What does "Last round" mean to Suthep? An infographic shows speeches of Suthep Thaugsuban on the PDRC stage, addresing to the protesters about the "last round" of fights against Thaksin regime which seem never really the last.
See bigger image here.
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"Last Round" of Suthep over 180 days
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The 21 announcements of the National Peace and Order Maintenance Council (NPOMC)
The 21 announcements of the National Peace and Order Maintenance Council (NPOMC)
following the coup on May 22, 2014 at 16.30
The NPOMC has
1. seized the country
2. declared nationwide martial law
3. imposed a curfew from 22.00-05.00
4. prohibited all television and radio broadcasts
5. annulled the 2007 constitution
6. appointed people to important positions in the NPOMC
7. banned political gatherings
8. exempted those with particular necessities from the curfew
9. ordered educational institutions to close from May 23-25
10. given the head of the National Peace and Order Maintenance Council (NPOMC) the highest power as Prime Minister.
11. annulled the 5th announcement and then annulled the 2007 constitution except for sections on the monarchy
12. asked social media companies not to spread provocative messages
13. summoned important political figures, government and state enterprise officials and governors
14. bared newspapers, radio, and TV from interviewing academics with critical views
15. ceased all broadcasts on satellite, cable, and digital TV channels and community radio
16. ordered permanent secretaries to function in the place of the cabinet
17. ordered internet service providers to report on and monitor information that incites unrest
18. barred all media from presenting critical news, and gathering against the junta
19. summoned more important figures
20. invited diplomats, international organisations and military attachés to meet with the junta
21. forbidden listed people from travelling outside of the Kingdom
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[Infographic] Travel warnings to Thailand
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[Infographic] How many days did the junta detain people?
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When truth is missing from the land of (pretended) smiles
On Thai television, Thailand seems very normal and Thais seem to be happy under the coup d’état. There is very little resistance and Thais seem to have adapted very quickly to the new regime. One slight difference is that the short documentaries publicizing the king’s dedication are aired more frequently. There are occasional interruptions to allow for the announcements of the coup makers. And all TV channels must air a special 15-minute programme by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the junta's administrative body, at 6 pm every day. The daily programme shows how the coup makers are working very hard to follow the slogan of coup leader Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha “Resurgent Happiness” for the Thai people.
Until recently, a 20-minute-long video entitled “Resurgent Truth Thailand #1” was circulated on the social media.
Teaser of Resurgent Truth part 1 with English subtitles. (If you have problem turning on the subtitles, please see here)
“While the junta created the “Resurgent Happiness” campaign, people actually live in fear,” said a representative of the group, who asked not to be identified due to safety concerns, but who will be referred to in the story as Somchai.
“The junta put guns to people’s heads and force them to smile with happiness. Some people may be really happy, while another group can’t even say that they aren’t happy,” he said.
While opposing the coup runs a serious risk of being arrested, people should at least access the truth of what really happened or “another side of truth” which is forbidden under the military regime.
“While the coup makers try to present the image that detainees have been treated very well, that’s not the point. The point is that this is a violation of people’s rights and freedoms. Some people face more charges. Some people were arrested because they did not report. This is what the coup makers want people to forget.”
Logo of the Resurgent Truth
In the first video of the series, the group interviewed the activists who organized anti-coup reading activities, a lawyer from Thai Lawyers for Human Rights who provide legal aid to people affected by the coup, a group of volunteer observers of human rights violations, the students who were arrested and released for organizing anti-coup sandwich-eating and reading activities, an ex-detenee, etc.
Most of them tell their stories of how and why they got involved in the activities and how they think of "happiness," forcibly given by Gen Prayuth, while the junta's song "Return Happiness to Thailand" of which lyric was composed by Gen Prayuth, is played in the background.
The video has stirred debate in Thai society. Unsurprisingly, the video was blocked by the MICT or the Ministry of Internet Censorship Technology, as it is called in Thailand, within less than 24 hours after it was published. This is added to more than hundreds of websites being blocked earlier.
So far, at least 454 people have been officially summoned in Bangkok and an additional 57 informally summoned in the provinces. At least 178 have been arrested. Of these, 55 were apprehended during public demonstrations. Among the 214 individuals who have been detained and then discharged, most were detained for seven days. The authorities have charged some of the individuals arrested with the serious crimes of sedition and lèse majesté. Moreover, they will be tried in military courts.
Somchai said the group is composed of people from various professions, including media professionals, creative directors, videographers, and activists.
Apart from Resurgent Truth, Reporters Without Censors, an underground media group, has been established. The group said the anonymity of group members would allow uncensored reporting.
While Somchai said his group does "not want to say that the activities are aimed at opposing the coup”, Reporters Without Censors explicitly said their mission on uncensored reporting is to defy the junta.
“Our activity is to defy their demands, while they want us to remain docile and follow their instructions. Believe only them. Consume only controlled media. We give an alternative which does the opposite of what is instructed, to oppose the junta,” said a representative of Reporters Without Censors. “The junta wants all Thai citizens’ brains to suffer from malnutrition, so that their brains are empty and ready just to follow orders.
Truth, fear and happiness
Photos from Resurgent Truth #1
On 24 June, military officers visited the newsroom of a Thai-language newspaper, and instructed the editorial staff not to report the establishment of Free Thais for Human Rights and Democracy (FTHD), an anti-coup group in exile.
The issue was later discussed during a meeting between media representatives and the junta representatives.
A representative from a right-wing newspaper seemed to be very frustrated with the junta’s hesitation to intervene in the media’s editorial decisions and proposed that the junta tell them directly what to report and what not to report. "The NCPO's order that media should exercise 'judgement' is too vague."
Gen Udomdej Sitabutr, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, in his capacity as the Secretary-General of the NCPO told the media representatives “The media should carefully exercise their judgement. Do you wish to see people who think differently like this in society? To be frank, I think you should not report [about the FTHD] because they’re the same people. If you report about it, there’ll be a problem. Ok, I agree that you may have to at least say something about it. But not the full content because then we’ll face the same conflict.”
The general’s words, quoted by the Post Today, reflect the mind-set of the junta, and most importantly, of coup leader Gen Prayuth, that differences and conflict are undesirable in Thai society.
It also reflects the junta’s belief that if they can suppress political activists, silence all different voices and censor differences, the colour-coded conflict will be dissolved. What Thai people should do is to put faith in the junta, blindly believe and follow the junta, and happiness will return to the land of smiles.
The junta’s song - lyrics by Gen. Prayuth - captures this idea very well:
“We will do as promised. Give us some time.
Then the land will be beautiful as it was before.
We will be honest, so you should just trust us and have faith in us.
The land will be alleviated.
I want to return happiness to you, my people”
Happiness has become a buzz word in Thailand. But under the gun, who could possibly say anything else? Only happiness and approval is allowed to be reported, not fear and disapproval.
While people are living in fear, “Telling the truth is the easiest and the most sustainable way of opposing the coup,” said Somchai.
The full video of Resurgent Truth #1 with English subtitle. (If you have problem turning on the subtitles, please see here)
Suluck Lamubol contributed to this report.
Read related news: Roundup: human rights violations after the coup
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[infographic] The Vicious Cycle of Amnesty
The latest round of crisis in Thai politics, which ended with a coup d’état, started with the controversial blanket amnesty bill, supported by the ruling Pheu Thai party.
The bill was aimed at granting an amnesty to those involved in all political incidents taking place between the 2006 military coup d’état and May 2011. Besides protestors, it also included government officials and those who gave orders and committed crimes in political incidents between 2004 and August 2013 and those accused and convicted by the now-defunct Assets Examination Committee. The controversy arose as this meant that former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his Deputy, Suthep Thuagsuban, both responsible for the crackdown on anti-establishment red shirts in 2010, would walk free from prosecutions over the 92 deaths during the crackdown, and former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra would not have to serve a jail term over his conviction for abuse of authority and would escape any possible punishment for human rights violations in the restive Deep South.
The Thai junta who staged the latest coup on 22 May 2014 is now drafting an interim constitution. A self-declared amnesty is a predictable consequence after any military coup and has been repeated since the 1976 coup d’état. It is anticipated that this charter will also grant an amnesty for the coup makers.
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the coup leader, and his coup group have to obtain an amnesty to protect them from criminal liability. A coup is a crime that is subject to capital punishment; however it is rare to obtain a conviction of coup makers in court. This reflects the institutionalization of coups in Thailand, given how they are accepted by parties and the courts. The military cannot stage a coup on its own. It requires the help of different branches of power and legitimacy to legalize the new government. With the courts’ recognition of the coup group as those wielding absolute power during the vacuum period and acceptance of the amnesty status of the coup makers, military coups have become part of an unwritten constitution in Thailand.
The infographic by Prachatai shows the timeline of the Thai political crisis starting with the amnesty bill under the civilian government of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and ending with the anticipated amnesty for the coup makers.
See larger image here.
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Military ill-treats, threatens to kill anti-coup protesters
Contrary to what the junta has tried to claim, that all detainees were treated very well while in their custody, other than being deprived of their freedom, the first account of degrading treatment of anti-coup protesters by the military has been revealed.
Unlike other ‘well-treated’ detainees, they are not renowned academics or activists. They were not summoned and the arrests had no media presence. They are men in their twenties from the North East who came to Bangkok for the examinations at an open university in Bangkok. Their names and affiliations are not revealed out of concern for their safety.
At 9.40 pm one night, around two weeks after the coup, the military arrested a male student, Mr A, at the campus. Upon arrest, Mr A stood still with no intention to flee, but the military officer held him by the neck, kicked his knee joint and then hit him in the back with an Uzi submachine gun. Mr A fell to the ground. The military searched and found 16 6-by-3 inches stickers read "No Coup, No Coup" and "Let the People Decide," which had appeared on electricity posts around the campus in the past few days.
Two friends who rushed to the scene were also arrested even though the military officers searched them and found no stickers.
Mr A told the military that he did not own the stickers and that he had found them unattended. The military then took him to the place where he claimed to have found the stickers. The military later took them to their residences and searched for illegal objects. At the dorm of one detainee, the military found and took photos of a t-shirt with messages supporting Nitirat, a sticker supporting the amendment of the lèse majesté law and books on the Russian Revolution.
Later the military took them to a nearby police station where the military and the police interrogated them separately in a rather dark room with no windows. The focus of the interrogation was who hired them, how much they were paid, and what their political ideology was. The military officers spoke very impolitely, using ‘ku’ and ‘mueng’ (disrespectful words for ‘I’ and ‘you’) with the detainees.
“They asked me ‘Who incited you? University lecturers? These lecturers are trouble makers.’ They then asked me which lecturers I study with. I said I rarely attended class and had just finished my job as a sugar cane carrier in the provinces and came to Bangkok for the examinations. The military then checked the examination schedule to see if I was lying,” one of them told Prachatai.
The interrogation lasted many hours. They were allowed to sleep for only a few hours before the police woke them up before 6 am for further interrogation.
Since their arrest, they had been deprived of food and water. At 9 am, they were allowed to drink water and have breakfast.
Mr A later confessed that they got the stickers from another friend. The police then raided the dorm and arrested Mr B.
Mr B confessed that he himself produced 1,000 stickers.
The police then forwarded the case to the military. The four were interrogated again by the military. The focus of the interrogation was who masterminded them, who paid them to distribute the stickers and their political ideology.
At around 7 pm, the military put them in an old unlicensed van with no plates and blindfolded them.
In the van, the military hinted about having them killed.
“The soldiers told us to fall asleep. Told us to think of our moms and dads,” one of them said. “They scared us while we were blindfolded. They instructed another soldier on the phone to prepare four dishes of rice, lotus flowers and holy threads and to dig four holes.”
In Thailand, a rice dish is an offering for a spirit while the holy threads are used to fasten a lotus flower to a corpse’s hands before burial/cremation.
At a temporary military camp they were interrogated again.
“They asked me if we knew what system of government existed before 1932. I replied that it was an absolute monarchy. The soldier said “Yes, absolute monarchy is the answer. When Thailand is democratic, there’s chaos and struggle. That’s why we have to take over.”
The interrogator also asked if Sombat Boonngam-anong, a prominent anti-coup red-shirt activist, was behind them.
After the interrogation, they were allowed to rest. “The soldier told us if we couldn’t sleep, we should use a chair and rope. “String the rope up so that you’ll have a nice sleep.”
The next morning, another military officer with higher rank came to talk to them. They said this officer spoke to them nicely, before taking them to a police station to sign a release agreement that they will have to stop all political activity. They were released around noon.
“The scariest moment was when I was blindfolded in the van because I did not know where I was being taken. It felt like years, but actually it was not far away. When we were allowed to sleep at the camp, I couldn’t sleep because I was afraid that I would be taken to be beaten up. We were not allowed to contact anyone. Our mobile phones were confiscated,” said Mr A.
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A Call to Remember: 6 years of Da Torpedo behind bars for lèse majesté
This story was published on Prachatai in Thai on Monday and the original can be read here. Today (Tuesday) is both the six-year anniversary of the arrest of Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul, aka Da Torpedo, and the two-month anniversary of the coup by the junta's National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Daranee is currently serving a fifteen-year sentence for three alleged violations of Article 112. During the past six years, Daranee has experienced consistent obstacles in accessing justice. She still lives in pain with degenerative jaw disease. In late 2013, she decided to cease her appeal to the Supreme Court and request a royal pardon, whose result she is currently awaiting.
Daranee originally wanted to take her case to the end point of the Supreme Court so it would be a case recorded in history for later generations to study. Even without a decision by the Supreme Court, her case is a historic one, for a variety reasons, some which can be uttered and others which cannot. The final question that Metta Wongwat conveys from Daranee is one appropriate for both the anniversary of her imprisonment and the anniversary of the coup: “The conflict is proof of the strength of the level of democracy [in Thailand]. There is nothing strange about the conflicts among the people over thinking. But how will we manage the conflict so that we are able to live together?”
Several clarifying additions for English-language readers have been put in [ ] in the text.
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22 July 2014 is the six-year anniversary of the imprisonment of Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul, or ‘Da Torpedo,’ at the Central Women’s Prison.
