the Office of The Under Royal Graciousness.     

On 12 December 2014, four victims of participating in a training curriculum called ‘Pillar of the Kingdom’ filed lèse majesté and fraud complaints against Chainarin and 13 others.  These were accused of asking nearly a hundred high-ranking state officials and businessmen to participate in a programme called ‘Pillar of the Kingdom’, in which individual participants were each charged up to 100,000 baht (about 3,050 USD). Most participants in the training were led to believe that it was conducted in the name of the monarchy.

In addition, there are reports of the prosecution of cases against Mr Phuchit, a committee member of the Foundation of King Rama Nine the Great, and Col Siratchabut, who is closely associated with the palace, under Article 112 in the Military Court of Bangkok. In total, at least four people who are closely associated with the institution of the monarchy have been arrested.       

The prosecution for the practice of making false claims of a network of high-ranking police officers in November 2014

The prosecution of people charged with making false claims, fraud and lèse majesté which have currently attracted much public attention are those made against the network of high-ranking police officers of Pol Lt Gen Pongpat Chayapan, Commander of the Central Investigation Bureau, and Pol Maj Gen Kowit Wongrungroj, Deputy Commander of the Central Investigation Bureau.

In the arrest warrants issued on 22 November 2014 against the network of high-ranking police, eight other police officers and civilians were accused of fraud and misconduct. Two other high-ranking officers were also charged with lèse majesté.  

23 November 2014: Pol Lt Gen Prawut Thavornsiri, spokesperson and assistant to the Royal Thai Police commander, revealed that Pol Lt Gen Pongpat, Pol Maj Gen Kowit and eight others were arrested and detained under martial law. All detainees confessed and two other civilians were still being pursued by the police.  

24 November 2014: Pongpat and Kowit were brought to the Criminal Court for detention. The court rejected the bail requests of both suspects.

28 November 2014: Investigation officers detained Natthapol, Sitthisak, and Narong Akharaphongpreecha, Sutthisak S. and Chakan P., who are allegedly criminal associates of Pol Lt Gen Pongpat Chayapan. The five were detained by Prakanong Provincial Court in Bangkok under Article 112 and other charges including coercion with threats to life, person and freedom, unlawful detention and kidnapping

30 November 2014: Natthanan T. and Chalach P., two suspects accused of lèse majesté, assault and coercion, reported to the police. The two were suspected of threats and making false claims about the monarchy in an attempt to reduce the amount of a debt of Nopporn S., a businessman, who is alleged to have a connection with the Akharaphongpreecha brothers. The two suspects confessed.    

1 December 2014: Wittaya T., a suspect facing an arrest warrant reported to the police while Manager Online reported Nathakon and Thiraphong, were arrested and detained by the Judge Advocate General’s Office.

On the same day, the Military Court of Bangkok issued an arrest warrant against Nopporn S., an energy millionaire, who was accused of criminal association with the Pongpat network. On December 2014, he denied all allegations against him in a phone interview with the press from unidentified location and said that he needed to flee to prepare to fight the case.   

6 December 2014: Capt Prinya Rakwathin, managing director of Chao Phraya Express Boat, reported to Watprayakrai Police Station after an arrest warrant was issued against him for lèse majesté, harming others, conspiracy to robbery, conspiracy to coercion and assault. He was implicated in criminal association with the Pongpat network.  

On the same day, the Military Court issued an arrest warrant against Nuanrat H., 48-year-old owner of an ice-making business, for citing the monarchy in threatening a rival at a Pathum Thani wholesale market to stop trading under Article 112, and threatening others.  She is now in detention.   

10 December 2014: Police officers arrested Sudathip M. on a charge of lèse majesté.  Previously Sudathip was the subject of an arrest warrant on other charges together with Pol Lt Gen Pongpat.  10 December 2014: Sudathip was taken to the Criminal Court to apply for authority to detain her.  The detention request detailed that Sudathip used her family connection with the monarchy to supply chili paste and other dishes to Sukhothai Palace.  If other shops made bids, the accused claimed her family connection with royalty.  She received a monopoly concession.  These claims caused damage to the reputation and honour of the institution and therefore constitute an offence of lèse majesté.

12 December 2014: The Military Court of Bangkok issued additional arrest warrants against Chakan P. and Natthapol Akharaphongpreecha while the two were already under detention. The two were accused of lèse majesté after the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) filed a complaint that they had cited the monarchy as an excuse to be absent from classes at NIDA.       

24 December 2014: Investigating officers of Khlong Luang Police Station requested the military court to issue an arrest warrant against Kasina W., a close friend of Natthapol Akharaphongpreecha, for defaming the monarchy and detaining others. On the same day, Thonburi Provincial Court issued an arrest warrant against her and two other unidentified men under Article 112. The three were accused of involvement in citing the monarchy to monopolise the ice-making business at a Pathum Thani wholesale market.     

Pol Lt Gen Srivara Rangsipromnakul, Commander of the Metropolitan Police, announced that Kasina was arrested and detained and that the police will continue to look for two unidentified men accused of the same charge.   