She was the first political prisoner [of this era] to be imprisoned under Article 112.
Retracing a memory: the case of Da Torpedo
After General Sonthi Boonyaratglin fomented the 2006 coup, scattered opposition groups were born. These were small, little groups which existed before the establishment of the Democratic Alliance Against Dictatorship (DAAD), which then expanded to become the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) of today. At that time, different groups of people made speeches against the coup at Sanam Luang. The majority were those who admired the Thai Rak Thai Party, mixed together with some progressives. They gathered in small groups and the listeners numbered not many tens of people. Daranee was a star of the ‘Hyde Park’ at Sanam Luang, and her fiery and straightforward speech earned her the nickname ‘Da Torpedo.’
All of this occurred in the context of the existence of significant divisions among how people in society thought, particularly about the institution of the monarchy, which was omnipresent and used widely as a political tool. This was the case to the degree that the junta was able to use the institution of the monarchy to gain legitimacy in fomenting the 2006 coup, which then caused the role of the institution of the monarchy [in society and politics] to be criticized even more severely.
In 2007, big news was made when a vendor from Pak Klong Market threw feces in Daranee’s face. The vendor claimed that she did so because she could not bear Daranee’s speech about General Prem Tinsulanond.
The story of Daranee’s speech on a small stage on Sanam Luang on the evening of 20 July 2008 became well-known in society as a result of the actions of Sonthi Limthongkul. He recorded her
speech and then read it on the Makkawan stage [of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)], which was also live streamed on both cable television and online [the Manager/ASTV website]. During this period, the PAD was demonstrating to call for the ouster of the government of Samak Sundaravej of the People’s Power Party.
“This bitch should be put in prison, and should be killed as well. I speak from my soul, I swear, don’t let me meet with her. I will beat the bitch until she is completely flattened. She is the most vile, brothers and sisters. Don’t listen to her, she has defamed beyond defamation. She has gone ten times beyond the defamation committed by Jakrapob.”
“I have never seen anyone more wicked than this damn woman, the mother of all the damned.”
Sonthi hinted that he was referring to Daranee before he read parts of her speech word for word on the stage.
The next day, the Army sent an urgent letter to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner about prosecuting those who commit offenses against the king. The Army asked the Metropolitan Police to examine the speech of Ms. Daranee. If it was found that there was wrongdoing, the Metropolitan Police were to proceed in accordance with the law.
The next day, the court issued a warrant for her arrest. The police arrested Daranee at her apartment and she has been in prison since then up until today.
She was sentenced by the Appeal Court to 15 years in prison for 3 counts of wrongdoing (she spoke on the small stage three times). The case is now finished and those who are interested can read the decision of the Court of First Instance, including what she said on the stage, in Fa Diew Kan, which printed the entire decision in the issue on “New Information,” Volume 7, Issue 3, in 2009.
(While she was imprisoned, she was also found guilty of defaming Sonthi Limthongkul. The Court ordered her to pay a fine of 50,000 baht. In addition, she was found guilty of defaming General Saprang Kalyanamitr and fined 50,000 baht.)
Sonthi Limthongkul was charged with violating Article 112 for repeating her speech from Sanam Luang on the Makkawan Stage; the Court of First Instance threw out the case as they viewed that the defendant was acting with the intention to bring a case against Daranee and this was not within the scope of violation of Article 112. Subsequently, the Appeal Court overturned this decision and sentenced him to 2 years in prison, but he was granted bail. The Appeal Court offered the opinion that, “It was not necessary for the defendant to broadcast and repeat the content [of Daranee’s speech] in public. This is because some Thais did not know the content of Ms. Daranee’s speech, and came to learn about it from the defendant’s speech. This resulted in criticism that affected the institution [of the monarchy]. This was an action that was not sufficiently circumspect.”=
The genealogy of a thought criminal
Daranee completed her bachelor’s degree at Ramkhamhaeng University. She studied for a master’s degree at Thammasat University, but did not complete because she had a disagreement with a professor, and so she continued her graduate study at Krirk University. Her path always led her to choose to study political science without deviation.
Her older brother said that his younger sister was a bookworm. She had to rent two rooms: one to live in and one for her books.
“I like to buy and read books. Sometimes I bought them and put them away for later. I had about a thousand books. But now I do not know where they are any longer,” Daranee said after 6 years in prison.
“Before, I liked to read run-of-the-mill academic books, about politics, history, sociology. But in the later periods, before I went on the stage, I read the work of Supot Dantrakul. I have not read all of his books, only some of them,” Da said.
During her time in the Women’s’ Prison, Daranee has gone from a hardcore political to a person who does not know the country’s news. The channels through which to learn about what is taking place are through hearing news from new prisoners or chatting with the wardens. The Women’s Prison has a rule which forbids prisoners from watching the news. They are only permitted to watch Korean and Thai films. Daranee said that once, many years ago, she was punished and prevented from visiting with her relatives for a week because she had secretly tuned to a news channel on the prison television.
At the same time, the books and magazines in the prison are limited. They are women’s magazines that are years out-of-date. This is what she tells those who come to visit. This lack of books is in addition to the below-standard quality of life of the women prisoners, which results from crowding, problems of organization, overly-strict rules and regulations, and the problems of budget shortfalls.
An account of systemic problems is often heard from the mouth of this student of politics. This is not only a problem of the prison, but extends to the political problems of the country as well.
During the past 6 years there are many things that have changed and many that have not.
Things that have not changed
First, the foundation of her thinking has not changed from the first year that I went to visit her until the sixth year when we once again had the chance to speak for a short, 15-minute period. She still maintains that inequality and the wide gaps between classes are the most significant problems of Thai society. This caused her to be impressed with the policies of the Thai Rak Thai party, since the things that are called ‘populism’ had positive effects that reached the lives of the lower-class people directly. Even though she was very disappointed with this party’s inability to protect or assist the people who rose up to demand what she called ‘democracy,’ no matter. She thinks that economic policy is very important, and must be emphasized for the people at the grassroots to be able to come along in the world.
“When people are economically equal, the effect will be to make them more politically equal,” Da said.
Significantly, she often expressed concern about the ability of Thailand to compete when the ASEAN Economic Community was opened. She worried that Thailand lagged behind its neighbors.
One visitor joked with Da that, “Perhaps the issue of the AEC does not matter. It’s better to tackle our urgent issues first.”
Second, the condition of her inflamed jaw and the adhesions between the top and bottom portions have not changed. At present she still suffers with this disease. She cannot fully open her mouth when she eats or speaks. She said that she did not dare to undergo surgery in the prison as it is a major surgery. The recovery takes a month. Within the prison system, she would be cared for during recovery by her fellow prisoners. But as she has argued with many big shot prisoners, she does not have confidence in this process.
Once she joked that when she was in pain, she took paracetamol, and perhaps before she is released and has the surgery she will end up with liver disease.
Things that have changed
First, from the time that Daranee fought the case in the Court of First Instance, she said that she would fight the case until it reached it’s end in the Supreme Court. This is because she wanted hers to be a historic case that the next generations can learn from by reading the Supreme Court decision. But it seems that her hope has been collapsed. After the long fight in the case and the upholding of the 15-year sentence by the Appeal Court, she no longer places hope in fighting the case. The people who came to visit her seemed to evaporate until there were nearly none in the later years. Plus her brother became unable to continue visiting her every week once fate brought him to be forced to live in a prison cell as well.
“Now, there is a new regulation. Prisoners are to write the names of 10 persons who come visit them. Anyone in addition to this cannot come visit.” She appealed this new regulation which may have caused her to meet with even fewer people.
Daranee said that she cannot remember when she withdrew her Supreme Court appeal, but it resulted in her case ending with the Appeal Court decision. From that point, she requested an individual royal pardon at the end of 2013. She learned that the matter was in the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary in January of this year, and now can perhaps only await his mercy.
The second thing that changed is her dream that she would enter politics. In prior years, she had said that she would do so and her role in Parliament would be to push for policies to urgently assist lower-class people. But at present her dream after she is released is to write a book about her life in prison. She plans to use one part of the proceeds to establish a hotline center to help prisoners who do not receive justice in their cases, such as those who do not have lawyers, have problems with documents, etc.
No one has asked her yet when her political dream slipped away.
Daranee at a court hearing (file photo)
A new librarian in the prison
However, Daranee has had some good news in the 6 years she has been in prison. She was appointed the librarian to look after a small library in the first (receiving) zone of prison.
She wants to inform people that anyone who wants to donate books can do so. Any kind of books except political books can be donated. It is best if two copies can be donated as if one copy is donated it will be sent to the library in the zone for people who are imprisoned on grave cases.
In one period, Daranee talked about the good books available in prison and noted that she had read a book of interviews with academics collected on the occasion of the 100 year anniversary of Pridi Banomyong (Pridi is a name that she often talked about when she was first in the prison). She mentioned the comments of Ajarn Chantana Banpasirichote Wankaew, with whom she was impressed.
“The conflict is proof of the strength of the level of democracy [in Thailand]. There is nothing strange about the conflicts among the people over thinking. But how will we manage the conflict so that we are able to live together?” This question may be one that she wishes to leave with society on the occasion of her sixth year in prison.
Timeline of Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul’s Case
(Compiled from the Freedom of Information Documentation Centre of iLaw)
22 July 2008: Arrested at her apartment. Bail is denied.
25 July 2008: Suthachai Yimprasert, lecturer in the Faculty of Arts at Chulalongkorn University, submitted a petition for her bail. The officials at the Appeal Court accepted the petition.
1 August 2008: The Appeal Court dismissed the petition for temporary release. After examination, they offered the opinion that this offense possessed a high penalty, was a serious crime, and affected the hearts of the people. If the accused was released, they worried that she would commit additional crimes.
9 October 2008: The Court accepted the case from the prosecutor in the Office of the Attorney General (Office of the Special Prosecutor for Criminal Cases, Area 7). The case was assigned Black Case No. Or. 3959/2551.
16 October 2008: Suthachai submitted another petition for temporary release. The Court of First Instance and the Appeal Court dismissed the petition on the same day.
1 December 2008: The Criminal Court met to examine the evidence and question the defendant. They ruled to move the meeting until 15 December as the defendant had just appointed a lawyer at the end of November. Prawais Praphanukul, her lawyer, submitted a petition for temporary release. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition and claimed that there was no reason to change the initial order.
4 December 2008: Daranee’s lawyer submitted an appeal of the order of the Court of First Instance that dismissed the request for temporary release. He argued that the order to deny temporary release per Article 108/1 [of the Criminal Procedure Code] must be a case in which an accused/defendant will flee or interfere with evidence, or create an otherwise dangerous situation; or the petitioner must be an untrustworthy person who would cause damage to the investigation or carrying out of the case. In this case it did not appear that the defendant would be able to interfere with the evidence because the officials had already investigated and proceeded with the case. Regarding flight, this was only a presumption without any presentation of credible cause that the defendant would flee. The Court of First Instance relied on facts outside the case file in its analysis and the ruling was in conflict with Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 39 of the 2007 Constitution because this case is still at the level of examination. Whether or not the defendant has committed the crimes as charged was still unconfirmed. Therefore, she must be held to be innocent. Subsequently, in mid-December, the Appeal Court upheld the original logic of the Court of First Instance. In other words, permission for temporary release was denied and the petition was dismissed.
15 December 2008: The Court set the dates of witness testimony by the plaintiff witnesses for 23-25 June 2009 and the defense witnesses for 26-30 June 2009.
23 June 2009: Judge Phromas Phusaeng of the Criminal Court ordered for this case to be examined in secret per Article 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
24 June 2009: Daranee released a statement to the ‘Media and brothers and sisters who love justice.’ In the statement she noted that she became a lèse majesté defendant on 22 July 2008 and had been detained for a year without release up until the present, while many others facing the same charge were granted bail.
In the statement, Daranee raised the question about the examination of her case, which the court had ordered to be held in secret without allowing any media or people to come to listen. How come these guidelines were not used in other cases “of the same charge and type,” or other cases of lèse majesté? Her view was that the secret examination of her case was an obfuscation of the truth, the prevention of the people from gaining knowledge, and was a complete destruction of the principles of justice.
25 June 2009: In Room 904 of the Criminal Court, her lawyer submitted a petition to the court to temporarily halt the examination of the case per Article 211 of the Constitution. He noted that the Criminal Court’s order to examine the case in secret and to prevent ordinary people from coming to listen was in conflict with Article 40(2) of the 2007 Constitution, which stipulates basic rights in the process of examination in the court, and in conflict with Article 29 of the Constitution, which stipulates the limitations that can be placed on an individual’s rights and liberties.
The defendant’s view was that Article 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code on which the Court relied on to order the secret examination of the case was in conflict with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court had not yet offered analysis on this matter. Therefore, the defendant asked the Court to forward these views to the Constitutional Court for analysis. Per Article 211 of the Constitution, they asked the Criminal Court to wait to decide the case until the Constitutional Court made a comment.
Subsequently that day, the Court examined and dismissed the petition of the defendant. They noted that secret examination was not in conflict with Article 211 of the Constitution, as the defendant had a lawyer and was able to submit any and all evidence to the Court. The examination of the case would therefore continue.
However, after the examination of the plaintiff witnesses, Daranee’s lawyer requested that the Court move the examination of defense witnesses from 26 and 30 June as originally scheduled to 28 July and 5 August. The Court agreed.
28 August 2009: The Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty as charged of committing several different counts of wrongdoing. She was punished for each count. She was sentenced to 6 years in prison for each of 3 counts, for a total of a prison sentence of 18 years.
The defendant appealed and asked the Court to send her petition to the Constitutional Court on the basis that there was not yet a comment by the Constitutional Court on whether or not Article 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code was in conflict with Articles 29 and 40 of the 2007 Constitution. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition.