In total, at least 26 people have been accused of associating with the monarchy-citing network and high-ranking police, 19 of whom have already been charged with lèse majesté. Out of this number, 16 suspects have been brought to trial. There is no report on whether the suspects have been granted bail or not. Three suspects in this case are still on the run.    

Concerns for the wider application of the lèse majesté law  

Although prior to the 2014 coup d’état there were prosecutions of suspects charged with making false claims under Article 112 to seek personal benefit, these were very few in comparison to the total number of Article 112 cases. There are concerns that the arrests and prosecutions for the offence of making false claims, which have been continuously increasing in 2014, will create a new benchmark in extending the application of the lèse majesté law to cover a broader range of offences beyond the intention of the law to safeguard national security.  

Because criminal law gives importance to the intention of the offender, the choice of law to be used against an offender must therefore take into consideration the intentions of the perpetrator. The act of making false claims is likely to be motivated by material gain, not the intention to act against national security.  The act of using the name of royalty with the intention of wrongfully gaining material benefit from others should therefore be prosecuted as the offence of fraud, not lèse majesté.    

The lèse majesté law or Article 112 is the most sensitive issue in Thai society. News of prosecutions or sentences under this law is likely to be strongly criticised in online media where opinions are likely to differ among many factions according to the individuals’ political beliefs  Therefore the enforcement and sentencing of individuals under this law must proceed in the most watertight and limited way so that these cases do not ignite social conflict.    

The extension of lèse majesté cases to cover offences involving the making of false claims should make lese majesté cases more numerous may have the effect of further escalating social conflict.   

Moreover, the practice of making false claims per se is likely to be conducted in secret without clear evidence, so it is hard to prove the allegation. Therefore there is concern that defendants accused of lèse majesté must face severe judicial and social pressure because of the political atmosphere and viewpoints of people in society.  Article 112 may be easily used as a tool for business rivals to accuse one another in order to destroy their opponents.   

The Thai police have been notorious for their use of torture to force confessions and the arrest of scapegoats. The two Myanmar suspects accused of killing two British backpackers on Thailand’s Koh Tao Island are good examples. In the restive Deep South, lawyers say that security officers regularly torture insurgent suspects to get confessions since the Thai police do not have enough evidence to issue arrest warrants by normal means. The Thai police are now aiming to optimize investigations by pushing for a law which will allow police from all divisions to intercept suspects’ communications. However, experts say the bill could ironically end up aggravating police abuses.

The attempt to arm the Thai police with the authority to intercept the communications of criminal suspects is in the proposed amendment of the 1934 Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) . At this point, the cabinet has already approved the proposal, which is now under the consideration of the Council of State before being sent to the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) for legislation.   

Permission to allow the police to intercept communications is proposed in Article 131/2 of the new CPC draft. In short, this Article of the new draft states that the police can ask for permission from the courts to intercept the communications of anyone suspected of committing or preparing to commit a crime related to national security or public morale, including all crimes where it is difficult to find evidence. The Article, however, also states that the interception can only be done under court supervision and the police are obligated to send regular reports on the interception process which cannot last beyond 70 days.

An unofficial translation of Article 131/2 of the new CPC draft:

Article 131/2: If in a case, there are suspicious circumstances indicating that individuals are preparing or conspiring to commit crimes or cooperating in, associating with, being involved in, and supporting crimes against national security and the laws related to stability and public morale, which appear to be perpetrated through organized crime, or complex crimes where it is difficult to gather evidence, the investigating officers may request the court with jurisdiction over the specific locality to authorize permission to intercept phone communications, financial information, electronic information, or any information sources relevant to the crimes and suspects. The information gathered from the communication interception can only be used as evidence in court proceedings against the suspects of criminal cases.

If certain criminal cases are complex beyond the normal procedures of gathering evidence, summoning suspects, or issuing court warrants, the court alone can authorize permission to act in accordance with the first paragraph for up to 15 days each time for a total period not exceeding 70 days. During the interception period, the court can issue orders to all relevant personnel to cooperate with the process and the police must submit reports on the interception to the court every 15 days.

Is interception necessary?

According to Pol Col Siriphon Kusonsinwut of the Criminal Affairs and Litigation Division of the Royal Thai Police, who is the key person behind the draft CPC amendment, after the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, which gave more protection to criminal suspects, the police were left to operate with very limited human and technical resources. Therefore, to cope with the complexity of crimes in the digital age, the amendment of the CPC to include the authority to intercept communications of suspects will improve the efficiency of the Thai police.

“The police could not do much besides summoning and issuing arrest warrants. If the suspects do not cooperate with the investigation and the police cannot gather enough evidence in time, the cases are usually dismissed,” said Siriphon at a ‘Technology and Society’ seminar organized by Thai Netizen, an advocacy group promoting internet freedom and online privacy, and the Economics Faculty of Thammasat University, held at Thammasat University in Bangkok on 22 December 2014.

He added that if this bill is passed, it will help redeem the tainted image of the Thai police, who allegedly torture suspects during detention to get information to make up for the lack of resources. Moreover, since the bill to allow interception will speed up this phase of criminal procedure, the losses of crime victims will then be compensated quickly as well.

When asked whether this law will give excessive power to the police to deprive basic rights to privacy without sufficient justification, Siriphon told Prachatai that there should be no problem because the draft is written clearly so that the method can be applied to only certain crimes and there is a good checks and balance system for interception.  

“The criminal cases where investigation by interception procedures would be permitted must be serious enough to carry a penalty over three years of imprisonment. Moreover, only a chief judge can authorize interception permission and if the police officers are found to be abusing the interception procedures they can receive up to ten years in jail as penalty,” said Siriphon.

In other countries, such as in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, police officers are capable of intercepting the communications of criminal suspects under the supervision of the court in accordance to the Criminal Procedure Code of the three countries. Therefore, communications interception is not as controversial as it may sound.

In his blog, Siriphon pointed out that the interception law in the new CPC draft will be modeled after the interception laws in the CPCs of these three countries, especially that of the United States.    

Although Siriphon made it clear that communication interception is not a viable tool for the police to use in investigating simple criminal cases, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) already has the authority to request the court to approve interception requests in cases falling under the DSI’s responsibility. According to the 1998 Anti-Money Laundering Act, the 2004 Special Case Investigation Act, the 1976 Narcotics Control Act, and the 1914 Martial Law Act, the court can authorize permission to intercept communications of criminal suspects of crimes related to the all the acts mentioned. Therefore, one might ask why the police still need to amend the 1934 CPC to have extra authority to intercept communications.

For Kanathip Thongraweewong, a privacy law academic and an Associate Professor at St. John’s University in Bangkok, although the proposed interception law is modeled after that of the US and the UK and has the potential to optimize police operations, several loopholes can be spotted in the draft.

Lack of Transparency  

First, Kanathip argued that although the proposed interception law seems to incorporate judicial oversight of the interception procedures before and after the interception warrant is permitted, these is no mechanism to ensure ‘public oversight’ to keep the interception procedures in check.

According to International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, independent oversight mechanisms should be established to ensure transparency and accountability of the interception of communications.

In other words, there is no mechanism that could make sure that the police will not end up abusing the criminal suspects’ basic rights beyond the court’s authorization during the interception procedures.    

“Although one might argue that public oversight can affect the efficacy of the interception procedures, the lack of it can result in the leakage of information on suspects or third persons and other abuses by the police as well,” said Kanathip.

Jurisdiction overlap

Secondly, he pointed out that there are already laws that make it possible for the DSI to request interception permission from the court for special criminal cases under different conditions.  Would there be any “overlap” or “redundancy” in the application of these laws in the interception processes? Kanathip asked.

To put it in other words, if criminal suspects can be prosecuted under more than one law, which law should the court rely on to authorize interception procedures, the normal interception permission for complex crimes under the new CPC bill or the one for special cases falling under the authority of the DSI under the current CPC?  

“What would happen to certain offences that can be prosecuted by several laws? For example, criminal defamation offences or offences against national security from the importation of false or illegal contents into a computer system?” said the privacy law academic.

According to US law, pre-conditions and procedures of communication interception are clearly and elaborately laid out for specific circumstances, such as in cases of Presidential assassinations, kidnapping, and assault (Section 1751), interference with commerce by threats or violence (Section 1951), and interstate and foreign travel or invalid transportation of racketeering enterprises (Section 1952) of the United States 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. However, the proposed interception law in the new CPC draft of Thailand has not yet made this as sufficiently clear, Kanathip pointed out.

In the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act, Section 2516 clearly sets the prerequisites of communication interception, that it can only be permitted in offenses punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year. Moreover, only the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General with the approval from a Federal Judge can grant permission to intercept communications in respect to other sections applied to specific crimes. The Act also lays out in great detail conditions on the disclosure and usage of information obtained from communication interception and the procedures for tapping the communication of criminal suspects in Sections 2517 and 2518 respectively.

Breach of privacy without the notion of basic privacy protection   

Finally, Kanathip added that unlike other countries where interception is allowed, such as the US and the UK, Thailand does not in fact even have a basic data protection law. Therefore, making interception possible without having a law to protect private data can aggravate the unlimited abuse of rights to privacy by the authorities.

To make sure that the interception bill will not become a new tool for abuse by the authorities to install widespread public surveillance, Thailand should at the very least first establish a basic data protection and privacy protection law.

Moreover, Kanathip mentioned that if the US CPC is proposed as a model for the interception bill, Thai lawmakers should not simply pick certain useful parts of the US law as they like, but should borrow the entire structure. This is to ensure that the Thai CPC amendment would be extensive enough to optimize police operations while at the same time guaranteeing basic protection of suspects’ rights to privacy.        

“If interception is necessary for the investigation of crimes and the US laws are proposed as a model for amending Thai law, only one or two sections as proposed are not sufficient,” said the privacy law academic.  

He recommended that the new law should be structured like the US Omnibus Crime Control Act. First and foremost it should be stated as a basic rule that interception of private data is prohibited. Then warranted interception is allowed as an exception for complex crimes.