9 February 2011: The Appeal Court ruled that when they examined the appeal they found that the defendant’s petition had never been sent to the Constitutional Court. Therefore, it was correct to send this matter to the Constitutional Court. And, as the Court of First Instance did not send the petition to the Constitutional Court before they issued the decision, the Appeal Court overturned the sentence of 18 years. They sent the petition to the Constitutional Court and when the Constitutional Court had examined the petition, depending on the circumstances, the Court of First Instance would be asked to rule on the case again.
17 October 2011: The Constitutional Court commented that Article 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not in conflict with Articles 29 and 40(2) of the 2007 Constitution. The Court of First Instance could therefore make a new decision in this case.
15 December 2011: The Criminal Court ruled that the defendant committed several separate violations of Article 112. She was punished for each count, for a total of 3 counts, and sentenced to 5 years in prison for each count, for a total of 15 years in prison (The reason for the reduction from the initial
sentence of 18 years was not given).
16 March 2012: The Appeal Court dismissed the petition for temporary release, which was submitted along with 1.44 million baht in cash from the Department of Rights and Liberties Protection in the Ministry of Justice.
12 June 2013: The Appeal Court met to read the decision upholding the decision of the Court of First Instance. They did not read the entire decision, but only the order of punishment. They noted that, “ …still believe that the defendant defamed and insulted the king, and caused his dignity to be tarnished. Harsh punishment is appropriate in order to not turn her into a model [for others]. The appeal of the defendant is not tenable. The sentence of 15 years of the Court of First Instance stands.”
9 September 2013: The deadline to request an extension to submit an appeal to the Supreme Court passed. The defendant did not submit an appeal of the decision of the Appeal Court. The case is therefore at its end. No further appeals can be made.
Translated by Tyrell Haberkorn.
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2014 Interim Charter to re-engineer Thai political landscape
After the 2007 Constitution was torn up two months ago, Thailand was presented with an Interim Charter with 48 articles on 22 July 2014. The significance of the charter is that it allows the establishment of three bodies: a National Legislative Assembly (NLA), taking the responsibilities of Parliament, a National Reform Committee (NRC), which will propose a “reform” plan aiming at re-engineering the Thai political landscape, and a Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC), which is responsible for drafting a permanent constitution. These bodies are selected and appointed by the junta’s National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), surely without public participation.
As anticipated, the junta granted itself an amnesty for taking over power on 22 May 2014 and the NCPO has conferred on itself special powers over the interim government.
Panas Tassaneyanond, Thammasat University's retired Dean of Law and former Senator for Tak Province, said the interim charter did not specify when the reform council, the legislative council and the constitutional charter drafting council would complete their work.
The explanation provided by the interim charter drafters also did not include a time frame, so the only thing democracy lovers could hold on to was the NCPO leader's pledge to return power to the people, said Panas.
"Right now, no one would like to, or could, comment much about the future--not even by the new government. Therefore we just have to rely on the social contract the junta leader has made to the people -- like the (junta) song that says that they ask for some time and they will later relinquish power," Panas said.
None of the members of the newly-created bodies except the NCPO (whose membership will soon be expanded), would have a final say on the future course, he concluded.
Ekachai Chainuvati, law lecturer at Siam University, optimistically saw a rough timeline and believed that the military leaders would be held accountable if they could not push forward implementation of the things they announced.
Ekachai also believed that social pressure and media monitoring of the NCPO would eventually change their mind into allowing a referendum on the new charter.
"They have backed off cancelling the 30-baht-universal health scheme and they lessened their grip on the media after mounting concerns were voiced. So in this sense, people should not lose hope and keep checking and monitoring the work of the junta. At the end of the day, the NCPO and the interim government will have to amend and delete the no-referendum clause," said Ekachai.
However, he cited the super power the NCPO has been wielding over all bodies. "Article 47 means that the hundred or more NCPO announcements remain effective despite having this provisional constitution," he said.
See larger image here
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Thai junta spends US$ 4.3 bn in 2 months
Within about two months since the junta’s National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) seized power on 22 May 2014, the junta has decided to spent more than 138 billion baht or about 4.3 billion US dollars.
See larger image here
17 June 2014 The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives said it had paid 89,931 million baht to 838,538 rice farmers who had not yet received payment from the Rice Pledging Scheme under the civilian Pheu Thai government
17 June 2014 The NCPO approved a budget of 5,400 million baht to help 580,000 victims of natural disasters since 2012 who had not yet been compensated by civilian governments.
24 June 2014 The NCPO approved a budget of 8,357 million baht to continue building 396 police stations which had been left unfinished. The project was initiated during the Abhisit Vejjajiva government.
24 June 2014 The NCPO approved 96 million baht for the Fisheries Department to provide farmers with shrimp larvae after the spread of Early Mortality Syndrome (EMS) in shrimps.
28 June 2014 The NCPO approved 17,000 million baht for water management projects to prevent floods and drought.
4 July 2014 The NCPO approved a budget of 2,455 million baht for the Army to build a museum on valuable woods.
9 July 2014 As part of the Return Happiness campaign, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives reduced the interest rate for farmers to three percent (no more than 50,000 baht per one farmer) with the government paying compensation to the bank. In total, the government has to pay 2,292 million baht
22 July 2014 The NCPO approved a budget 4,401 million baht as a loan for the Bangkok Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 2,870 million baht of the budget is for gasoline while 1,531 million baht is for bus maintenance. This is also to increase the liquidity of the BMTA.
22 July 2014 The NCPO approved a 252 million baht budget for renovation of Government House and the PM’s Official Residence, Phitsanulok House.
22 July 2014 The NCPO approved 1.3 million baht for the Education Ministry to buy and install distance education equipment at 15,411 schools across the country.
22 July 2014 The NCPO approved 119.15 million baht for scholarships for 300 students at the Asian Institute of Technology in the 2014 and 2015 semesters.
25 July 2014 The NCPO approved a 200 million baht budget for the Anti-Money Laundering Office to improve its computer system.
28 July 2014 The NCPO approved a budget of 163 million baht to buy longan, rambutan and long kong from farmers in the North, East, and the South.
The total of 138 billion baht does not include the spending for the more than 84,000 “return happiness” events.
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Student activist reveals military threats of enforced disappearance
Contrary to what the junta has tried to claim, that all detainees have been very well treated while in custody, other than being deprived of their freedom, a second account of degrading treatment of an anti-coup protester has emerged. A student activist said he was threatened with enforced disappearance and being killed because he had protested against the coup just twice. The story also shows how the media saved him from detention.
Prachatai earlier reported the first account of degrading treatment of anti-coup protesters by the military. This involved threats of killing and deprivation of water. The story can be read here.
Worawut Thuagchaiphum is one of six student activists from Mahasarakham University in northeastern Maha Sarakham Province who were ordered to report to the military for organizing anti-coup activities. What makes him special? He was the only one in the group who was summoned three times.
In the evening of 22 May 2014, when Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha staged a military coup d’état in Thailand, the group made cloth banners with anti-coup messages and hung them from the Maha Sarakham Clock Tower and aroud the city.
One of the cloth banner read "The people own the power. No Coup."
(L) Worawut Thuagchaiphum and friends while hanging the anti-coup cloth banner in Mahasarakham province. (R) Soldiers come and destroyed the banner.
Later on 25 May, they organized a candle-lit event in the city of Maha Sarakham to express disapproval of the coup. About 30 military officers with guns and armoured cars came and destroyed the banners and tried to arrest the students, but the military agreed not to arrest them after negotiation with a lecturer who was at the scene. An officer said before leaving “You lot will really get it soon. I’ll arrest you lot and lock you up so you’ll be too scared to do anything”.
A day later on 26 May, the military sent a letter to the university Rector, asking him to have the six students report to the military on 27 May.
On the morning of 27 May at the military camp, the military welcomed the students with words of intimidation.
“Have you ever been disappeared? Disappear with not even a fingerprint left behind?”
And throughout two hours of interrogation, the alleged intimidation continued and focused on enforced disappearances and beatings.
Worawut gave the following examples:
“We’ve taken the power in this country. You want trouble, eh?”
“You’re craving for peace? I don’t have peace but you’ll get a piece.” [NOTE: This is an untranslatable play on words. The word for ‘peace’ (‘santi’) has had the vulgar term for ‘clitoris’ incorporated into it to make the neologism ‘santaet’.]
“You want democracy so much? Have you ever been disappeared?”
“Now I can kill you, beat you without breaking the law because we’ve taken power.”
At noon, they were released. Worawut went to the university and found that four military officers were waiting for them. The military escorted him and another friend to the City Hall and later to the military camp.
At the City Hall, he briefly got a chance to call his friend. He asked him to spread the news to the media because he thought it would help keep him safe.
At the City Hall, an officer with the rank of second lieutenant allegedly intimidated him again:
“Have you ever been shot? Do you know how painful it is?”
“Have you ever been tortured? I’m very keen on torturing people.”
Worawut Thuagchaiphum on the military's armoured car on 25 May. (Photo from his Facebook account)
The officer asked what he thought of the monarchy; he replied “I think just like other people.” According to the student activist, the officer replied “I know what you think of the monarchy. You consume too much red-shirt news”.
During detention, they were deprived of food and water. They were told to call friends to bring them food, but no friends dared to come since they were afraid that they would also be detained.
Later a military officer found a report about him on Prachatai and, according to Worawut, said “You guys are smart. I detain you here, but you have the guts to send news to the outside. Because you did this, we’ll detain you and not release you. You think they can help you. No. We’ve taken complete power”.
The officer then placed a gun in front of them and, according to the activist, said “Do you know how many people were shot by this gun? This gun is to shoot fucking people like you guys”.
Later Col. Norathip Poinok came to talk to them at about 10 pm and said “I’ve read the news. Today I’ll release you because I don’t want to have an issue. After you’re out, please give them the correct information that we had you here for political attitude adjustment. That’s all. We didn’t do anything else”.
Later they were taken to talk to a psychologist who merely asked them simple questions, such as how they were and their personal information. The military released them at the university before midnight.
A day later on 28 May, military officers came to meet him at the campus and allegedly threatened him not to make any political moves. The officers also allegedly confiscated his belongings, including notebooks and textbooks.
Later on the same day, a military officer called and ordered him to go the military camp for the third time. This time the military allegedly threatened that if he did not stop his political activities, his family would have to suffer.
He then checked with his mother who said military officers were wandering around his house and sometimes visited the house. His mother said she received a call from someone claiming to be a military officer who told her that her son had violated martial law.
Worawut said this time the military ordered him to leave the province, even though at first the military ordered him not to stay in the province. He said the military thought he was behind the leaflet “We need an elected government, not one appointed from the coup.” He said, “How could I do that? The military said themselves that they “followed [me] all the time, even on campus.”
After Thai-language Prachatai published this story last week, Worawut was summoned again Wednesday.
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Lesson from Loei ore mine: How Thai junta uses martial law to end conflict by silencing people
The Thai junta staged the coup in 22 May with the ambitious mission of ending political differences in the kingdom of more than 60 million people which has been deeply divided for almost a decade. It vowed to bring back reconciliation and return happiness to the Thai people. In doing so, it has prohibited people from joining any assembly or holding political seminars, it has detained activists, it has threatened outspoken academics, and it has shut down media affiliated to political camps. This is, they say, to stop people from having more differences in political thinking.
The first conflict that the junta has tackled seriously is in the North East of Thailand. This has nothing to do with the colour-coded political conflict and involves less than 10,000 people in six villages in Wang Saphung District of Loei who have been affected by mining operations on about 10,000 acres of land.
Loei Province is famous for its Phi Ta Khon Ghost Festival. In the photo, the community around the mine shows Phi Ta Khon on the Children's Day in January 2014. Photo courtey of Loei Ore Mine's Facebook
The junta’s intervention in the past two months has halted the mining which has degraded the environment and the livelihoods of the villagers. However, the short-cut of an alleged attempted backdoor deal with the mining company fell short of solving the conflict and instead has destroyed the credibility of the junta and villagers’ trust in them.
On Tuesday, the military invoked martial law to force the villagers to stop a planned activity to raise environmental concerns. The military also confiscated a stereo belonging to the villagers. This is not the first time that the military has pressured the villagers not to make any move concerning the mine and environmental issues, but insisted that the military will help solve the problem.
The military on 25 August forced the villagers to stop a planned activity to raise environmental concerns. The military also confiscated a stereo belonging to the villagers. Photo courtey of Loei Ore Mine's Facebook
“We’ve been treated badly for so long but the military has even aggravated what’s bad. I’m speechless,” said Pornthip Hongchai, a village leader and an active member of Khon Rak Baan Koed (People Who Love Their Home). The KRBK, consisting of villagers from six villages affected by the gold mining operations of Tungkum, the mining operator in the area, was set up to defend local natural resources and prevent their exploitation by investors.
Throughout 12 years of mining, villagers have suffered numerous environmental problems. The most chronic is the contamination of water sources from cyanide waste on the mountain in Loei where the mine is situated. According to the group, about 3,700 villagers from 1,000 families have suffered from drinking the water. A former mine worker suffered cyanide poisoning and was paralyzed. The authorities have never taken action against the company.
The villagers during a community meeting in June 2014. The meeting was held after gunmen came to villagers and threaten the villagers. Photo courtey of Loei Ore Mine's Facebook
In November 2012, the mine was ordered to close for three months after a dam for collecting cyanide waste collapsed. However, the company later resumed operations as if nothing had happened.
The tension between villagers and Tungkum Co. Ltd., the mine operator, flared up in September 2013 when the villagers barricaded the mine entrance, blocking trucks, each of which normally carries 15 tons of cyanide waste, from passing through the villages. Although the sound of the machines disappeared and the sound of birds chirping returned, the villagers had to live in fear because of judicial harassment, thugs, gunmen and death threats.
The villagers fight the thugs on the night of 15 May 2014 Only two men were charged and have been released on bail. Photo courtey of Loei Ore Mine's Facebook
In May, gunmen reportedly shot into the air to threaten the villagers in June. And on 15 May, which the villagers call "15 Black May" villagers in Ban Na Nong Bong were beaten up by 300 armed men. The leader of the KRBK also received a death threat.
Moreover, Tungkum has filed seven civil and criminal lawsuits against 33 villagers and demanded compensation of 270 million baht. The villagers have donated title deeds as security to bail out those who were charged, mostly poor farmers.