“In addition, the definition of related terms, such as ‘interception,’ ‘data,’ ‘oral communication,’ and ‘electronic device,’ should be clear. The types of crime that can be subject to interception should also be clearly identified. This is because the laws that limit the right to privacy of people are only exceptions and such limitations should be clear and transparent,” added the privacy law expert.

• Any detention by authorities must be in a place which is declared, officially certified and open for inspection.  
• Persons detained have the right to notify their families, lawyers or any trusted persons of the circumstances of their detention. They have the right to be visited by families, lawyers and friends. 
• The authorities must record names, times and dates, the name of the official who orders the detention and the physical condition of detainees before and after the period of detention. 
• The families of detained persons have the right to demand that the authorities to divulge these records. If the authorities refuse to do so, the families can petition the courts and the courts can order the authorities to reveal this information.
• If it is believed that someone is being tortured, anyone can petition to the court and the court must hold an urgent hearing on whether the torture allegation is true. 
• The court can also order an end to torture and the release of persons tortured, send victims to hospital and provide other remedial measures. 
• The bill also prohibits the authorities from deporting any person from Thailand, if it is believed that this action may lead to that person being tortured or disappeared. 

The Prevention and Suppressionof of Temptations to Dangerous Behaviors bill which will ban specific kinds of pornography in a bid to increase efficiency in suppression, potentially paves way for a ban of group sex, bondage and discipline, dominance and submission, and sadomasochism (BDSM) in the name of public morals. The bill also poses a great threat to media freedom as it not only broadly defines a wide range of media content deemed inappropriate, it also adopts the notorious article of the Computer Crime Act which indiscriminately holds internet intermediaries liable for all pornographic/violent materials without safe harbour.

Not that Thailand has no laws banning pornography. Article 287 of the Criminal Code bans the trade in objects deemed obscene and Article 14 (4) of the Computer Crime Act bans the import into a computer system of any pornographic data.

In the draft, it is stated that the bill is principally structured to get rid of child pornography and to safeguard children from being induced to commit wrongdoing in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Thailand has ratified, and to increase efficiency in suppressing pornography. However, the vague wording of the proposed law could mean that forms of art and media which are erotic or deviant, violence, and drugs will be banned.

The bill therefore is aimed at prosecuting those who produce, trade, distribute, and publish obscene or violent "materials which induce dangerous behaviour."

The bill defies "materials which induce dangerous behaviour" as any publication, printed matter, photographs, films, messages, data or anything which encourages or induces the following:

1. deviant sexual behaviour
2. sex with children
3. cruelty against children
4. suicide of children or group suicide
5. illicit drug usage
6. commission of the following crimes: terrorism, robbery, theft, murder, assault

It then explains that “deviant sexual behaviour” is

1. sex between parents and children
2. sex between people who share at least one parent
3. sex with physical violence, especially using implements
4. forced sex
5. group sex
6. sex with animals
7. sex with corpses

If passed, the Prevention and Suppressionof of Temptations to Dangerous Behaviors bil will definitely outlaw hundreds of movies and TV series, especially from Hollywood, such as Fifty Shades of Grey, the popular Hollywood movie based on the novel of the same title in which the main protagonists engage in BDSM practices. At present, without the law, Amarin Publishing House has already censored some erotic scenes of the Thai translation, saying that the contents are “too excessive to be presented in Thai society”.

Jompon Pitaksantayothin, a law academic from the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce who is an expert on laws related to child pornography, said the bill can be called discrimination against people with certain sexual orientations and violates freedom of expression. “This is merely expression related to sex. When the state tries to control this, suppress this, is it the state’s business?”

“Deviant? How do you judge? It’s the people’s sexual orientation. Is it OK to force people’s sexual tastes by law?” asked Jompon.

The law academic said currently group sex and BDSM with no physical assault are not criminalized, but when they are recorded or they become videos, they will be illegal. “And to some people, anal sex is perverse, so do the law drafters think this is normal then? You can see there are so many gaps in this bill.”

He added that in fact Thai law criminalizes all kinds of sexual objects and pornography. It would be more logical if the Thai authorities decriminalized pornography and sexual objects and then make exceptions.

For Lakkana Punwichai, aka Kampaka, a TV personality and controversial critic on gender and politics, the bill seems to care more about imposing a defined set of morals on society rather than freedom of expression.

The administrator of the popular satirical anti-establishment Facebook Page called Hod Sad V2 said the bill seems to be very broad and the application of the bill is likely to cover large areas of life. “I think it’s a private taste, it seems that they are trying to brand others who consume media that they prohibit as bad people. But in fact, it’s more to do with personal taste, isn’t it?” added the satirical Facebook page administrator, who did not reveal his real name.

Article 18 of the bill stipulates that anyone who, for the purpose of distributing and showing, produces and possesses material that could induce people to perform unlawful sexual acts and other criminal behaviour could face one to five years imprisonment and a 100,000-500,000 baht fine. There are exceptions for research and medical purposes.  

Article 19 stipulates that whoever distributes or shows such materials will face the same penalty as offenders under Article 18. The distributors, however, will have to serve 1.5 times the jail terms of Article 18 if they distribute the materials on a computer system.

Any cinemas or hotels showing such material will face de-licensing.