The villager who was beaten by the thugs on the night of 15 May 2014 Photo courtey of Loei Ore Mine's Facebook
The company proposed to the villagers that they will withdraw the lawsuits and offer to share 20 per cent of the mining profits in exchange for the barricade to be lifted off. Nonetheless, the villagers have declined the offer and responded with a lawsuit in the Administrative Court against the company and the state authorities involved, including the then Minister of Industry.
After the coup on 22 May when martial law was imposed across the country, the junta has intervened in the conflict under its policy to build “reconciliation”. It has stopped the villagers from holding all kinds of activities, including a community concert, and said it would “protect” and “return happiness” to them.
To return happiness, the junta set up committees, with no one from the villages, but composed of representatives from several state agencies which the villagers say have never cared about their problems.
The committees organized negotiations between the villagers, led by the Khon Rak Baan Koed group, and the mining operator, and witnessed by provincial officials.
There is no surprise that he state authorities have always support the mine since apart from paying royalty to the Thai state, the company allocates its10 per cent of the company’s profit to the Thai state. The state has received about 350 million baht from the company.
Vilaggers from six villages around the mine express their opinion regarding the mine during the referendum, held by Khon Rak Baan Koed on 18 July 2014. Photo courtey of Loei Ore Mine's Facebook
The villagers demanded that the mine be closed and that the mine operator must compensate them and come up with remedial measures for the villagers. These demands come from a referendum held by villagers in the six villages in May and July.
However, on Monday, the military and the provincial authorities reportedly planned to have the village headmen sign an agreement with the mine operator. The KRBK said they did not have any knowledge of and did not approve this agreement. The agreement will reportedly grant concessions to Tungkum for two more plots of lands of about 3,900 acres. The Monday plan failed after the KRBK pressured and threatened the village headmen with lawsuits.
Pornthip said the military’s claim of helping to solve the conflict seems to have worsened the situation. Under the junta, they feel very frustrated because they were silenced and the villagers have lost hope and trust in the junta.
“Why did the military come? They claim that they’re here to protect us but instead they use martial law to prohibit us from expressing ourselves and voicing our thoughts,” said Pornthip. “We’ve had the idea that we should draft a letter asking the military to leave the area. We prefer to fight with thugs and gunmen on our own rather than be under the military. We’re afraid of the gunmen, but that’s better than the military because the military prohibits us from doing anything.”
“We told them that our freedom of expression is guaranteed under the interim constitution. The military replied ‘No, we rule under martial law here’,” said the village activist.
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Iron flowers of the Deep South: The story of female paramilitaries and identity conflict
In light of the violent political situation in Thailand’s troubled South, paramilitary troops have been engaged to patrol the heavily militarized three border provinces, conducting search and arrest missions in villages, manning checkpoints, and carrying out a host of other ad-hoc activities.
While the male paramilitary troops (Thahan Phran Chai) have earned a notorious reputation for themselves, little is known about female paramilitary troops in the area who are given the duty of mediation with local villagers, especially Muslim women.
Female Paramilitaries 43rd Ranger Battalion Facebook fanpage
Thailand’s troubled South, consisting of the three southern border provinces -- Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, is home to a predominantly Muslim population. Over the past ten years, the region has been plagued by incessant violence fuelled by deep distrust between the Muslim locals and the military. Since the annexation of Patani to Siam in 1902, the region has been plagued with secessionist movements.
Between the 1940s and 1980s, insurgents staged a number of uprisings in retaliation against a forced assimilation policy pursued by the governments of the time. By the late 1990s, the separatist movement had died down. However the peace did not last long. When Thaksin Shinawatra became Prime Minister in 2001, violence again erupted. According to Joseph Liow, an expert on Southeast Asian Muslim politics, the resurgence of conflict is a consequence of Thaksin’s “policy missteps, one after another.”
Negotiation with insurgent groups has proved difficult. Due to the fluid nature of these groups, they often maintain a silence about attacks and have rarely made specific demands. This makes it difficult for the Thai state to engage in dialogue with groups involved in the insurgency.
Female Paramilitaries 43rd Ranger Battalion Facebook fanpage
The male paramilitary troops are constantly armed and are notorious among the locals for being responsible for ‘dirty tasks’ that the army refuses to be associated with. These tasks range from enforced disappearances to extrajudicial killings. In comparison, the female paramilitaries are not armed and assume support operations. They are deployed in front line operations only if it involves women and children. Otherwise their jobs are mainly restricted to paperwork and occasionally serving rations to commanders and visitors to the camp.
“As women, we are able to explain patiently and communicate clearly with the villagers. This is important as we need to build good relations with the local people,” said Lieutenant Noi*, a female paramilitary, deployed at Inkayut Military Camp in Pattani Province. The female presence is important to quell any form of distrust the villagers may have towards the soldiers, she added.
In total, there are approximately 807 female paramilitary troops in Thailand and Muslim women make up around 2/5 of them.
The duties of a female paramilitary vary from day to day. On most days, they get up at 5.30 am for morning exercise, followed by cleaning the area and then deployment. The nature of their job differs according to the unit where the women are posted. In general, the jobs of female paramilitaries range from manning checkpoints, search and arrest missions and peacekeeping during demonstrations to conducting lessons in villages, paperwork and even maintaining social media.
Female Paramilitaries 43rd Ranger Battalion Facebook fanpage
“The role of a female paramilitary soldier is not static and always changing. They help out in strategic operations, social media management and civilian work. One thing for sure, they are never involved in combat but are a good help in negotiations before the arrest of suspects in local areas” Colonel Mektrai from 43rd Ranger Battalion.
To be a female paramilitary, one has to be single, between the ages of 18-30 and have completed at least Grade 10. They are required to be physically fit to undergo a 45-day training programme to learn basic soldiering skills. The training programme is relatively short, compared to the military in other parts of the world. Additionally, with a lack formal assessment upon the completion of training, it is difficult to ascertain the standards and proficiency of the female paramilitary troops.
According to the commanders of the 43rd Ranger Battalion, Muslim female paramilitary troops are a valuable asset to the force as they are able to communicate with villagers in the local language and are able to connect well with the locals based on their shared ethnicity.
By deploying these women in strategic operations, the military is attempting to co-opt local support and create a sense of familiarity amongst the local people towards these female Muslim paramilitaries.
Male paramilitaries undergoing military training in Inkayut Camp
Assessing the success of female paramilitary troops
Suri*, a 20-year-old female paramilitary from Narathiwat Province says that her fluency in the local language has helped her connect with the villagers while on duty. “They ask me for my name and ask if I am a Muslim. I tell them that I am and they are friendly to me,” she added.
However, the sentiments on the ground seem to vary to a large degree. June*, a 21-year-old undergraduate from Prince of Songkhla University (PSU), told Prachatai that she dislikes uniformed personnel, whether they are male or female. “I had a short interaction with [a female paramilitary] during an anti-drug workshop and I was really afraid of them. The mention of ‘soldiers’ is just intimidating!” she said.
Although Suri said that her mediation role has been successful, the idea of being a paramilitary is still not welcomed in her hometown.
Fresh out of school, Suri followed her sister’s footsteps and applied to be part of the paramilitary force. “My parents are happy and proud that I am working as a female paramilitary” she chirped. Suri gets about 10,000 baht a month as a female paramilitary. This is a lot more than the measly 300 baht per day salary that 10th grade school leavers are getting elsewhere in the country.
Although her family is glad that she has found a job that she likes, Suri lets on that the rest of her village does not know what she does for a living. “I do not tell my neighbours about my job as a female paramilitary. It is too dangerous. We don’t know who is living in the village and if word gets around about my job, I could get into trouble,” she said.
To account for her absence from her hometown, Suri and her family tell their neighbours that she is pursuing further education in another province. She said, “Some villagers have a bad impression of soldiers and people from the military. For my safety, I tell my neighbours that I am studying in another province.”
It is no surprise that Suri has to hide her identity as a female paramilitary from her wider social circle. Paramilitary troops in general have earned a notorious reputation in the country’s Deep South. Villagers do not have a good impression of paramilitary troops as they are known to be rude and unreasonable.
Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, director of Deep South Watch (file photo)
What makes matters more complicated is the fact that Suri and her family are Muslim. According to Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, director of Deep South Watch, a number of Muslim female paramilitary troopers have been found dead, supposedly targeted and murdered by Muslim insurgents for their divided allegiance and for being a “spy” for the military. This gives Suri all the more reason to conceal her identity as a female paramilitary.
Islamic culture yet to be wholly embraced?
Apart from their role as mediators, the military has appointed female paramilitaries as “representatives of the nation’s female population”. However in a region where Muslim identity is not fully embraced by the Thai state, the wearing of the headscarf continues to be prohibited while wearing paramilitary uniform.
According to June, who said she dislikes female paramilitary troops, what was even more uncomfortable was the female paramilitary troops’ advocacy of equality among men and women during military-held workshop.
As June is a relatively conservative Muslim, she did not agree with the way the female paramilitary troops were trying to foster a spirit of equality among men and women during the workshop. June said, “Men and women have different roles (in Islam) and to speak about equality is to ignore fundamental differences”.
Female Muslim students from Prince of Songkhla University during prayer time
Clearly, there exists a clash of values. When asked about the idea of gender equality between female paramilitaries and their male counterparts, Lieutenant Noi said that discrimination does not exist. “We support their operations and are treated equally,” she added. Female paramilitary troops have embraced the idea of a strong modern woman which sits uncomfortably with the relatively conservative Muslim population of the South.
Similarly, Nurisan Doror from the Deep South Woman Association for Peace, an NGO based in Yala, said that it is impossible for female paramilitary troops to represent ALL women. “It is not possible; they (female paramilitary troops) are not religious. Also, they have to be role models first, they have yet to gain acceptance from locals,” she said.
According to Nurisan, in order for female paramilitary troops to represent local women, they have to be role models in the way they practice Islam. Given that these female troops do not wear the hijab and possess differing views on the role of women, locals have problems identifying with them.
This reflects a deep misunderstanding between the military and the people in the South.
Women’s role in the South revisited
Although female paramilitary troops and the local population have different ideas on the role of women, we are beginning to notice a resurgent role of women in peace-building efforts in the South.
Angkhana Neelapaijit (file photo)
Angkhana Neelapaijit, chairperson of the Justice for Peace Foundation which has worked with families of the victims of enforced disappearance in the Deep South, supports the idea of young women taking up jobs as female paramilitary troops, although she cannot help but cast doubt on the short training process. She said that women have to step up to assume an active role in peace-building and what is important is that women do not regress into a passive role during conflict.
The Justice for Peace Foundation specializes on issues related to enforced disappearances in the South and Angkhana has taken on additional projects to work with women whose families have gone missing due to the conflict. Angkhana, a nurse by profession, used to be a normal Muslim housewife. But after her husband, Somchai Neelapaijit, a human rights lawyer, was disappeared in 2004, she stepped up to become an activist, fighting for justice for her husband and other victims of enforced disappearance.
Gone are the days in which women are confined solely to the kitchen. Since the resurgence of the Southern conflict, women have found themselves going out to work and bringing in the money to support their families. The escalation of violence in recent years has led to many households losing a male family member through death or enforced disappearance.
When this happens, the women in the family are forced to step up, and assume leadership positions within the household. They become responsible for putting food on the table and bringing up their children single-handedly.
According to Angkhana, many men avoid going out to work during the conflict because they say that they are afraid of being targeted. “When this happens, the women go out to work, and are the sole breadwinners during times of conflict,” said Angkhana.
“If you go to fishing areas, you will see women working, harvesting and bringing in the fish. They work from 2 am all the way to noon time. It is hard work and they earn only around 200 baht a day,” Angkhana added.
Roles have been reversed. There is indeed hope for women’s empowerment.
Rosa Emilia Salamanca, Executive Director of Corporacion de Investigacion y Accion Social y Economica (CIASE) in Colombia, sums up the role of women in conflict areas aptly: “Women are so successful in peace because they support societies during the conflict. Every day women are trying to build peace by trying to rebuild their society from what is destroyed. I think women are so successful because they support society in the worse scenarios you can imagine.”
*Names have been changed to protect the privacy and anonymity of interviewees.
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Thais adopt #IceBucketChallenge to campaign for lèse majesté prisoners
Thai social and political activists have adopted the method of the Ice Bucket Challenge to campaign to free lèse majesté prisoners. Instead of throwing an ice bucket over one’s head, the challenge is to sing a song whose lyrics touch every free spirit.
More than 20 videos of recorded live performances of “The Song of Commoners” have been posted and shared on YouTube and Facebook, along with messages giving moral support for “Bank” and “Golf,” the two theatre artists recently charged with lèse majesté, as well as 16 others who are currently in jail because the notorious Article 112.
Since the coup, 15 people have been charged under Article 112 or the lèse majesté law. Of those, 12 are currently detained in prison.This adds to the number of those charged before the coup to a total number of 21 people facing lèse majesté charges, and 18 were in jail.
One group of activists leads to another. They “tag” others to sing and play the song. Most of the people participating in this innovative challenge are activists, student activists, lawyers, and journalists.
A live performance of The Song of Commoners by (from left) Putida Chai-anan aka “Gene”, an activist from the One Mai group, Yingcheep Atchanon, from iLaw, and “Jam” from Thai Lawyers for Human Rights. After the performance ended, they challenged two other human rights lawyers to do the same.
The translated lyrics:
I want to come across someone who is still dreaming, listening to a song.
It would be good if that person really exists, please tell me that I’m still dreaming.
*The path that we are walking together might not look beautiful.
This is not the last time, and we will not give in.
**How many winds of dreams have blown into the prison cells.
It might be cold and silent, but please listen to our song
I want to listen to you, singing aloud a song of common folk.
This will awake people from the dreams of our coming days
The Song of Commoners played by the red-shirt pop band in exile Faiyen. Photos of Golf and Bank are shown in the video.
The Song of Commoners was written by Chuveath Dethdittharak and Natthapong Phukaew, aka “Kaewsai”, who are friends of the two artists, Patiwat S., 23, and Pornthip M., 25, aka Bank and Golf, respectively. The two were arrested in mid-August for their alleged involvement in a political play called ‘The Wolf Bride’, centred on a fictional monarch. It was performed in October 2013 at Thammasat University, Bangkok, to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the 14 October Popular Uprising. The play was organized by former members of the now-defunct Prakai Fai Karn Lakorn, part of the left-leaning Iskra or Prakai Fai group.
Bank, who played the role of the king’s brahmin advisor in The Wolf Bride, is a student from Khon Kaen University’s Fine Arts Faculty, and the Secretary-General of the Student Federation in the North East.
Golf is a graduate from the Faculty of Political Science, Ramkhamhaeng University. She led Prakai Fai Karn Lakorn with the ambition of making performance arts more accessible to grassroot people and touch on serious issues such as social inequality and censorship. The group was dissolved in 2012 due to differences between group members.
Chuveath said this song was dedicated to raise awareness of the deprivation of freedom of Bank and Golf.
“At first, I did not intend to write this song for a political movement, but my friends were arrested and I didn’t know what to do, so I wrote this song to express my feeling,” said Chuveath.
The song unexpectedly united people who feel similar to him -- that that we are living in a dark period under the junta regime, where freedom of expression is limited, he said.
“I just wanted to sing this song for friends who were arrested, to console them and those whose families were intimidated. I wanted just that at first, to encourage these people, but later, I realised that it has good meanings that could be shared among many others” said Chuveath.
According to Natthapong, an activist who is a co-writer of The Song of Commoners, this song is not dedicated to Golf and Bank alone, but to everyone whose rights have been suspended and trampled upon.
He hopes that this song will allow people from across the political spectrum to hear the stories of people who have suffered intimidation, arrest, and detention due to their political ideas.
“This song might only be shared primarily among red-shirt activists for now, but if others from the opposite end of the political spectrum to the red shirts listen to this, even if they don’t like it, the fact that they reacted actually already affects them” said Natthaphong..
A live performance of The Song of Commoners. The song's co-writer Natthapong Phukaew, aka “Kaewsai” (left) plays the guitar.
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When junta control universities, metal box becomes symbol of the fight for academic freedom in Thailand
Since the coup d’état on 22 May, the junta has threatened and detained academics and students in many tertiary educational institutions. It even sent soldiers to storm on-going academic seminars and force them to stop. Despite the climate of fear, Thai academics are now protesting against the junta and the suppression of free speech by using a metal box. Yes, a metal box -- or ‘Peep’ in Thai.
Peep or metal buckets are normally used for packaging food. However, the square covers at the top allow people to put thier heads in easily, leading to the common proverb (Photo curtesy from weekendhobby)
This comes from the Thai proverb “wanting to cover one’s head with a metal box”, meaning you feel so ashamed that you do not want anyone to see your face so you cover your head with a metal box.
Now, covering one’s head with a metal box has become a popular trend on social networks, where people take pictures or photoshop their heads covered with a metal box to express their disapproval of academic suppression under the military regime.
At Chiang Mai University in northern Thailand, a seminar on the subject of ‘metal boxes’ or ‘peep’ was planned for Thursday as a response to last week’s order from the military to call off a seminar on the interim charter and the junta’s happiness campaign.
The junta on Wednesday ordered the university to cancel the event on ‘Peep’.
The original text in the background aksked if you have covered your head with a bucket yet today. However, the red banner reads "the Army Chief asked for cooperation to postpone the seminar on Peep or metal bucket," (Photo curtesy of Faculty of Law Chiang Mai University)
It is known that the Thai military are becoming very paranoid as they have ordered the cancellation or merely interrupted activities on various issues such as the Israeli-Gaza conflict, and even environmental issues.
The phenomenon started early September, when Sugree Charoensuk, Dean of Mahidol University's College of Music, wore a metal box on his head as he walked to attend a meeting with the university’s President as to express disapproval that Rajata Rajatanavin, the President, took the post of Minister of Public Health while still remaining as the university’s President.
Sukree Charoensuk covering his head with metal bucket at the Deal Office of Mahidol (Photo curtesy of Matichon)
Later on Monday, Viroj Ali, a lecturer at the Political Science Faculty of Thammasat University, was the first to adopt the action as a protest against the junta’s actions to limit academic freedom.
Viroj covering his head with metal bucket in his office (curtesy from Matichon)
On the same day, another political science lecturer from Chiang Mai University, Somchai Preechasilpakul, announced his support for academics covering their head with metal boxes in symbolic protest against the junta’s censorship in education.
“The beginning of the use of metal boxes symbolically allows academics who want to get involved with the governing of the junta, to make them realise that their regime is no more legitimate than that of politicians and they should spend their time, which they have been juggling among many positions, to fulfil their responsibility in raising the ranking of universities instead,” said Somchai.
Earlier on 18 September, the police stormed an academic seminar at Thammasat University and forced it to be abandoned. The topic of the seminar that was deemed to be dangerous and ironically obstructive to the junta’s attempt to create a functioning democracy was “The Collapse of Dictatorial Regimes Overseas”. Obviously, the panel was strictly about overseas tyranny and did not discuss Thai politics or the Thai dictatorship.
After the seminar was forced to stop, the police briefly detained for about three hours four prominent social science academics, Nidhi Eoseewong, Prajak Kongkirati, Chaowarit Chaowsangrat, and Janjira Sombutpoonsiriand, and three undergraduate students from the progressive League of Liberal Thammasat for Democracy (LLTD) student group, who organized the event.
The next day, according to the Thai Student Centre for Democracy (TSCD), police in and out of uniform ripped off posters and announcements around the Social Science building of Thammasat University, Rangsit Campus.
These posters were largely not related to politics. However, many criticized the junta’s order to stop the seminar or carried statements criticizing Somkid Lertpaithoon, the Thammasat University President, who is now serving in the junta’s National Legislative Assembly.
“The lesson from the seminar today did not end when the seminar was forced to stop, but it has reached its important point that dictatorships do not only exist in foreign countries,” said one poster on the board, now taken down.
One of the posters on the SC board in Thammasat Rangsit Campus says the seminar that was forced to cancel has achieved its agenda no matter what
The students responded by putting up posters read “Waiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii” which is the sound of women’s screaming in Thai to mock the junta.
Plain text of women's scream written as "Waiiii" to mock the junta
Earlier, in late May, six students from Mahasarakham University who organized an anti-coup protest were summoned to a military camp and threatened with guns and enforced-disappearance. One of the students had to flee the country as the military kept harassing him.
In May, four students from Ramkhamhaeng University faced the same predicament after they merely distributed stickers with anti-coup messages.
This catalogue of repression also includes many outspoken anti-coup academics of Thailand’s leading universities who were ordered to report to the military and keep their mouths shut since.
Gen Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the head of the junta, said earlier that he is not a dictator, but recently forbad academics from holding discussions about dictatorship at Thammasat University, reasoning that these seminars cannot be held because it could harm the reconciliation process. Ironically, the general added that there is a governance process on whether to order the cancellation of an academic forum.
“There is a committee to check whether the contents of the seminars and discussions are appropriate or not, I’m not the one who is doing this alone. The committee checks whether certain things can be said or not. Discussions about democracy and elections can’t be held and people are not yet allowed to criticize the government,” said Prayuth on last Friday in response to those who opposed the military intervention in a seminar at Thammasat University, Rangsit Campus.
During his talk last week, Prayuth urged people to understand that his actions were intended to kickstart the reconciliation process and create a functioning democracy in Thailand, while in fact he is silencing mainly the anti-establishment red-shirt and the anti-coup side.
Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, a Thammasat law lecturer from the courageous Nitirat academic law group, challenged Prayuth, saying that he should not have stopped the seminar about the collapse of dictatorial regimes overseas last week if he is sure that he is not a dictator.
“Gen Prayuth Chan-Ocha once told representatives of foreign businesses that he is not a dictator. The NCPO has never admitted it is a dictator. Today’s seminar talks about dictators overseas. Why do the army and authorities need to be so scared?” Piyabutr posted on his Facebook page on 18 September 2014.
On 21 September, 60 academics from 16 universities responded to the junta’s 18 September crackdown on students and academics at Thammasat University with their concerns and submitted a letter to the police and military.
“The unacceptable actions of the police and military are obviously harmful to academic freedom. All academics who have signed this letter urge the junta to stop intimidating academics and students immediately,” said the statement signed by 60 academics.
Academics now need to ask for permission from the military to hold seminars and discussions by sending the contents of their seminars to the police, said Kanokrat Lertchoosakul, a lecturer from the Political Science Faculty of Chulalongkorn University and one of the signatories.
Sirawith Seritiwat, one member of LLTD who was detained for several hours for taking part in organizing the seminar last week, told Prachatai that the majority of students at Thammasat University also responded with disappointment and concern to the abrupt cancellation of the political seminar and the bulletin boards that were wiped clean by the police.
“Now it is difficult to organize academic seminars. We have to go asking for permission from the municipality, police, and the military. This is against academic freedom and liberty,” said Sirawith.
The junta’s attempts to silence anti-coup academics and students are not confined only to Thailand.
According to New Mandala, a well-known academic website about Southeast Asia based at the Australian National University (ANU), the Thai embassy in Canberra has been trying to lobby ANU administrators and government officials to put pressure on the Website team to refrain from encouraging academic debates on sensitive issues concerning Thai politics.
“The embassy indicated to some members of the ANU community that they should not expect cooperation from Thai government agencies or officials in Thailand, given that they are from the ANU. Thai students, both at ANU and elsewhere, have been warned not to have contact with New Mandala. Those associated with New Mandala are not welcome in Thailand. It has also been reported that the ANU was offered Thai government funding for a Thai studies centre, on the unstated but obvious condition that New Mandala’s critical activities cease. The ANU declined the offer and, as reported, the financial support went to Melbourne University instead,” said New Mandala.
Thailand is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which obliges the state to protect the rights of individuals to freedom of opinion, expression, association, and assembly. However, the reality after the coup d’état in May is the opposite.
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Exclusive: Suspects say they were electrocuted, beaten during Thai military detention
Earlier Prachatai has published exclusive reports of two groups of anti-coup student activists in a Bangkok university and Mahasarakham University in the North East province being ill-treated. They were allegedly blindfolded, threatened with being killed and suffered minor assaults.
In early August, Kritsuda Khunasen, a red-shirt activist claimed that the military subjected her to blindfolding, beatings, sexual harassment, and suffocation.
In mid-September, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights revealed in its report that at least 14 people were allegedly tortured physically and psychologically by the army. All of them are suspects in cases related to political violence and weapons. Most of them are red-shirts. The torture allegations included beatings and electrocution.
The military junta and the police have always denied allegations of torture, saying that they treated all detainees well. Despite calls from various local and international human rights organizations, they did not accede to setting up an independent body to investigate the cases.
In this report, Prachatai has interviewed three suspects, two of them accused of committing crimes relating to political violence during the red-shirt demonstrations in 2010 and the anti-election People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) demonstrations in early 2014.
Prachatai talked to the three suspects, who were arrested after the 22 May coup d’état and were allegedly tortured during detention. Two of them are red-shirt supporters whose charges are related to political violence. The other has been accused of trafficking illicit drugs.
The accounts of alleged torture include electric shocks to the genitals, suffocation, continuous beatings all night, and detention in a hole in the ground, while the hole was being filled.
Chatchawan Prabbamrung
Age: 45
Occupation: Refrigeration mechanic
Arrested: 6 July 2014
Court arrest warrant issued on: 14 July 2014
Police charge filed on: 15 July 2014
Pre-charge detention period: 9 days
Accusation: premeditated murder, bombing to cause injury, possession of illegal explosives, carrying explosives in a public place.
He was accused of shooting M79 grenades at the Big C superstore on Ratchadamri road during the demonstration of the anti-election People’s Democratic Reform Committee on 24 February 2014, killing two children.
Account of alleged torture:
About 50 military officers with weapons captured Chatchawan and his wife at an intersection in northern Chiang Mai Province and took them into two different vans. While traveling in the van, the couple were blindfolded and Chatchawan was threatened to confess, otherwise his wife would “not be safe”.
On arrival at an unknown destination, the officers tied his hands behind his back. Two men who wore masks looking like animals beat him for almost four hours. He was later brought into a basement room. In the room, an electric wire wrapped in absorbent cotton was tied to his genitals while another wire was inserted into his anus. The officer splashed water at him and switched on the electricity. When he screamed with pain, the officer covered his head with a plastic bag, suffocating him. An officer once put a pistol into his mouth. This was done to force him to answer where he hid the weapons.
He had been detained for several days before being brought to a press conference and formally charged along with three other suspects.
His wife was detained for several days before being released. Although she was not beaten up, she was subjected to solitary confinement in a room with no windows so that she could not know if it was day or night.
Kittisak Soomsri
Age: 45
Occupation: Employee of the Vocational Education Commission
Arrested: the night: 5 September 2014
Police press conference: 11 September 2014
Accusation: possession and use of illegal weapons, carrying weapons in a public place. The suspect was brought to a press conference along with five other suspects. News media reported that they were the “men in black” who were responsible for the death of Col Romklao Thuwatham, killed by explosives during clashes at the red-shirt demonstration on Rajdamnoen Avenue on 10 April 2010. The police later made it clear that they were not involved in the death of Romklao and that their alleged operation was at a different intersection on the same road.
Account of alleged torture:
Three men captured him at his office without court arrest warrant. They also threatened his wife not to file a police complaint, otherwise the entire family would “not be safe”. He was then detained at an unknown place.
The interrogation started on the first night. A bag was used to cover his head so that he could not see the face of the interrogator. During the interrogation, he was hit on the head and mouth several times. Two men sat on his stomach and legs. At bedtime, the blindfold was taken off. He was handcuffed all the time, whenever he ate, slept or went to the bathroom.
These torture methods were intended to have him confess to committing the crime on 10 April 2010 and implicating others.
He confessed the morning after because he did not want to be tortured any more.