Jompon said the jail terms in Article 18 and 19 are unproportionate and too severe. He also questioned the intention of the bill. "The principle of the bill is to protect children, but in the end why does the law also prohibit adults from watching these materials?" he asked.

The law was drafted by the Social Development and Human Security Minister as part of the controversial Digital Economy bills which were approved in principle by the junta late last year.

Internet intermediary liability

Another great threat to freedom of expression of the bill is Article 22, which stipulates that any internet intermediary who knows that there are, in a computer system under their control, materials inducing dangerous behaviour, but does not immediately remove or delete such materials, must serve a jail term of up to five years or pay a fine up to 500,000 baht, or both.

This is considered worse than the notorious Article 15 of 2007 Computer Crime Act (CCA), in which intermediaries have to serve jail terms if it is found that they “consent” or “encourage” such posting. The amended CCA, expected to be deliberated by the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) soon, has removed this part, and replaced it with a notice and takedown procedure.

“This is too severe. If the bill is applied as it’s written, where the intermediaries have to delete the material immediately, it will put a heavy burden on the intermediaries,” said Jompon  

Searches without warrant

Article 14 (2) allows the police to search the body of a person and vehicles without a warrant when they suspect that the person or vehicle is carrying illegal material. The search of places still needs a court search warrant.

The law academic said this definitely violates the right to privacy.

Just imagine you’ve downloaded a bit torrent file of Fifty Shades of Grey in your laptop and carry it around; if searched, and found guilty, you have to face at least one year in jail. 

• Organizers of the assembly must “notify” the police about the planned rally, where it will take place and when it will start and end, at least 24 hours before the rally commences.If the assembly organizers want to extend the assembly, they must notify the authorities 24 hours in advance.
• Assemblies must not be held within a 150 metre radius of the residences of the King, Queen, Heir Apparent, princes or princesses, or royal visitors. 
• Assemblies must not be held at Parliament, Government House and the courts, except where space is designated for assemblies. 
• Assemblies must not obstruct the entrances and exits or disrupt the services and functions of state agencies, airports, harbours, railway stations, transportation stations, hospitals, schools, places of religion, embassies and international organizations. 
• Amplifier microphones must not be used between midnight and 6 am. No moving assembly is allowed between 6 pm and 6 am. 
• Microphone amplifiers used in a rally must use electric power under regulations issued by the Royal Thai Police. 
• Protesters must not disguise themselves, except for traditional costumes. 
• Protesters must not carry weapons in an assembly, and not trespass, cause damage to property, assault or threaten to assault others, or cause disturbances to others more than can be reasonably anticipated. 
• Assembly organizers must take responsibility for the assembly being peaceful and weapon-free, to try to control the assembly so as not to affect others more than is appropriate, to inform the protesters of their responsibilities and conditions set out by the authorities, not to instigate violence, and to collaborate with the authorities. 
• Any march or relocation of an assembly can take place if the authorities are notified in advance. 

• If a protest is held within a 150 metre radius of palaces, international organizations, and residences of royal visitors, or block entrances and exits to public transportation stations, protesters face jail terms of up to six months. 
• If an assembly is held without at least 24 hours’ notice to the authorities before the protest commences and the authorities do not relax this rule, or the protest does not end within the agreed period, or moves to another venue without notification to the authorities, the protesters face fines of up to 10,000 baht. 
• If rally organizers do not cooperate with the authorities, incite violence, give speeches using microphone amplifiers after midnight and use microphones that are too loud, the rally organizers face jail terms of up to six months. 
• If protesters carry weapons, trespass or damage property, cause harm, threaten others, obstruct the authorities, move the assembly after dark, they face jail terms of up to 10 years. 
• If an assembly causes temporary or permanent disruption of communication systems, the production or the distribution of electricity, tap water, or other public utilities, the rally organizers face jail terms of up to 10 years. 
• By defining an assembly as illegal, the police are given the right to order the protesters away, and any protester not leaving the venue is liable to punishment.  This is even more unreasonable and disproportionate, said academic.
• Jantajira Iammayura pointed out that the failure to comply with petty legal conditions, such as the failure to give 24 hours’ notice, should only carry penalties for the organizers and not turn all protesters into offenders. 

The junta cabinet has approved a bill on religion which can be used to prosecute, with jail terms, people who propagate ‘incorrect’ versions of Buddhist doctrines or cause harm to Buddhism. The bill also posts jail terms specifically for homosexual monks.

In recent decades, although Theravada Buddhism, the prominent Buddhist sect in mainland Southeast Asia, remains the most popular faith in Thailand, followed by about 90 per cent of Thais, the conventional practices and doctrines of Buddhism and the institutions which promote it have lost their ability to attract followers. This religious gap is filled with Buddhist cults which have managed to attract hundreds of thousands of followers, such as the Santi Asoke, a Buddhist sect which promotes simplistic communal lifestyles whose founder was disrobed by Thailand’s Buddhist monastic authorities in 1989, and Dhammakaya, a controversial commercialised version of Buddhism which has attracted billions of baht in donations from its followers. Viewing these developments as threats, prominent Buddhist institutions have come up with the legal mechanisms to control Buddhist practices and regain power.