Bancha Kodphuthorn
Age : 28
Occupation: Construction worker
Arrested: 22 July 2014
Formally charged: 23 July 2014
Pre-charge detention: 1 night
Accusation: robbery
Account of allged torture:
During the night of 22 July, several military and police officers raided his friend’s house where he was visiting. Bancha and the house owner were detained in a car and blindfolded so they did not know where they were taken. At the unknown destination, still blindfolded, he was kicked and slapped several times. When he answered that he did not know, they beat him again. After an hour of beating, he was pushed into a hole in the ground. The officers filled the hole with soil until the level reached his neck. Then he was hit with a gun. After half an hour in the hole, he was put onto the ground and beaten overnight until the morning of the next day.
The torture was intended to force him to name members of a drug trafficking gang.
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Understand the Red Shirts
Kamthong Somchai started his day on Jan. 17 as usual. He left a deserted guardhouse, which is his only shelter with his tricycle, to look for recyclable garbage on Lad Phrao road, not far from the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) rally. He was wearing a white t-shirt saying “We love Yingluck; we love Democracy,” which he had received during an election campaign.
Captured by a group of alleged PDRC guards, he was asked if he was a red-shirt supporter, Kamthong told them frankly that he was a red-shirt supporter even though he knew that the answer may lead to negative consequences.
He was tortured and beaten for several hours, and blacked out several times. He was later released. His tricycle, wallet and ID card were taken along with 3000 baht in cash.
Kamthong Somchai under treatment in hospital with a laceration wound on his right eyebrow
Although the red colour led to him being beaten, he still proudly affirms his red identity and his admiration for Thaksin.
“I am red-shirted. I bond with the movement. I joined the red shirts because I love Thaksin. Red shirts love Thaksin because of his practical results.”
Kamthong was one of the red shirts who have actively participated in the red-shirt movement since after the coup d’état, the 2009 demonstrations and the 2010 red-shirt demonstrations till the day of the military crackdown.
Kamthong has worked in various positions in the past twenty years. He once worked as a construction worker in Thailand and abroad, as a security guard and later as a garbage recycler for almost two years.
“Searching for reusable or recyclable stuff is not an ordinary job because I don’t need to invest anything, only my labour. I can sell the stuff for 600-700 baht per day,” he said. “Although it’s trash, to me it’s cash.” He said could earn almost 10,000-20,000 baht each month if he was hard working enough.
He has no relatives in Bangkok. He feels a bit secure because of the universal healthcare scheme, initiated by Thaksin.
Back in his hometown in Nakhon Phanom Province, he used funds from the Village Fund to support his rice farming, a policy also initiated by Thaksin.
“Thaksin is the first politician to really respect Isan people,” he said.
Kamthong is one of the red shirts described as the emerging new middle class/lower middle class in the latest research on Thai politics Re-examining the Political Landscape of Thailand by Apichat Satitniramai, Yukti Mukdawijitra, and Niti Pawakapan, among others, which tries to understand who the red shirts are, what the red-shirt movement is and the current colour-coded political conflict. The research used surveys, focus groups and interviews and the report was launched in late January.
Apichai is an economist from Thammasat University, Yukti is an anthropologist also from Thammasat and Niti is a political scientist from Chulalongkorn University. The three initiated the project after the 2010 military crackdown on red-shirt protesters as they saw that there was no research giving a satisfactory explanation of the colour-coded political conflict.
According to the study, the socio-economic changes in Thailand over the past 20 years have led to the emergence of a new kind of citizen which the research calls the “new middle class” or lower middle class, or the red-shirts. This group’s characteristics and interests differ from the old middle class or the middle-upper middle classes which constitute the “yellow shirts,” the colour originally adopted by the pro-establishment and anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD).
From surveys in 2010, the researchers also found that red shirts were more likely to work in the agricultural or non-formal sectors than yellow shirts. In contrast, it was found that a higher proportion of yellow shirts were civil servants, state enterprise employees, or business people, than among red shirts and neutrals. Moreover, more yellow shirts than red shirts had completed a bachelor’s degree or higher. Thirdly, yellow shirts have higher incomes than red shirts or those supporting neither side.
“In general, yellow shirts are those with a higher economic and social status than red shirts as shown by their higher level of education and more secure employment as civil servants, state enterprise employees, businessmen, and professionals, whereas most red shirts are those with a lower level of education, whose employment has an irregular income like commercial agriculturalists, semi-skilled and skilled labour, self-employed, etc.,” concluded Apichai, adding that the new middle class account about 40 per cent of the population.
The demands, needs and aspirations of the new middle class are different from the old middle class. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, during the time of Thai Rak Thai Party, seemed to notice this and intentionally designed policies to transform this new social class into the strong base of his party. Meanwhile, the political reform resulting from the 1997 Constitution had greatly transformed the Thai political landscape. The charter, which focused on decentralization of power and empowered MPs, political parties and local administrative bodies, motivated politicians to respond better to voters’ aspirations and demands through macro-level policies. It also enabled the government to be more effective in driving policies and platforms that had been promised to voters during election campaigns.
Thaksin came at the right time. Unlike other politicians, Thaksin was able to transform his campaign promises into tangible policies, says the research.
“The Thai Rak Thai Party under Thaksin Shinawatra was created at this transition. That made him the first elected prime minister who was able to deliver the promised policies very quickly,” says the research. “This is the first time that the ballots votes of the majority really affected their lives.”
The garbage recycler said in the past he did not care much about general elections as he went to work far away from his registered residence. His mind was changed after the Thaksin era. He cared about elections. And especially after the 2006 coup, he was even more determined to go to vote, no matter how much it cost him to travel back to his hometown or how much he lost from his daily wages.
As the changing political landscape led the new middle class voters to realize their rights as citizens and the power of their votes in affecting their livelihood, the rearrangement of electoral politics reduced the influence of the old middle class who did not seem to care much about their voting rights because they had various tools for negotiating with the government. “Electoral politics at the national and local levels have greatly reduced the influence of the old middle class over the state, simply because they are the minority,” the research notes.
Because the old middle class are the minority, the Democrat Party, popular among the old middle class, has unsurprisingly won no election since 1992. This old middle class party, which regularly joined coalition governments before the political reform, has never had a chance to form a government since, except in 2009-2010 under Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, in unusual circumstances, the research elaborates.
“If the Democrats could do [what Thaksin did], the red shirts would not hesitate to vote for them, but as you can see, the Democrats have only been interested in the groups who have supported them. It’s not that the red shirts hated the Democrats from the beginning, but because they have never cared for the red shirts and the Isan people,” said the garbage recycler.
The research says the current political conflict in Thailand would actually be normal if there had been no military coup d’état. This conflict may be categorized as distributive politics where groups of people who have their own interests, distinct from other groups. They resort to using electoral politics to push for state policies to serve them. This is a normal conflict which can erupt in any society especially where there has long been high economic disparity, the research says.
However, this conflict escalated because of the military coup d’état which overthrew Thaksin in September 2006. “Because of the coup, the conflict has developed into a conflict over political rules. The red shirts are fighting to protect democratic rule, electoral politics. They want the power holders to be connected and committed to the voters and come from elections and without interference from unconstitutional powers or the invisible hand. Meanwhile, the yellow shirts fight to reduce the power of elected politicians” The PDRC proposal to have an appointed People’s Council to govern and reform the country for 12-18 months is a clear example of such an attempt to reduce the power of politicians.
Even though Kamthong saw the significance of elections, he said he was kind of fed up with them. “We voted and then they took over power -- repeatedly. In no more than two years, they will try to seize power again. We can’t do anything.”
The researchers argue that even though it seems to be a conflict between classes, it does not propose that class -- old or new middle class -- is a determining factor in the colour-coded identities.
Interestingly, because the red shirts are not the poor, this implies that they are materially ready to dedicate their time and resources to join the red-shirt movement. “This in a way explains why the movement has lasted for years -- because red shirts are not that poor,” the research says.
The poorest in the country, according to the survey, cannot be identified with any politically coded colour.
The researchers point out that both red shirts and yellow shirts are pro-democracy. They, however, put different emphases on democratic values.
“The ideologies of the red shirts and yellow shirts are not those of opposing ideas as the media likes to portray it. Both groups value democracy, only they have different emphases,” the research argues. To the yellow shirts, because their smaller population, they call for checks and balances from power outside parliament or appointed power, while the red shirts, because they have more and more power as electoral politics has developed, feel empowered by their voting rights. Therefore the red shirts are more committed to the parliamentary system. The red shirts give priority to parliamentary democracy, elections, and equality. They emphasize equality in accessing political power and justice and participation in politics. That is why they opposed the coup d’état and interference from unconstitutional powers, whether the independent state agencies, the army, or the courts, the research explains.
Another way to understand why the yellow shirts are no fans of electoral politics is to examine figures from a World Bank report.
The World Bank chart shows that even though Bangkok represents only 17 per cent of the population and 26 per cent of GDP, it accounted for about 72 percent of the state expenditures in 2010. In contrast, the Northeast accounts for about 34 per cent of the population, 12 per cent of GDP, but only shared 5.8 per cent of total expenditures in 2010.
The research explains that as Bangkok is the centre of the country, as in the saying “Bangkok is Thailand”, the voting rights of Bangkokians do not mean much to them because all governments need to invest in Bangkok. Unsurprisingly, most yellow-shirt Bangkokians tend to see populism in a negative way. Populist policies are not much benefit to them and divert state resources to support people in rural areas.
The garbage recycler highly praised the populist policies initiated by Thaksin. Asked what he thinks about the yellow shirts’ allegation that populism does not yield sustainable results, Kamthong replied “They’re richer than us. They’re more ready and more secure. They can say anything about populism because they don’t need it.”
Having worked in various low level jobs, he said he is used to the insulting looks of Bangkokians.
“I don’t hate Bangkokians who disdain Isan people. With or without political conflict, they have been looking down on us, but we can live with it. However, after the incident [when he was assaulted], I feel unsafe.”
Niti observed that the sentiment of insulting Isan people because they are of a lower class has been around for several decades and is partly a legacy of the Cold War when the now-defunct Communist Party of Thailand had its base in the Northeast.
“When I talked with Isan people, they always told me that they feel neglected and inferior. The saying that ‘Isan people could only be servants and gas station attendants’ really hurts them,” said Niti.
The original quote is from Charoen Kanthawongs, member of an advisory committee of the Democrat Party, who once told the New Straits Times that "People in the Northeast are employees of people in Bangkok. My servants are from the Northeast. Gas station attendants in Bangkok are from the Northeast."
Economic disparity is not the only factor that turned most Northeastern people into red shirts. Another important factor, the research says, is the resentment, retaliation and vengefulness from the feeling that they were deprived of their political rights by the 2006 coup, that they have long been treated unfairly by the state, given the unfair distribution of state resources, and that they have been treated as second class citizens for so long. The realization of this injustice and inequality formed the identity of the new cultural citizens who came out to demand their rights in the name of the red-shirt movement.
Red-shirts binding Kamthong’s wrist with red threads. It is a traditional Thai ceremony believed to bring back blessings and luck to the person after a bad incident at the Ko Tee red-shirt rally site in Lak Si, Bangkok. Photo courtesy of Red Comrades group
After days in hospital, Kamthong stayed at a red-shirt rally site in Lak Si, outer Bangkok. He was welcomed with a wrist-binding ceremony by fellow red-shirts who helped take care of him and provided him with food, new clothes and a new mobile phone.
Last week, a “person from far away overseas” gave him a brand new motorized tricycle and 15,000 baht in cash so that he could restart his garbage recycling career.
He said he could not be happier and that he will continue to fight with the red-shirt movement.
Atippat Jeerapatpimon, representative of the Red Comrades group, handed over a motorized tricycle and 15,000 baht in cash to Kamthong. Athipphat said a 'person from far away overseas' sponsored the donation.
Mutita Chuachang contributed to this report.
Read related story: Grassroots reflect on their rights to vote
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Understanding Thai-style Buddhism
The involvement of a controversial monk Buddha Issara as an anti-government protest leader sparks fierce debate on the function of Buddhism in this turbulent country.
It is commonly acknowledged that monks play political role in Thai society; maybe not as officially involved as in Sri Lanka where monks can run for political offices, or as dreadful as in Myanmar where the monastics lead the call for the purge of Muslim Rohingya. The recent protest in Thailand, however, sees monks participating in modern Thai politics in a radically different way from before.
Luang Pu (Venerable Grandfather) Buddha Issara is one of the most popular faces of the leaders of anti-government People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). Camping out at the occupied government complex in the outskirts of Bangkok since the beginning of the Bangkok Shutdown campaign by PDRC on 13 January 2014, the monk is well known for his daily negotiation with heads of various governmental units, who come to ask him to authorize permission to reclaim the buildings.
Buddha Issara surrounded by personal guards during negotiation with the authorities
The 58-year-old monk stunned the public last week when he led a group of protesters to SC Park Hotel, owned by Shinawatra family, and requested the management to pay for the “time loss” fee to the tune of 120,000 baht after the hotel manager refused to let the group stay at the hotel.
On Monday, he led a group of protesters to Voice TV, perceived to be pro-red shirt largely due to one of its major shareholders is Panthongtae Shinawatra, the son of Thaksin Shinawatra. Once there, they demanded “fair” reporting, citing the Blue Sky channel, which has close ties with the Democrat party as the example, and asked the executive to apologize for distorting news. After the station’s news director came and went down on his knees to apologize, the group was satisfied and left.
“Ideally, it is not correct for monks to be involved in politics,” said Eak Akarasilp, 48-year-old business owner who is a regular at PDRC protest. “But when the nation is on fire, how could you expect monks to just sit there and watch?”
The recent conflict between the caretaker government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and the PDRC, comprising of networks of elites, middle class Bangkokians and the Southerners, has been playing out on the street for over three months and already claimed at least 22 lives. The demonstrators said their aim is to rid influences from Thai politics of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, brother of Yingluck, who they believe is all to blame for rampant corruption and deep national polarization.
The group disrupted the general election earlier this month, as a part of the demands to set up the unelected "People's Council" to replace the current government.
Buddhism above politics?
In Thailand, it is a generally held assumption that religious and secular world should be kept separate. The action of Buddha Issara has prompted negative responses from Buddhist organizations and the public, who consider his political involvement an inappropriate behaviour for monk and call for his defrocking. All sides, however, seem to avoid taking the responsibility of moving forward with their grievances.
Buddha Issara, whose loyal followers include the Army Commander-In-Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha, and former one like Anupong Paochinda, said despite him being sued by Buddhist Association for treason, he would not disrobe until the cases are finalized in the criminal court.
Many academics, who study Buddhism and Thai politics, see that sangha dynamics has been deeply intertwined with that of secular politics. Some even suggest that the perceived status of Buddhism as sacred and thus “above politics” may have obstructed, rather than enabling, democratization in Thailand.
Duncan McCargo, a professor in Asia politics from University of Leeds, writes in his recent article, “The Changing Politics of Thailand’s Buddhist Order,” that the sangha has been a source of legitimacy that government leaders must seek in order to gain moral and spiritual approval, a factor which could determine the fate of political leadership in the worldly order.
McCargo points out that the main problem in Thailand lies in a lack of moral leader who is able to push for progressive ideas supporting the democratic process.
Even though there are monks who are regarded as having influence over liberal thoughts in Thai society like the late Buddhadasa Bhikku and Phra Paisal Visalo, their teachings are often interpreted to align with the deeply ingrained ideology of ‘Nation, Religion and the Monarchy.’
“Ironically, in a society where slogans about “wisdom” are proliferating – [it] undermines civil order and makes the task of institutionalizing liberal and democratic norms so difficult,” notes McCargo.
This may be the reason why the talk of “morally good people,” despite being unelected, should be the best governance option for Thailand is so prevalent among the anti-government protesters, as well as the conservative technocrats.
Keeping the sacred away from the ‘dirty’ politics
In an attempt to remove the secular from the religious, Thailand is one of a few nations in the world that disenfranchise monks and other monastics such as Mae Chi (nuns). This happens despite the fact that the UN convention on civil and political rights recognizes universal suffrage for everyone, including clergy.
Speaking on the complex relationship between religion and politics in Thailand, Tomas Larsson, a professor of politics from University of Cambridge, argues that the effort to keep Buddhism from the profane world of politics could be considered a security concern to protect the “national essence” and its hierarchical order.
According to this perspective, the secular authority, acting as a “guardian state,” seeks to protect the sacred status of monks from the invasive Western values such as democracy and human rights usually through the policy of disenfranchisement.
Larsson’s recent research on universal suffrage and monks has found that in Asia, only Thailand, Burma and Bhutan do not allow monks to vote.
Monks in Laos and Cambodia were disenfranchised under the colonial period, but they were given back rights to vote after gaining independence in 1960s.
While Burma and Bhutan disenfranchise clergy of all religions, Thailand places exclusive restriction on monks’ voting right, claiming that they should be above politics.
He estimates that about 310,000 people are religiously disenfranchised in Thailand.
The regulation does not, however, prevent monks from political engagement. In 2005, the late Luang Ta (Venerable Grandfather) Maha Bua, a highly revered monk among the elites and urban middle class, called for a nationwide opposition against former Premier Thanksin Shinawatra, claiming that Thaksin intended to overthrow the monarchy in order to become the first Thai President.
Another case was V. Vajiramedhi, a celebrity monk popular among middle class Bangkokians. His followers tweeted his saying during the 2010 red shirt crackdown that “killing time is more sinful than killing people,” a statement that many red shirts recalled bearing a strong resemblance to Kittiwuttho, a militant monk who in the 1976 student massacre said, “killing communists is like killing fish and giving them as alms for monks.”
Monks' participation in the red shirt rallies in 2010
In 2010, hundreds of monks also came out in support of the red shirts and joined the street protest, but none of them claimed the leadership role. The protest ended in military crackdown that resulted in more than 90 people dead.
There remains a popular belief among people that electoral suffrage for monks could lead to the schism among the sangha, and monastic involvement in “dirty” politics would undermine the reverent position that monks and Buddhism have.
Larsson notes in his study that the suffrage exemption of monks in Thailand is widely justified on the basis of the Vinaya, or Buddhist monastic codes, because voting could lead to negative karmic consequence if the politicians that monks vote cannot uphold proper code of morality. The secular authority thus has the duty to protect the sacredness of Buddhism so that monks can continue being the proper “fields of merit” among the population.
"Religious disenfranchisement exemption in Thailand, Burma and Bhutan constitutes the instances of resistance to globally dominant normative order, and specifically Buddhist resistance to the powerful norm of the universal suffrage," said Larsson.
Buddhist factions and the national divides
Conflict within the Thai Sangha becomes an escalating issue as the divide between the red and yellow shirts has deepened in recent years. This is reflected in the competition between two monastic factions: Thammayut Nikai, founded by King Rama IV, and Mahanikai which represents every other sect beside Thammayut .
Emphasizing strict monastic rules, Thammayut has mainly dominated in the Council of Elders, a centralized ecclesiastic body established in 1902. Part of the great modernizing process initiated by King Rama V, the council is enlisted with the power to govern monks and temples in provincial and district levels throughout the nation.
The creation of the Council of Elders, the selection procedure of its members and the centralized hierarchical order make the council function like stiff bureaucracy and full of internal politics, critics say.
The politics between the religious and secular world materialized in 2004 when during Prime Minister Thaksin, Somdet Kiaw from Mahanikai was appointed to the position of an acting Supreme Patriarch in place of Somdet Phra Nyanasamvana, the then current Supreme Patriarch whose declining health was a justification for such change.
Somdet Phra Maha Somanachao Kromlunag Vajirañanavamsa (left) and King Bhumibol Adulyadej (right) during ordination
The move, however, received backlash from Thammayut monks and their followers, particularly those led by Laung Ta Maha Bua, who accused Thaksin of interfering with the royal power since the King has the sole power to appoint Supreme Patriach. The ailing Supreme Patriach replaced by Somdet Kiaw was also King Bhumibol’s spiritual mentor when he ordained for a brief period in 1956.
Laung Ta Maha Bua then went on to join Sonthi Limthongkul, a media mogul and a prominent leader of the ultra-royalist yellow shirt movement in a talk show broadcasted through the yellow-shirt television station, ASTV, calling to oust Thaksin. The protest was soon followed by the military coup in 2006.
Thammakai, one of the largest, if not the largest, contemporary Buddhist movements in Thailand, is also seen by yellow shirts and many as closely allied with Thaksin. They have long been highly criticized for the materialist approach to Buddhism.
A call for secularized reform
Suraphot Thaweesak, a scholar of Thai Buddhism, said that the Sangha should be self-governed, and local monastic communities should be able to look after themselves rather than being enforced with rules from Bangkok. Otherwise, the chance for the Sangha to be more democratic and responding to the community’s need is impossible, he said.
“The nature of the Council of Elders was to accommodate the authority which was the King in the past,” said Suraphot. “Until now, it still is responding mainly to the King and the nation’s conservative values.”
Not that more a democratic Sangha never happened before. During the government of Field Marshal Pibul Songkram who spearheaded 1932 People Party’s Revolution that overthrew absolute monarchy and installed constitutional monarchy, the short-lived Sangha Act of 1941 was created from the demand of monks who wished to see check-and-balance system replacing the centralized Council of Elders.
Under the period, the monastic governing body mirrored the structure of secular governance and was divided into parliamentary, legislative and judicial parts. Although all positions were appointed rather than elected, the change reflects an attitudinal change regarding the question of monastic governance and how to respond to more complex needs of monastic communities in a more democratic way.
The 1941 Sangha Bill also aimed to unite Thammayut and Mahanikai orders, but received resistance from the Thammayut side, who accounted for a much smaller number and was afraid of losing control.
After Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat staged a coup and came to power, however, the Council of Elders was restored through the Sangha Act of 1962, a legacy that is still in effective until today.
Suraphot, together with a group of like-minded scholars of Thai Buddhism, recently formed “Buddhism for the People,” a group seeking to advocate for the secularized Thailand. They suggested that the Council of Elders should be abolished to make way for monastic self-regulation.
“This would abolish all hierarchy and the holy titles within the Sangha,” he said. “When the monkhood are truly independent, the democratic culture within could then be born because they no longer need to be a mechanism of the state.”
Suraphot, who recently conducted a nationwide survey on monks’ involvement in politics, estimated that about 70% of the monks he studied were sympathetic toward the red shirts. This was due to their view that policies initiated by Thaksin were economically and socially favorable to a majority of people, he explains.
Still, Suraphot worries that the liberal democratic values are lacking from the monkhood. He noted that even the monks joining the red shirt movement in 2010 had their own agenda when it came to pushing Buddhism to be the national religion, a move that could endanger an already fragile situation in a country that has seen social hostilities fueled by religion, especially in the three southernmost provinces.
Suraphot was not too optimistic about the Sangha reform. He said the first obstruction would be the palace, which would not let go of the control of the monkhood so easily. Because Buddhism is still considered a sensitive subject due to the perception that its status is sacred and thus above criticism, the discussion concerning the Sangha is as difficult a topic to touch upon as much as that of the monarchy.
“Abolishing the 1962 Sangha Bill would be as difficult as abolishing the lèse-majesté law in Thailand,” he said.
Pinyapan Pojanalawan, another scholar who studies Thai Buddhism and a member of the advocating group, said the teaching of Buddhism itself is not against democracy; however it is the interpretation that creates clashes against the democratic values.
He said that Thai-style Buddhism allows issues like commercial Buddhism, which he viewed playing big role in money laundering, to prosper while being too rigid when it comes to allowing women to be ordained as nuns.
“Thai-style Buddhism is relaxed where it should be strict, but it is also too rigid where it should be open and inclusive,” said Pinyapan.
Cover artwork by Prakit Kobkijwattana
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Crime of the State: Enforced disappearance, killings and impunity
In October 2003, Jawa Jalo, an ethnic Lahu, was captured by armed state officials during a search of a litchi farm in a northern border province. Although the officials who captured him reported to their commanders that no illicit drugs were found on Jawa, they still decided to take him into custody at a ranger camp. An official trod on his neck until his tongue protruded and blood flowed from his mouth. At the camp, he was beaten up. Other detainees, most of them ethnic Lahu, were twice forced to kick him. Jawa was seriously injured and left on the floor to die. The officials dumped his body into a hole in the ground. They shot him several times to make sure that he was dead. Two detainees were ordered to bury the body. A few days later, Jawa’s daughter twice went to the ranger camp asking for her father. The first time, the officials said they had already released him and did not know where he had gone. The second time, an official told her that her father had been taken to Chiang Mai.
Jawa Jalo is still disappeared.
According to Lahu Association President Sila Jahae, more than 20 Lahu have suffered enforced disappearance at the hands of army rangers and police officers.
Around120,000-150,000 people of Lahu ethnic live in Mae Ai, Fang, Chai Prakarn and Chiang Dao districts in Chiang Mai and Mae Sai district in Chiang Rai. About 90 per cent of the population have Thai citizenship.
The Lahu people, mostly living in districts bordering Myanmar in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces, have been living in a climate of fear since the Thaksin Shinawatra administration announced the War on Drug policy in 2003.
State authorities believe that the border districts are part of a drug trafficking route from Wa State in Myanmar and that some hill tribe people are involved.
The War on Drugs intensified the unfair treatment of the Lahu based on stereotypical assumptions made by state authorities that hill tribes people are involved in crimes such as drug trafficking, deforestation and land encroachment.
During this period, state officials, mostly soldiers and rangers, arbitrarily arrested individuals, claiming they may have been involved in drug trafficking or possession of illegal goods. Upon arrest, the villagers were usually beaten and blindfolded. Arriving at the army camp, they would be interrogated and beaten again. They were detained in a hole in the ground, about 2-3 metres wide and 4 metre deep. Each hole contained about 10 detainees, but sometimes the number may reach 40.
Most of the detainees were kept in the hole for seven days continuously before they were temporarily brought up for interrogation and torture, including electric shocks. They were fed twice a day. The average detention period was two to three months, though a few were detained for only 45 days.
“The condition in the hole is so terrible. We eat, sleep, piss and shit in the same hole,” said Sila.
Sila Jahae, President of Lahu Association
Stories of the hole and torture are widely known among Lahu villagers. In many cases, at the time of capture, shooting and beating are done in public, in front of other Lahu. Most of the victims and victims’ families do not dare to report the case to the police as they are afraid that they themselves will be disappeared.
“It’s a custom of state officials to capture a villager and beat them in front of other villagers,” the President of Lahu Association told Prachatai.
Sila is a vocal Lahu activist who has fought for justice for the Lahu and other hill tribes in Thailand. He himself was detained in a hole in a ranger camp twice. First time, when he bumped into a group of rangers on his way back home from police station. Second time, the soldiers came to detain him while he was in a meeting with Lahu Association members. He was luckier than other Lahu. He was released unharmed after his wife complained to a local MP.
After the War on Drugs was concluded at the end of 2003, the practice of torture, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances has continued until today. State officials may arrive at the door, claiming to search for illegal goods and order a search without a court warrant, or a fake warrant, taking valuables and vehicles from the house and detaining the person at an unknown, unofficial place.
Today the practice has created a new problem when some local Lahu who are running for a local political office accuse their rivals of involvement in drug trafficking or possessing illegal goods. Some Lahu villagers have decided to flee into the forest or to Myanmar. Some have joined militant groups as they want to escape the atrocities committed by the Thai state, according to Sila.
Sila said no state officials have ever been held to account for the crimes against the Lahu.
About 1800 kilometres to the South, in the restive border province of Yala, after a secondary school in Bannang Sata District had been targeted by arsonists eight times, the local task force picked on the school’s janitor, Mayateng Maranor. On the morning of 24 June 2007, about 50 army rangers from Special Task Force 41 cordoned off the village and set up a checkpoint in front of his house. At around noon, the rangers searched Mayateng’s house and questioned him about why he had let the school burn down. They also questioned him about the whereabouts of his teenage son. Mayateng denied all allegations and was arrested without a warrant under martial law. Many of his personal items, including his pickup truck, were also taken.