Since 2006, the Sangha Supreme Council (SSC), known in Thai as ‘Mahathera Samakhom’, the governing body of Thai Buddhist clergy, and the National Office of Buddhism (NOB), the secular office under the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for promoting Buddhism, have unsuccessfully tried to propose a ‘Bill to Patronise and Protect Buddhism’, written by the two organizations. The draft bill was rejected under previous military and civilian governments, who recommended that the contents of the bill should merely be included in monastic rules, but not apply to the general public. However, in August 2014, the junta cabinet, which sees Buddhism as a part of the Thai identity, has approved the bill and is preparing to submit it to the National Legislative Assembly. It is now under consideration of the Council of State.

Pointing to the importance of Buddhism to the nation, the draft bill says “Buddhism is one of the pillars of the Thai nation and is the religion that most Thai people adhere to. Therefore, Buddhists should be united in patronising and protecting Buddhism to make it prosper and enhance Buddhist principles and ethics to develop the quality of one’s life.” In addition to these vague sentiments, however, the bill will allow the SSC and the government to punish anyone deemed to threaten a narrowly defined version of Buddhism promoted by the authorities.

For Sulak Sivaraksa, one of the founding members of International Network of Engaged Buddhists and a historian who is renowned for his criticisms of the SSC, the bill clearly shows the SSC’s desire to gain more prominence in Thai society.

“This bill shows blind stupidity and lust for power,” said Sulak. “The Sangha Supreme Council is a very weak council. It doesn’t have its own identity. That’s why it wants to show that it has power, which is regrettable,” he added.

Monopolising Lord Buddha’s teachings

In Section 8 of the bill on penalties, Article 32 states that anyone who propagates wrong versions of Buddhist teachings or, in others words, versions which differ from the SSC’s interpretation of the Tripitaka, the ancient Buddhist scriptures, could face one to seven years imprisonment.

To effectively enforce this doctrinal monopoly of Buddhism, provincial Buddhist committees will be established under Article 14 of Section 3. One of the functions of these committees, as laid out in Article 16 of the bill, is to form a warning centre in each province against threats to Buddhism.

According to Venerable Phramaha Paiwan Warawunno, a liberal Buddhist monk known for his criticisms of the SSC, the content of the bill to protect Buddhism violates the rights of individuals to interpret the Buddha’s teachings. He pointed out that the Buddhist doctrines in the Tripitaka should not be monopolized by any specific institution, but should be open to all on individual basis.

A spectacular Buddhist ceremony organized on October 2013 at the controversial Dhammakaya Temple, which continues to attracts billions of baht in donations from its followers (courtesy of Dhammakaya Post).  

“Whose interpretations of Buddhist doctrines are correct and shall be used as standards? Who will have the right to judge whether a specific version of the Buddhist doctrines is correct and point out that the others are not?” he questioned.

Venerable Shine Warat Dhammo, an undergraduate student monk at the International College of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, a Buddhist university in Bangkok, said that if the bill is passed it may become the religious version of the controversial Article 112 of the Criminal Code, aka the lèse majesté law.

“It will be a grave danger to education especially tertiary religious education of both monks and lay persons alike,” he added.

Nidhi Eoseewong, a prominent Thai historian and political commentator, also drew a comparison between the Bill to Patronise and Protect Buddhism and Thailand’s lèse majesté law.

At a public seminar on ‘Religion and State: We Won’t Be Able to Separate in this Life’ organized by Dome Front Agora, a student group at Thammasat University’s Tha Prachan Campus in Bangkok on 21 February, Nidhi pointed out “No one really knows what the Lord Buddha taught word by word. You only have the Tripitaka which was in fact written some 500 years after the Lord Buddha died. Therefore, even the oldest Buddhist scripture is written through an interpretative process.”

Tightening the rules against ‘sexually deviant’ monks         

In an attempt to prevent men with sexual orientations other than heterosexuality from entering the monkhood, Article 40 under Section 8 of the bill stipulates that monks who perform, knowingly or unwittingly, an ordination ceremony for persons with “deviant sexual behaviour” can also be punished with a prison term of no more than one month.

Article 41 of Section 8 also states that monks who are ‘sexually deviant’ can be imprisoned for up to one month if they cause ‘harm and disgrace’ to Buddhism although the bill does not mention what kinds of actions are deemed harmful to Buddhism.

In countries where Theravada Buddhism is a prominent faith, such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Cambodia, the subject of homosexuality and monkhood is understudied. In Thailand, although homosexuality is generally accepted, since the Vinaya, the Buddhist monastic rules, stipulates that monks must be celibate, most monks choose to remain silent about their sexual orientation.

A photo of two men in Buddhist monk robes kissing, posted on a Facebook page titled Monk Fetish, a page which uploads pictures of appealing Buddhist clergymen

In Thailand, the SSC has never applied strict rules regarding this matter. Sulak said that even some high-ranking monks in the SSC are themselves openly homosexual. Nonetheless, if the Bill to Patronise and Protect Buddhism is enacted, this could all be changed.   

Venerable Shine believes that the disenfranchisement of people of alternative sexes and genders from the Buddhist monkhood is a form of violence and a violation of human rights.

“It seems as if people who took part in writing this bill hold prejudiced views against people with alternative sexes and genders. This is a form of violence and a violation of human rights because naturally gender and sex can’t be straightforwardly defined as male and female.” the monk told Prachatai.

He added that the application of this section of the bill is going to be problematic because it is based on prejudice.

“Although the bill states that only monks with alternative sexes and genders who cause harm to Buddhism could be prosecuted, the bill does not mention what sort of actions constitutes harm to Buddhism. Since the wording of this section of the bill already discriminates against monks with alternative sexes and genders, its application will be very problematic,” he added.

Religious hindrance to democracy

Besides the legal loopholes in the bill, Vichak Panich, a Matichon columnist and expert on Buddhism and religious studies, pointed out that if the bill on protecting and patronising Buddhism is going to pass, it will become another obstacle to democracy in Thailand.

“This bill will give the SSC, which is already quite a dictatorial organization, since it is not transparent and elected, the power to prosecute not only monks but also lay persons who defy its authority,” said Vichak.

Vichak added that the version of Theravada Buddhism which is promoted by the SSC and the National Office of Buddhism (NOB) in Thailand always has two functions in Thai society.

“It [Theravada Buddhism] is promoted as a part of the Thai identity and nationalism. Moreover, it promotes the intangible concept of virtue and morality over freedom and rights. This lends support and justification for some groups of people in society to judge others,” said Vichak. “It is no surprise that this bill is being accepted under the current political regime.” added the religious expert.

In addition, according to Sulak, an attempt to further elevate the status of Buddhism in Thai society can backfire and become a grave danger to Thailand’s plural society.

In the 2011 version of the Bill to Patronise and Protect Buddhism, Article 4 states that Buddhism will be made the state religion of Thailand. However, in the current draft bill, which has been approved by the junta cabinet, the statement that Buddhism is a state religion has been deleted.  

“Although Buddhism is not the state religion now, Buddhism always assumes a state of paramountcy over other religions in Thailand and the Buddhist clergy already enjoy many privileges. If it is to become a state religion it might stir up some conflicts with other religious minorities in the country,” Sulak told Prachatai.

To sum up, Venerable Shine pointed out that the bill itself is counterproductive and would end up destroying Buddhism instead of protecting and patronising it.

“In order to thrive, religion must always be adaptable to societies to allow people to understand its practices and teachings, including, making itself open for debate and discussion. If this is prohibited, then the religion itself would be dead,” he concluded.

Sansern Sriounruen speaks to members of the so-called "red-shirt village" at a university in Buriram in December 2013

Eight months after the implementation of the Thai government’s Master Plan to reforest the country, villagers in Isaan bear the burden of a flawed policy at the cost of their livelihood and health.

KALASIN – Three thousand rubber trees lie fallen on top of each other as if nothing more than a row of toppled dominoes. A slender man with calloused hands and laugh lines around his eyes gazes at the field that was once his life savings, primary source of income, and home. It is now covered in weeds, destroyed in the name of environmental conservation and reforestation.

Paiwan Taebamrung, 46-years-old, recounts the circumstances under which it all happened. A district officer came fully armed to his house at night demanding Paiwan leave his property. The smell of whiskey was in the air. Three days later, the officer returned with the village headman. Paiwan watched as dozens of officers cut down 30 out of 36 rai of his rubber trees.

The Master Plan, rolled out by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) shortly after the coup last year, purports to target commercial investors who own and exploit thousands of rai to grow rubber, cassava, and other cash crops.

Villagers claim they are not at all investors – only poor families trying to make a living on land they have worked their whole lives.

“Many impoverished villagers who have lived in the forest for decades have been identified as investors,” explains Dr. Nattakant Akarapongpisak, a lecturer in the Faculty of Politics and Government at Maha Sarakham University.

This was the case with Paiwan. “They labeled me an investor and told me I had to move out. My family has been working on this land for 47 years.” Paiwan’s house was deemed an illegal structure, and he and his wife have had to move in with his elder sister.

Now, eight months after his eviction, the repercussions of the Master Plan are as strong as ever. Paiwan and his wife have had to find work as day laborers making the minimum wage of 300 baht per day.

“It is hard to make ends meet,” he says, “and I feel frustrated I am not working my own land. I worked in the South for 20 years to save up enough money to buy the rubber trees.”

According to the Internal Security Operations Command, farmers in 68 provinces are facing similar charges and evictions. What began as an admirable goal of achieving forest cover in Thailand within 10 years has now turned into a laundry list of human rights violations.

The International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) clearly outlines the right to work, and protects people from deprivation of their means of subsistence. Barring access to land directly contradicts the principles the Thai state has sworn to uphold.

With his land seized, Pongsamai Silawan, a resident of Kalasin province, lost his primary means of income. He soon discovered that his meager salary as a day laborer was not enough to support his family.

“I have to sneak onto my land to tap for rubber,” the 52-year-old Pongsamai says. He recounts the events of a day following his secret tapping. As he was cooking rice, he heard the dogs barking. “I dropped everything. The officers were coming,” he says. “When the dogs bark, I am ready to run.”