The stories of Mayateng and Jawa are among about 70 cases of enforced disappearance and torture documented by the Justice for Peace Foundation (JPF), Bangkok-based NGOs which works extensively on the issue of enforced disappearance, torture and extrajudicial killings.
30 cases are related to anti-separatist policies in the three southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and four districts of Songkhla. Annexed to Siam in 1909, the area’s inhabitants are predominantly Muslim Malay, most of whom are not proficient in Thai.
Around 30 cases of enforced disappearance documented by the Justice for Peace Foundation are related to anti-separatist policies in the three southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and four districts of Songkhla.
The region has a history of resistance. The situation deteriorated after Thaksin dissolved a special state agency in charge of security in the Deep South and replaced it with the highly unpopular police force in 2002.
The Thai state’s response to insurgency in the Deep South under all subsequent governments has been highly militarized including the deployment of large numbers of troops and the imposition of special security laws, such as the state of emergency, according to a JPF report, Enforced Disappearance in Thailand, published in June 2013. “This approach, combined with insurgent violence and intimidation, has resulted in a civilian population characterized by fear and plagued with human rights violations. Arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearances have all become common experiences in the south,”
Policies that lead to state violence
Interestingly, the policies that have led to serious human right violations were created by a popular leader elected by the majority. The serious human rights violations committed under Thaksin’s administration even seem to be forgotten when the country is overwhelmed by color-coded political conflict.
What are the characteristics of a policy that usually leads to serious human rights violations, such as torture, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances? Tyrell Haberkorn, an expert on violence and human rights violations in Thailand from the Australian National University, says policies that usually lead to such violations are ones that create grey areas for the state officials.
“In case of the War on Drugs, the policy was just vague enough for the state officials and gave a wide range of space. They were told to ‘deal with the drugs problem’ but Thaksin or people under Thaksin never said how they should deal with it. That was taken as a signal as to do whatever you need to do,” said Haberkorn.
The policy given to the local law enforcers is ‘an eye for an eye,’ meaning that those with a history of involvement with drugs are considered ‘security threats’ that could be dealt with in a decisive, ruthless and severe manner. Each province was also given a quota for arrests and seizures of narcotic drugs. Police and local officials who failed to meet the quota were punished.
In the case of the restive south, Haberkorn said, the grey area comes from the special security laws in force in the region, which basically allow a period of detention without charge from seven to thirty days. They also allow detainees to be held in a non-official place, such as a military camp or a temple. The families of detainees do not know where they have been taken and do not know where to ask about them. Lawyers also do not have to be given access. The detainees basically are not given access to anyone.
Systematized crime of the state
The best-known case of enforced disappearance is that of the Muslim human rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit. 12 March 2014 marked the 10th anniversary of his disappearance which took place during the Thaksin administration.
10 years ago, Somchai was representing Muslim suspects who were accused of stealing weapons from an army camp in Narathiwat on 26 January 2004. He later found out that his clients had been tortured and forced to confess while in the hands of the Crime Suppression Division (CSD). The allegations of torture included beatings, kicking, electric shocks and urination into the mouth. Somchai exposed the torture allegations by CSD police on the following day at a panel discussion in Bangkok which was attended by a high ranking official in the government and journalists. Somchai later submitted a petition alleging abuse to several state agencies.
Somchai Neelapaijit who was last seen on 12 March 2004
On 12 March 2004, while Somchai was driving his car on Ramkhamhaeng Road at around 8.30 pm, a car behind him forced him to stop. A witness saw Somchai talking with five men who then forced him into their car. Somchai has never been seen since.
Five police officers were accused of robbery and coercion. Pol. Maj. Ngern Thongsukand, was identified by the witness as the person who pushed Somchai into the car. Ngern was one of the team investigating the weapons robbery case and was identified as an abuser of the Muslim suspects in the torture case.
Pratubjit Neelapaijit, daughter of Somchai and researcher of JPF, once said in a TV program that she believes there are actually 20 state officials involved in the crime.
Some of the most compelling pieces of evidence are the mobile phone records of the five defendants. On 12 March 2004, the day that Somchai disappeared, there were 75 phone calls between the five police officers, which was very unusual in comparison with the record of calls on the days before and after 12 March, which show very few contacts among the group. The phone records also show that the group had followed Somchai since the morning until his disappearance. Interestingly, the records show that one of the defendants also called a person at the Prime Minister’s Office after the incident on Ramkhamhaeng Road.
The Court of First Instance in January 2006 found only Ngern guilty of coercion, which is a relatively minor offence. He was released on bail. On the same day, then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra spoke to the media, saying that he knew that Somchai was dead and that state officials caused his death.
In September 2008, Ngern went missing.
In December 2009, Abdulloh Abukaree, one of the witnesses and one of Somchai’s clients in the torture case, also disappeared.
The Appeal Court in March 2011 acquitted all the defendants due to insufficient evidence. It also ruled that Somchai’s wife, Angkhana Neelapaijit, could not act on her husband’s behalf as joint plaintiff, reasoning that it could not be confirmed that Somchai had been murdered or injured to the extent that he could not act by himself.
In other words, the Appeal Court required to see the body of a victim of enforced disappearance before ruling that he was dead.
Thailand has not yet criminalized enforced disappearance. This means the current law only recognizes a murder case when there is a dead body.
The Department of Special Investigation (DSI), which is responsible for investigating the case, has been harshly criticized by Somchai’s family and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) for lacking the political motivation to adequately prepare experts and evidence as can be seen from several loopholes in the evidence, resulting in the court’s rejection of the evidence. The ICJ also urged the DSI to file murder charges against the defendants.
In December last year, the DSI claimed that because they lost the Somchai case file when anti-government protesters rallied at the DSI headquarters, it could not continue investigation of the case. The claim later turned out to be untrue.
A DSI officer has told Angkhana that Somchai was tortured to the death at a place near the CSD office. The body was burned and the ashes were scattered in the Maeklong River. Although the DSI seems to know the fate of Somchai, the DSI later announced in December that it is considering closing the case.
The case of Somchai’s disappearance, Haberkorn said, is a vivid example of how enforced disappearance in Thailand has become systematized in that the crime was carried out with collusion at every level. Moreover, within the chain of command, no one criticized the police who carried out the crime. And also it has become systematized because no one was held accountable.
According to Angkhana, the police officers involved in the case were briefly suspended from duty during the Abhisit Vejjajiva government, but they have been reinstated and even promoted during the current Yingluck Shinawatra government.
“State officials received the signal that this is something they can do. Certainly, they won’t be penalized and it is true that they may be rewarded,” said Haberkorn.
Culture of Impunity; culture of enforced disappearance
The most shaming failure of the nation to prosecute state authorities for committing serious human rights violation was the mass disappearance, torture and killings of communist suspects in the southern province of Phatthalung during the Cold War, nicknamed the “Red Drum” killings. The incidents took place under the anti-communist dictatorship of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn.
Image on the top right shows the methong of killing that a communist suspect would be pushed in 'red drums.' Image on the left shows the memorial of Red Drums Killing. Photo courtesy of the Bangkok Post, which was published in October 2003.
The name derives from the method of killing communist suspects. Thousands of communist suspects are believed to have been killed by being burned alive in 200-litre oil drums. While the bodies were burning, truck engines were revved to partially mask the screams of those who were being murdered. It is estimated that about 3,000 people were killed in this manner around 1972, according to Haberkorn’s research‘Getting Away With Murder in Thailand: State Violence and Impunity in Phatthalung.’
Even though the atrocities were committed under a military dictatorship, the exposure of such crimes was made possible by student activists, during a brief period of democracy in 1975, two years after the 14 October 1973 uprising.
The Red Drums Memorial site in Srinakarin district, phattalung province. Photo Courtesy of Mekong Travelers blog.
The exposure stirred hot debate in Thai society. The media widely reported the Red Drums case and the public urged the civilian government to punish the wrongdoers. The Interior Ministry then set up a committee in mid-1975 to investigate the case. About a month later, the then Interior Minister concluded that innocent citizens had been killed, but only seventy or eighty people were involved, rather than thousands. Regardless of the number, no one was punished. And the state agency responsible for the killing continued their work as usual, Haberkorn writes in her research.
“[Impunity and enforced disappearance] are directly related. I am routinely astounded because there have been so many cases of disappearance, torture and extrajudicial killings, a massacre,” said the academic. “But it's extremely rare that anyone was held to account.”
Since no one was held accountable, the practice of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings happens over and over, has become normalized and even flourishes in a culture of impunity, she added.
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Same-sex marriage may come true under Thai junta
The parliament appointed by the military junta is expected to pass the Civil Partnership Act, the first law in Thailand to recognize the existence of same-sex couples. However, the bill is widely unacceptable to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) activists, who say that although the bill allows for greater equality, it still discriminates against gay people. And most importantly, deliberation of the bill is expected to be rushed, without public participation, by the so-called the “rubber stamp” National Legislative Assembly (NLA).
The bill defines “civil partnership” as “two persons of same sex who have registered under the bill,” and stipulates that the rights of a person in a civil partnership will include the right to use one’s surname, property rights between the partners and rights on how the partnership is ended.
Superficially, civil partnerships seem to enjoy the same rights and status as heterosexual marriages under the Family Act. However, when looked at in detail, the bill does not entitle homosexual partners to raise children. Moreover, the minimum age of those allowed to register civil partnerships is 20, while for the heterosexual marriage it is 17.
Unlike the Civil Solidarity Pact in France, which allows either opposite-sex or same-sex couples to register for civil partnerships, Thailand’s draft civil partnership bill is for homosexual couples only.
Anjana Suvarnananda, Executive Director of Anjaree.org, spoke at the FCCT in 2013 about why the revision of the Family Law codified in Civil and Commercial Law would be significant for true marriage equality. (file photo)
Anjana Suvarnananda, head of Anjaree and a renowned LGBT rights campaigner in Thailand, considers this bill as yet another form of discrimination, which puts homosexual couples into a different category and as a result, they enjoy different rights from opposite-sex couples.
According to Somchai Preechasilpakul, Associate Professor at Chiang Mai University’s Faculty of Law, same-sex couples registered under the Civil Partnership Bill will not be able to enjoy the rights under the Civil and Commercial Code enjoyed by opposite-sex couples, whose marriages are registered under the Family Law, which is a part of the Code. In short, there is a need to amend the Civil and Commercial Code if the gay couples want to enjoy the same rights.
Anjana thinks that the true equality in marriage and family life will be achieved by revising the Civil Code, so that it recognizes all kinds of families and forms of relationships.
“If civil partnership registration has never existed in the Civil Code before, how are they going to figure out actual practice?” she asked, admitting that changing the Civil and Commercial Code will not be easy.
However, Kertchoke Kasamwongjit, Specialist in Conflict Management for the Rights and Liberties Protection Department of the Ministry of Justice and the head of the law drafting team, dismissed these concerns, saying that the Civil Partnership Bill could lead to a revision of the Code.
"We wanted a bill that would be passed very easily. We’ve never had even one word mentioning LGBT people in laws before,” said the Justice Ministry specialist. “So if I could put this first "one word" into any kind of law, revision of the Civil and Commercial Code won't be impossible.”
However, Anjana says: “You know, we sometimes say ‘better than nothing’, but it’s our own society. Changes take time, therefore discussions are very important as a first step.”
Despite the controversial details, the Justice Ministry plans to submit the draft bill soon, according to Kertchoke. This is a result of the military government’s order last week to have more draft bills from ministries submitted to the NLA for deliberation.
Moreover, the Justice Ministry plans to finish drafting ministerial regulations for the Ministry of Interior on registering civil partnerships by Friday to be submitted together with the draft bill, the official said. (The Interior Ministry is responsible for marriage registration.)
In the normal legislative process in Thailand, ministerial regulations related to an Act are drafted after the bill is passed. However this time, Kertchoke said the ministerial regulations must come together with the bill in order “not to waste time”.
The panel discussion on "Could Thailand become the first Asian country to legalize same-sex civil unions?" was held at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand (FCCT) on July 17, 2013. Panelists from several LGBT organizations—such as Anjaree and Thai Rainbow Association Thailand (RSAT)—and Wiratana Kalayasiri, former Democrat MP, talked about how the civil partnerships should be registered in the kingdom. (file photo)
“This is the second time I have tried to propose a registration bill,” said Kertchoke who has been working for marriage equality in Thailand for several years. “I’m still not sure what the result is going to be, but let’s give it a try.”
During the previous civilian government, after the Justice Ministry held five public hearings across the country, this bill was put before the Lower House in October 2013, with the support of opposition Democrat MP Wiratana Kalayasiri.
However, because of opposition from LGBT activists who criticized the bill for not reflecting the views and demands of LGBT communities, the process was halted until there was a coup d’état on May 22.
Because of discontent with the bill, the leading LGBT organizations in Thailand, such as the Foundation for SOGI Rights and Justice (FOR SOGI), started drafting their own bill last year and planned to submit it by the means allowed by the 2007 Constitution. The biggest difference in FOR SOGI’s bill is that all the couples are eligible, regardless of gender, while Kertchoke’s bill is for same-sex couples only.
Chantalak Raksayu from FOR SOGI said the organization opposed Kertchoke’s bill before the coup and will continue doing so.
The 2014 Interim Constitution makes it even harder for the group to work on a parallel draft bill since the charter does not allow citizens to submit draft laws. But FOR SOGI said they do not care much.
“I don’t think we will propose it (the bill) now,” Chantalak said. “They (junta) violate human rights, but what we are doing is exactly about human rights. Instead, we are going to make people aware of the importance of this law.”
The head of Anjaree is also concerned with the current political situation, especially the legislative process.
“Whether the bill goes to the assembly (NLA) or not is not an issue for me. I don’t know who the people in the assembly are,” said Anjana “They are not my representatives. It is sad to see such an important bill being processed and passed without adequate people's participation.”
“So if the bill is passed, I don't feel it is my law.”
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