If caught, Pongsamai could face up to four years in prison.

Pongsamai faces a dilemma. “Between being afraid and having no food, which would you choose?” he asks. He has had to cut back on many expenses. “I can’t afford food from the market. I must scavenge for it in the forest. I don’t have money for my motorcycle, and I am even in debt to the gas station.”

In the nearby village of Jatrabiab, in Sakon Nakhon Province, the government has taken a more direct approach. Labeled as “investors,” 34 villagers have been charged with trespassing and encroachment.

Charges have piled up in some families. The Srikham family had three members charged for encroachment. Khamlamun Srikham was called in to the Royal Forestry Department (RFD) under the pretext of registering her land in order to receive land titles.

She had wanted to divide the land she farmed into three parts – one for herself, and two parts for her daughters who could have land titles in their own names as an inheritance.

Yet soon after, Khamlamun and her two daughters were all charged for trespassing. The key piece of evidence behind the charges was the very information Khamlamun had provided to the RFD.

“We trusted [the RFD representative] as a government employee, that he would allocate the land to us,” Chai Thongdeenok explains. “But the RFD truly tricked us villagers. Now we have no rights and cannot use the land.”

Khamlamun’s eldest daughter was charged even though she’s been working in Bangkok for over 20 years. She now has to cover transportation costs to and from Bangkok to attend court hearings.

For Amorn,  Khamlamun’s younger daughter, what hurts the most is the effect the charges have had on her father. “He used to talk and laugh. But since the court case he is quiet and doesn’t say much,” she says. “I believe everyone who’s been charged is suffering from depression.”

Charges have been often exaggerated, say many of those arrested, adding even more pressure on these fragile families. When Khamphai Todkaew was brought to court, she found that she had been charged with farming 36 rai of land, when she only owned four rai.

These discrepancies in charges are not anomalies – of the 34 people charged, 25 reported being charged with incorrect property amounts.

Khamphai’s husband, Prasert, offered to be charged in her place, and thought he had reached an agreement with the police to such effect. Yet when the case was brought before the judge, the court charged both husband and wife.

They were presented with two choices: either fight but risk four years in prison if found guilty, or give up and suffer a reduced penalty of two years. In the absence of adequate legal advice, they opted not to fight the charge and instead plead guilty.

The arrests of both the mother and father have shaken the entire family. The eldest son, Lerdsak, 23 years old, has fallen apart emotionally. After 10 days in a psychiatric ward, he has returned home but is still at risk. “Every day now my brother has to take psychiatric medicines to manage his condition,” says his brother, Jakkrit. “He cannot work and we must spend a lot of time taking care of him.”

At least three families have had a family member see a doctor or have been admitted to the hospital for psychiatric illnesses. This not only puts an added strain on state mental health facilities, but burdens families with medical payments and extra care of loved ones.

Despite negotiations with representatives of the RFD, farmers in Jatrabiab were denied access to their land during the legal proceedings. A survey of families shows that 75% of those charged are barring access to their primary source of income, resulting in an average loss of monthly income of 50-80 percent per capita.

The absence of a steady primary income source, court fees, and agricultural loans have resulted in insurmountable debt. Collectively, the charged villagers owe around 4.2 million baht, or 180,000 baht per person on average.

Even under the best circumstances, it would take a farmer almost a decade to pay off this debt even without interest. When external factors such as available workdays, health and family expenses, and unexpected expenditures are taken into account, it is unlikely that families can ever repay it.

Land evictions of this type in Thailand have rarely met positive outcomes. The prospects of compensation from the state are low, says Nattakant, drawing comparisons with the Khor Jor Korprogram in 1992. According to Dr. Nattakant, under the 1992 program, government officials stated that there would be just and appropriate compensation measures. However, the funding never came and the land the government allocated was already occupied.

Today, military rule exacerbates the situation, argues Nattakant. “Officials have blocked villagers any access to help from their allies, including media, NGOs, activists, and academics. Some of the villagers have been received death threats if they tell the media about their plight.”

The military makes it nearly impossible for villagers to share their concerns with larger society. “The use of martial law or Section 44 of the interim constitution and the repeated summoning processes,” says Nattakant, “clearly violate the rights of local people to resist, or even question the implementation of the plan.”

Despite international condemnation and statements issued by the United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), the NCPO has failed to protect the rights of the poor. As of last November, over 500 forest encroachers had been prosecuted and 300,000 rai of land had been seized.

Under the NCPO’s approach, many more will suffer like Pongsamai and the Todkaew children, as they are pushed off their land and further into the margins of Thai society.

About the author: Sarah Sanbar studies International Relations at Claremont McKenna College. She is a student-journalist on the CIEE Khon Kaen study abroad program.

The article is first publish on The Isaan Record

Aum Neko in a sexually provocative pose at the Pridi Banomyong statue at Thammasat University in 2012.

 

 

Aum Neko was behind the posters advocating the abolition of university uniforms by portraying students in uniform simulating various sexual acts. The university ordered the posters to be taken down a day after they were placed around the campus

 

Turn on English subtitle at the bottom right corner.